[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
The US-DPRK Relations at the Close of the 20th Century
The US-DPRK Relations at the Close of the 20th Century
and the Prospect for United Korea at the Dawn of the 21st Century
Part I: American Nuclear Threats and North Korea's Counter Strategy
Han Hosuk, Director. Center for Korean Studies
An English abstract of the original paper in Korean
<http://www.kimsoft.com/>
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
----
(1) Preface:
Virtually all press organs and 'experts', both Korean and foreign, suffer
from two basic errors in assessing the North Korean nuclear issue.
The first error is that they do not accept the fact that North Korea does
possess nuclear weapons. Although some people suspect that North Korea may
have nuclear devices, most tend to believe that it does not.
Some people claim that North Korea was about to manufacture nuclear devices
in 1994, but it was forced to abandon its nuclear program in the face of
fierce opposition by the United States. Others claim that North Korea has
never had the technical ability to build nuclear devices, but the United
States intentionally exaggerated North Korea's nuclear capability for its
own strategic reasons - i.e., the US used the nuclear issue in order to
bring North Korean down.
The second error is that they believe that North Korea pushed its nuclear
program as a means of surviving its severe economic crisis in the 1990's.
The main reason for the failure to see the truth about North Korean nukes is
the false rumors of North Korea's impending collapse and its imminent
absorption by South Korea masked the gravity of the nuclear issue confronted
by the United States. Today, these rumors have proven to be groundless but
they have muddied the issues of North Korean nukes.
The press orgs and the experts were fed false intelligence on North Korea's
nukes by the US intelligence services, which have not doubt obtained
accurate information on North Korean nukes. I myself was mislead by the
misinformation spread by the 'experts'. Thus in my March 1998 article
(Nuclear Crisis and Financial Crisis: Two Major Issues Facing Korea), I
wrote that North Korea was only in the Plutonium extraction stage and lacked
technical expertise to build nuclear explosives. However, after researching
the issue for a year, I realized that I was wrong.
North Korea's nuclear program affects the strategic landscape of the
Northeast Asia in the 21st Century and it is the most important matter for
the future of Korea. One should study this issue with all seriousness and
diligence. One cannot afford to misjudge this problem.
In this article, I intend to prove that the US intelligence orgs have
mislead the public about North Korea's nuclear capability.
(2) Korea's Dangerous Strategic Balance and The US Hostility toward North
Korea
The most striking aspect of the post-armistice US-DPRK confrontation is that
America's overwhelmingly superior nuclear retaliatory power was check-mated
by North Korea's conventional forces in an atmosphere of quasi-war. For over
30 years after the armistice, the Korean peninsula was under relentless
threats of nuclear strikes by the United States and of massive conventional
strikes byNorth Korea. For over 40 years, the Korean people had to endure
the nightmare of nuclear war in Korea.
The United States had fingered its nuclear trigger countless times in Korea
and the Korean people were spared of nuclear holocaust only by chance. The
world's only super power going after a weak non-nuclear state for over 25
years non-stop is unprecedented and it cannot be justified by any norm. It
is a naked aggression.
It should be noted that during the Cold War era, US-DPRK nuclear war was
more likely than US-USSR or US-China nuclear war. US-USSR and US-China
conflicts were nuclear-nuclear, whereas US-DPRK conflicts were nuclear vs.
conventional weapons.
The United States wanted to keep up its pressure on North Korea and refused
to defuse the powder-keg in Korea. There are three reasons for this:
Defusing the crisis in Korea counters the US military domination of Korea,
which will lead to South Korean nuclear armament. This will unhinge the
American policy of nuclear monopoly in the region.
Defusing the crisis in Korea will lead to diminished demands for American
arms in the region.
The United States' hatred of North Korea goes deep. Gregory Henderson stated
that the American hatred is more intense that its hatred of King George III
of England, Nazi Germany, China and Cuba. The US nuclear strategy against
North Korea during the past half a century comes from such a deep-rooted
animosity. It goes without saying that this animosity is equally
reciprocated by North Korea.
Why does America hate North Korea so much?
The hatred is rooted in the Korean War. This 3-year long war was the first
total war waged by America on an Asian Communist nation. The outcome of this
war is likely to determine the future of America. When the war broke out,
America was confident of an easy victory, but the mighty victor over Germany
and Japan ran into great difficulties in fighting a backward agrarian nation
formed only two years ago.
After suffering grievously, the United States was forced to sue for
armistice. Adam Winnington, a special reporter for the London Daily Worker,
reported that "For the first time in history, the East Asian Communists sat
down at a negotiating table as equals of the Americans" - a far-reaching
political signal for the world to see.
Kim Jong Il said: "The Fatherland Liberation War was the first revolutionary
war in which the Korean people fought off heroically the main imperialist
nation of the world and protected our homeland." The United States suffered
the first defeat in its history. Its ego as the world super power was dealt
a humiliating blow. The US nuclear strategy against North Korea is driven
more by revenge for its humiliation than anything else.
Peter Hayes wrote: "After the Korean War, the United States planned nuclear
war in Korea under the guise of preemption. But its real intention was to
the closure of the war against North Korea and China with nuclear weapons."
It is important to note that the US nuclear intentions manifest in various
forms. South Korea mistakenly views the US nuclear threats as a "nuclear
umbrella" against North Korean threats and turns a blind eye to the nuclear
wasteland that South Korea will become. On the other hand, North Korea lives
in constant fears of imminent nuclear war.
The public opinion in the United States is on the side of nuclear war on a
tiny distant peninsula to restore America's honor as the Super Power. The
only concern the Americans have is how to protect its troops and civilians
in Korea in case of nuclear war in Korea. The Korean people - North and
South - are of little concern for the Americans.
(3) Half Century of War Crisis: American Nuclear Threats and North Korea's
Responses
(a)The US Nuclear War Plan
The US plan for nuclear retaliation was formulated during the Korean War.
The US shipped about 40 nuclear warhead to an air base near Seoul during the
war and planned to drop them on North Korean targets. Two of the top
commanders, Douglas MacArthur and Matthew B. Ridgway had asked for
Washington's approval to use the bombs. In 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower
formulated "New Look Strategy" that would use strategic bombers to drop
nuclear bombs on invading forces
.
(b) War Crisis in the 1960s
On December 2, 1967, USS Pueblo manned by Capt. Lloyd M. Bucher, six
officers and 75 enlisted men of the US Navy and two civilians left the US
naval base at Sasebo (Japan) on a spy mission. 50 days later at 13:45 hours,
North Korea dispatched 4 P4 patrol boats and 2 MiG fighters to capture the
American spy ship. One American sailor was killed during the capture.
Kim Jong Il personally directed this operation. Park In Ho, a People's Hero,
participated in the operation as a marine and recalls: "We asked them for
their nationality but they turned a search light on us and came toward us.
They probably thought that no one would dare to mess with the Americans.
They were mistaken. Our 7-men marine unit boarded the ship and captured all
80 of them in no time at all".
This was the first time an American warship was captured intact by the enemy
in its 106-year history. The national security advisers met at the White
House in rage. They considered the Pueblo capture a war provocation and
wanted nuclear retaliation. According to then Secretary of Defense Clark
Clifford, some hot heads wanted to drop nuclear bombs on Pyongyang. However,
the cool heads prevailed. President Lyndon B. Johnson determined that
America was in no position to engage in two wars - one in Vietnam and
another in Korea.
Johnson's first move was to ask the Soviet Union to press North Korea to
release Pueblo and her crew. Accordingly, the Soviets asked North Korea to
comply with the US demand. But Kim Jong Il rebuffed the Soviet pressure and
retorted that: "We will punish anyone who violates our territory in
accordance with our law. They came on their own will but they will not be
allowed to leave at will."
Kim Il Sung recalled: "Comrade Kim Jong Il told me that he will not release
the captured Americans unless they signed a surrender document. We will keep
Pueblo as a war trophy even after they sign the document. Pueblo will some
day be made into a museum so that our future generations will remember our
deeds."
The Americans were enraged and debated the following plans of action:
We will let North Korea know that we have mean ways to retaliate.
We will impose air surveilance up to 80 km north of the DMZ.
We will continue naval intelligence using the spy ship Banner.
We will salvage the secret assets dumped into the sea by the Pueblo crew.
We will close off Wonsan by seeding 83 mines.
We will capture North Korean warships.
We will bomb the North Korean naval base at Mun-pyong-ri.
We will attack the KPA 6th Division HQ located 10 km north of the DMZ.
We will blockade North Korea.
The United States dispatched three carrier battle groups to Korea and
deployed strategic bombers for nuclear attacks on North Korea. USS
Enterprise accompanied by 16 destroyers and battleships operated in waters
50 miles south of Ullung-do. In addition, the United States had 372 war
planes ready to attack North Korea. For the first time since the Cuban
crisis, a Presidential executive order was issued to mobilize 15,000 air
reservists.
North Korea at the time was armed with conventional weapons only, but it
refused to back down. On the contrary, it went on the offensive. At 21:00
hours of April 14th, 1968, North Korean troops attacked American and South
Korean troops at Dae Sung-dong south of Panmun-jom. They killed two
Americans, two South Koreans and wounded several. From 1967 to 1969, four
such attacks occurred killing 11 Americans.
It was the United States that blinked first. US Army Gen. Gilbert H.
Woodward was forced to sign a surrender document on behalf of the United
States Government and accepted 82 POWs and one corpse at a Panmumjom
ceremony. This was December 23, 1968. Some 30 years from this day, the USS
Pueblo is still in North Korea.¦
In December 1998, Kim Jong Il had Pueblo moved from Wonsan to Dae-dong-gang,
where another American warship Gen. Sherman was sunk in September 1866.
Pueblo is moored at the site of the sinking as a witness to the continued
aggression of the United States.
On April 15, 1969, an American EC-121 spy plane took off from an air base at
Azuki (Japan). The plane carried 30 US Navy officers and enlisted men and
one US marine. It flew along the east coast of North Korea on a spy mission.
The plane lost radar contacts near Chung-jin at about 14:00 hours. About one
hour and 55 min later, Radio Pyongyang announced that the Korean People's
Army shot down the spy plane with a ground-to-air missile. The plane went
down with its crew into the depth of the East Sea. Kim Jong Il commanded
this operation.
Richard Nixon accused Lyndon Johnson of mishandling the Pueblo affair, but
soon after his inauguration, Nixon was unexpectedly handed the EC-121
incident. Nixon dispatched two carrier battle groups to Korea and stationed
F-4 fighter-bombers on South Korean bases.
As in the case of Pueblo, North Korea refused to be intimated by the
American show of force and went on its own show of force. On August 17,
barely 4 months after the spy plane incident, the North Korean Army shot
down an American helicopter (OH-23) near Hanggang. Three of the crewmen were
wounded and captured alive. On December 3, 1969, the United States signed a
letter of apology for the release of the crew.
(c) War Crisis of the 1970's
In June 1976, the United Stated began Team Spirit military exercises aimed
at waging nuclear war on North Korea. On August 18th, less than two months
after the exercise began, three American officers, 7 enlisted men and 5
Korean workers appeared at the Bridge of No Return. They claimed that a
large poplar tree near the bridge got in the way of an American observation
post and proceeded to chop down the tree. Earlier on August 6th, they tried
to cut down the tree but North Korean soldiers chased them away. A North
Korean officer told the group to stop cutting the tree, but the American
officers refused to obey and started a quarrel.
Kim Jong Il ordered that the Americans should be taught a lesson. He also
told the troops not to harm the South Korean workers. The North Korean
officer took off his wrist watch and knocked down an American officer in
charge with one blow, whereupon, another American officer grabbed an axe
from a Korean worker and threw it at the North Korean officer. The North
Korean caught the axe in the air and axed the American to death. An American
captain and a lieutenant were killed and eight Americans were injured.
It is interesting to note that the whole event was video-taped by the
Americans from an observation post. Another point to note is that even
though an American quick reaction force unit stood nearly, the order to
counter-attack never came. The US released only the part of the video that
showed the North Korean officer axing the Americans and hid the scenes
leading to it from the public. The world opinion sympathized with the
Americans and the North Koreans were shown to be barbaric savages. The
Non-Aligned Nations Conference at Colombo voted down North Korea's demand
for US troop withdrawal and confederal union of Korea on the same day.
The US Commander in Korea, Gen. Richard Stilwell, was vacationing in Japan
at the time and upon hearing the news of the axe killings, he rushed back to
Korea in the back seat of a fighter plane. The United States again
dispatched a carrier battle group and strategic bombers to Korea on account
of a poplar tree under the code name Operation Paul Bunyan. The Americans
moved tactical nukes to the DMZ area in plain view of the North Koreans. B52
bombers loaded with nuclear bombs left Okinawa and flew toward Pyongyang.
They would make sharp u-turns upon reaching the skies over the DMZ. Kim Jong
Il was not impressed and laughed at the American moves.
On August 21, about 7 O'clock in the morning, a company of US army engineers
escorted by US and South Korean special forces units arrived at the poplar
tree. 20 troop carrying helicopters protected by 7 armed helicopters hovered
above. The North Koreans fired at the command helicopter carrying the
American commander (Gen. Brady), which crash-landed. Later that day, an
emergency meeting was held at Panmunjum and North Korea handed a memo from
the North Korean Supreme Commander to the UN Commander.
The United States contracted the Science Applications, Inc. (SAI) to
research nuclear war on North Korea. According to the SAI report, the United
States must destroy with nuclear weapons at least 30% of North Korea's
tanks, artillery and other equipment, 40% of the troops and 50% of its
communication systems. The report went on to say that at least 30 nuclear
bombs must be fired from 15 km from Seoul.
>From 1960 to 1970, the United States was engaged in Vietnam and had no
resources to fight another war in Korea. But 1970 heralded the end of the
Vietnam War and the United States wratched up its nuclear threats on North
Korea. US helicopters ferried nuclear weapons from storage locations some 35
to 50 miles south of the DMZ. In 1975, the United States, fearing North
Korean attacks on its nukes at the DMZ, relocated them to rear areas.
In June 1975, US Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger said that in case of
a North Korean attack, the United States would mount nuclear attacks or
drastically increase its ground troops. Gen. James Hollingsworth stated that
the US had a '9-day war plan', according to which North Korea would be
defeated in a few days in a violent clash with 700-800 air sorties.
On the occasion of Park Jung Hee's assassination on October 26, 1979, the
United States dispatched a carrier battle group to the waters of Chejudo and
on November 14th, it dropped 11 life-size dummy nuclear bombs in a practice
run.
(d) War Crisis of the 1980s
The Reagan's hard line administration made the Korean situation worse. The
United States practiced its deep strike and air-land battle doctrine in
Korea. The United States expanded combat troops to 191,700, of which 118,000
were Koreans and 73,700 were Americans.
What did North Korea do to counter the US threats?
First, in 1983, North Korea moved its strike forces stationed at north of
Pyongyang and Wonsan to the front areas.
Second, North Korea conducted three joint naval exercises with the Soviet
navy from 1986 to 1989. The Soviet Union was leaning toward detente with
America at the time and these joint exercises were ineffectual.
Third, North Korea proposed a 3-party peace conference of North, South and
the United States. North Korea for the first time was willing to negotiate
with South Korea, but the United States turned down this proposal.
(e) The War Crisis of the 1990s
The nuclear threats intensified as George Bush left the White House and
Clinton took over. Clinton's 'Presidential Review Document #13' states that
the United States will mount preemptive strikes on North Korea if it
developed nuclear weapons or long-range missiles.
North Korea's decision to withdraw from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty
took the United States by surprise. It shook the nuclear foundation of the
American hegemony. As Pat Buchanan said, it was "indeed a wakeup call to the
us. It was the end of the post-Cold War euphoria". The United States was at
a loss on how to respond to North Korea's nuclear program.
One March 16, 1994, the International Atomic Energy Agency reported that
North Korea prevented its inspection team from examining the radiochemical
laboratory at Yongbyon. The United States used this as an excuse to break
the DPRK-US terms of agreement and revived it Team Spirit military
exercises.
On April 28, 1994, Robert Gallucci proposed at a DPRK-US meeting that the
United States will scrap Team Spirit exercises if North Korea abided by
nuclear safeguards agreement and participated in north-south dialogs. But
Gen. Gary Luck opposed the Gallucci proposal on the ground that the
exercises were needed to safeguard the US troops in Korea.
On May 13, 1994, North Korea removed spent fuel rods from a 5-MW reactor
before the arrival of an inspection team, thus unabling outside agencies to
estimate the plutonium stock of North Korea. The United States threatened to
bring in the UN Security Council for a hostile resolution.
(4) North Korea's War Plan
North Korea has been at the receiving end of America's nuclear threats for
half a century and had to maintain military counter measures. The post-war
strategy is as follows:
First, it had to develop tactics unique to the Korean situation. Kim Il Sung
said: "We must develop tactics suitable for our geography and physical
characteristics." North Korean tactics include blitz-krieg, ambush,
encirclement, mountain fighting, night fighting, large-scale maneuvers,
regular army and special forces, and so on.
North Korean strategy is to destroy war machines all across South Korea at
the same time and occupy key positions. Instead of pushing back enemy lines,
North Korean plan is to attack the enemy from all angles inside and out. It
plans to attack rear area military assets and the enemy troops in three days
or less before the main reinforcements arrive.
Second, development of a strong army based on organization and mental
discipline. Modernization and universal military training are the foundation
of North Korean military. Kim Il Sung said: "We must possess the
revolutionary belief that we can defeat the enemy with our inferior weapons.
We must rely not on nuclear weapons but on our people united against the
enemy.".
Third, war supplies must be stocked for long struggles. Kim Il Sung said:
"We must turn our plants and factories for war material production when war
breaks out. We must ensure that every factory will produce war material. Our
war reserves must be for several years".
Fourth, underground fortress. The most effective defense against the
American nuclear attacks is underground bunkers. Underground facilities are
needed to mount counter offensive, for producing war supplies and for
sheltering the people.
(5) North Korea's Nuclear Objectives
US intelligence reports indicate that North Korea can occupy Seoul in 2-4
days using conventional weapons alone. South Korean strategy is to defend
Seoul first and then go on the offensive. It has three lines of defense
against North Korean invasion. The first line has 30,000 troops which are
within range of North Korean artillery and North Korea can easily break this
line with its heavy guns.
There are two major reasons why one would consider North Korean forces
superior to South Korean forces even in terms of conventional weapons:
First, the South Korean army was created by the United States and it has
been under the US tutelage and control ever since. It has significant combat
capacity but it is short on operational command and wartime operational
control. South Korea has peacetime operational control of its army which may
be taken away by the United States. It is essentially a servant army and has
no tactical intelligence capability of its own, being dependent on the US.
Second, North Korea's guns can strike South Korea's capital city - the heart
and head of South Korea. Seoul is a hostage to North Korea's guns and a
deterrent to US attacks on North Korea. North Korea has several thousands
heavy guns hidden in 1,800 underground bunkers. These guns can hit Seoul and
Inchon with 10,000 shells per minute and turn the heartland of South Korea
into a sea of fire. Natural gas pipelines criss-crossing the under belly of
these cities will explode and the resulting death tolls will be
astronomical. Civilian refugees and automobiles will clog the roads and
hamper military transports.
Some scholars assert that North Korean forces are inferior to South Korean
forces and hence North Korea needs nuclear weapons to even the balance. They
are wrong in their assertion. North Korea holds more trump cards than South
Korea. There is no reason why North Korea should invest huge sums of money
and political risks for nuclear development.
North Korea's nuclear program is not intended to counter South Korea's
military but it is solely to counter the American nuclear threats. North
Korea knows that the only deterrent to the American nuclear strikes is its
own nuclear capability.
(6) Offensive Strategy and Political Liability of Nuclear Bombs
It has been said the North Korea was forced to develop nuclear weapons to
defend itself from US nuclear attacks. However, it is wrong to assume that
North Korean nukes are purely for defensive usage. It should be noted that
North Korea's military doctrine is based on strategic offensives.
Kim Jong Il said: "If the enemy sharpens black sabers, then we will sharpen
red swords. If the enemy invades us, we will gladly respond with
revolutionary warfare."
What is meant by "revolutionary" war offensive strategy? It means North
Korea will strike America's heartland and unite Korea in case of US
aggression. Kim Il Sung said: "If the United States bombs our country, we
will promptly retaliate. If the enemy strikes us, we will strike back."
Kim's statement implies that North Korea has retaliation capability, some
means of striking the continental USA.
Kim Il Sung said: "We must continue to strengthen our military capabilities.
Our Party intends to unite the country peacefully. But if the enemy gets in
our way militarily, we will use force to unite the country."
The problem is that North Korea cannot defeat the United States that has a
vast stock of weapons of mass destruction. North Korea knows that the only
effective offensive weapons against US aggression is nuclear. North Korea's
conventional forces have little effect on the US military. For this reason,
North Korea embarked on the road to nuclear armament.
North Korea faced a serious political dilemma. If it became known that North
Korea has nuclear weapons, South Korea and Japan would develop their own
nukes. Nuclear-armed Japan and South Korea are not in North Korea's best
interest. North Korea had to find a solution to this dilemma and nuke-free
Korea was the answer.
North Korea proposed nuke-free Korea in 1986. From 1989 on, North Korea has
repeatedly claimed that it had no nuclear program and pushed nuke-free
Korea. North Korea's primary objective was to freeze South Korea's nuclear
program without freezing its own.
It is interesting to note that the United States has been pushing for
nuke-free Korea as well. The US wanted both North and South to abandon
nuclear ambitions and planned to remove its tactical nukes from Korea. In
fact, it is believed that all US nuclear weapons had been taken out of Korea
by the end of 1991.
North Korea completed a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant at Yongbyon in June
1992. The United States believed that North Korea could achieve nuclear
capability soon after and frantically searched for means of ascertaining
North Korea's nuclear intentions. The United States forced South Korea to
accept North Korea's nuke-free Korea proposal. North-South joint declaration
of nuke-free Korea was announced on January 20, 1992 and became effective
February 19th. This effectively shut down South Korea's nuclear program.
Kim Il Sung said: "We do not have the desire or the means to build nuclear
weapons. We have stated this several times already. We have no use for
nuclear weapons - even if we had them. It is unthinkable for us to use
nuclear weapons on our fellow countrymen in South Korea."
It is easy to misread Kim's statement. Kim asserts that he will not use
nukes on South Korea and that he will not build nukes to strike South Korea.
But he does mention that his offensive strategy against the United States is
based on nuclear weapons. Kim's intention is to use his nukes on US targets
in America and use his conventional forces to occupy South Korea.
(7) Military Nuclear Program and Civilian Nuclear Program
North Korea's armament factories and key military facilities are hidden
underground. The main reason for going sub terrain is to survive US air
attacks and go on the offensive. It is also to foil the US spy satellites.
In view of this fact, it is strange that North Korea has allowed US
intelligence to discover and monitor its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon.
The first detection of North Korea's nuclear program at Yongbyon was made in
April 1982. The US intelligence experts determined that North Korean nuclear
program began in 1979. Since then US spy cameras hovered over Yongbyon
continuously. In March 1986, US intelligence analysts discovered cylindric
craters on the banks of Ku-ryong-gang and a rectangular building the size of
two football fields.
American nuke experts surmised that the craters indicate that North Korea
was in the second stage of nuclear program - i.e., experimental
high-explosive denotations for nuke triggers. Indeed, North Korea conducted
about 70 tests of high-explosives from 1980 to 1991.
In February 1987, the US detected cells inside the rectangular building and
the experts determined that the cells were for plutonium separation. Soon
after, North Korea covered up the building so that the US spy cameras could
no longer see its insides. This intensified the American anxiety.
There are several puzzles here. Why did North Korea conduct as many as 70
high-explosive tests so close to the suspected nuclear facility? Why did
North Korea leave traces of its tests being fully aware of the US spy
cameras hover above? Conventional wisdom would put a roof over any building
that has sensitive innards. But why the roof-less building?
North Korea has numerous underground facilities, but it chose to build a
nuclear facility above ground. The only plausible explanation is that North
Korea was out to deceive the US. The world's experts debated if the Yongbyon
facility had progressed far enough for nuclear bombs or not and they were
oblivious to North Korea's other nuclear facilities.
Why did North Korea make its Yongbyon facility so visible?
North Korea used the facility to force the United States to a bargaining
table. American suspicion that the facility was for nuclear bombs played
into the hands of North Korea. In February 1990, North Korea's delegates to
the International Atomic Energy Control Agency demanded, in return for
allowing inspection of the Yongbyon facility, that the United States must
remove its nukes from South Korea and that it must stop the Team Spirit
military exercises. The United States refused to go along.
On July 21, 1990, North Korea stated that it would open the Yongbyon
facility for inspections, if the United States promised not to mount nuclear
attacks on North Korea and removed all nuclear weapons from South Korea. On
June 11, 1991, the United States finally buckled down to the North Korean
demands.
After forcing the US to forego nuclear attacks on North Korea, it moved onto
the next phase: US-DPRK bilateral negotiations. On April 1, 1994, North
Korea announced that the Yongbon issue was for the US and DPRK to settle.
The United States promised easing of economic sanctions and diplomatic
relations if North Korea allowed inspections of the Yongbyon facility.
If North Korea had no nuclear weapons and the Yongbyon facility were the
only nuclear facility, then the United States could have easily mounted
preemptive strikes on the facility. The fact of the matter is that North
Korea has two parallel tracks of nuclear programs: one for military
applications and one for civilian applications.
The Yongbyon facility is for civilian usage and not for nuclear weapons.
North Korea obtained reactor technology from East Germany, the Soviet Union,
and Czechoslovakia in the 1980s. On December 29, 1986, North Korea
established the Atomic Energy Institute under Prof. Choe Ha Gun, a noted
nuclear physicist.
In 1970, Kim Il Sung ordered the North Korean Academy of Sciences, Military
and Security organs to speed up nuclear weapons development. The
International Atomic Energy inspectors found that the Yongbyon facility was
some 30 years old and quite dated, and that it would be difficult to produce
any nuclear weapons at the facility.
One must be aware that the Yongbyon facility is not intended for weapons
production and that North Korea has other nuclear facilities for military
applications. In 1998, the US intelligence detected evidence of
high-explosive tests at a site 30 km from the Yongbyon facility. In February
1993, Western intelligence agencies found evidence of military nuclear
facilities built in the 1960's with Soviet technology. The facilities began
plutonium production early on. The US intelligence suspects that there is a
secret military facility in Yanggang-do. In September 1991, France's
Aeronautical Research Center found evidence of another nuclear facility in
Pyongang Buk-do. It was built inside a mountain. It is believed that North
Korea has four nuclear facilities for weapons production.
It is clear that North Korea intended to use the Yongbyon facility for
political gains after having stock-piled nuclear weapons built at secrete
nuclear facilities elsewhere. It was North Korea's nuclear weapons that
forced the United States to the negotiation tables and the Yongbyon facility
was a face-saving fig leaf for the United States for its sudden reversal of
anti-DPRK policies.
(8) North Korea's Nuclear Program and the US Acceptance
North Korea's nuclear program is shrouded in secrecy. There is no external
source that can break the secrecy. There are three reasons for this:
First, North Korea developed nuclear weapons on its own and no outside
agents were involved. North Korea was forced to go alone because no other
nations would help it. So-called alliances or pacts counted precious little.
North Korea refused to be subservient to China or the USSR and hence these
nations refused to provide any assistance to North Korea's nuclear program.
In September 1980, North Korea started construction of a 5-MW reactor at
Yongbyon with its own money and technology. This reactor was completed in
October 1987. This reactor used natural uranium and graphite moderators. The
US intelligence examined air samples from this reactor and determined that
it was based on a British design - the 50-MW Calder Hall magnox.
North Korea's self-reliance on nuclear development made it possible to
continue its program even after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990.
Had North Korea relied on external sources for its nuclear program, it would
have been fatal.
Second, even if the US intelligence had the complete story on North Korea's
nuclear program, it would have to hide it from the public. It would neither
deny nor confirm it. This is common practice not limited to North Korean
issues. For example, both Israel and South Africa possess nuclear weapons,
but the US intelligence is silent on the subject.
It is noteworthy that the United States has decided to live with North
Korea's nukes. This came about in March 1994. The United States was more
keen on preventing North Korea from making more bombs than on the bombs
North Korea already had.
Third, North Korea has informed the United States that it has nuclear
weapons. No other nations were informed. It was to North Korea's advantage
to let the US know that it has nukes, because without this knowledge, the US
would have continued its belligerence against North Korea. The US might have
mounted preemptive strikes on North Korea.
When did North Korea convince the US that it did indeed have nuclear
weapons?
On June 15, 1994, former President Jimmy Carter passed through Panmumjon to
meet Kim Il Sung. Carter was shown convincing evidence of North Korea's
nuclear bombs. Kim also told Carter in no uncertain terms that North Korea
will attack if President Clinton continued his anti-DPRK policies. Carter
was so concerned about the war potential that he woke up at 3 O'Clock in the
morning and sent his aid Marion Creekmore to Panmumjom to relay an urgent
message to Clinton via a secure line to the White House.
Kim Il Sung told Carter that North Korea is ready and willing to exchange
nuclear strikes with the United States. Carter was supposed to deliver
Clinton's ultimatum to Kim Il Sung, but instead he was given Kim's nuclear
ultimatum, which was totally unexpected. Soon after Carter's return home,
Clinton dropped his bellicose stance and proposed a peaceful resolution.
(9) When did North Korea build its first nuke?
Even though North Korea's nuclear secret is known to only two parties - the
US and DPRK - there exist enough evidence to draw some conclusions. We can
look at North Korea's nuclear scientists, engineering and various
time-lines.
(a) North Korea's Nuclear Scientists
Chen Soe Sun was primarily responsible for China's first nuclear bomb and
Abdul Kaidr Khan was the Pakistan bomb-maker. Who was North Korea's
bomb-maker?
North Korea's bomb was made possible by three noted scientists:
Dr. Lee Sung Ki, a world-class chemist. Dr. Lee Sung Ki (1905 - 1996) was
noted for his invention of vi nylon and his devotion to make man-made
textiles for the poor of Korea. He invented high-explosives for North
Korea's artillery - called "Lee Sung Ki canons" in his honor. Dr. Lee was
the first director of North Korea's Atomic Energy Agency and directed its
nuclear weapons program.
Dr. Do Sang Rok (1903 - 1990) was a quantum field theorist. He published
research papers on quantum mechanics in Japan and the US as early as 1930.
He was an expert on nuclear matters and nuclear energy. He built his own
particle accelerator and conducted North Korea's first experiment on nuclear
reactions.
Dr. Han In Suk was born in South Korea and studied physics in Japan and
Germany before Liberation. He taught physics at the Seoul National
University after Liberation but fled to North Korea soon after. After the
Korean War, he studied physics at Moscow University. He returned to
Pyongyang in 1960 and published numerous research papers on nuclear physics.
In addition to these three renowned scientists, there were many other
outstanding scientists: Dr. Kim Gyng Wan, a chemist and president of Kim
Chaik University; Dr. Yuk Gyng Ku, son of Yuh Woon Yong, who studied nuclear
physics in the USSR; Dr. Jung Gun, Dr. Choe Hak Soon, Dr. Keh Yong Soon and
Dr. Park Kwan Oh. Several hundred of North Korea's top scientists studied at
the Dubna Nuclear Research Institute in the USSR.
Thus North Korea had ample manpower for nuclear weapon development. Dr. Do
Sang Rok was awarded the 'Kim Il Sung' award in 1973 and Dr. Lee Sung Ki was
similarly honored in 1980. These two scientists were honored again in 1986,
most likely for North Korea's first nuclear bomb.
(b) North Korea's Engineering Technology
North Korea started to promote engineering technology early on. Even though
North Korea had never built even a single steam locomotive, it managed to
design and build electric trains that required no less than 14,000 different
parts by 1961. Construction of Pyongyang subways began in that year. Since
1980, North Korea has been making 300-HP dozers, 10-cubic meter drills,
3,000-HP high speed engines, 10-KVA generators and 4,200-HP electric
locomotives. In the 1990's, North Korea was able to build 10,000-ton press,
18m tunneling and 20-m large sea-going vessels.
Kim Jong Il said: "Science and technology form the foundation of our
revolution and to ignore science and technology is to ignore our
revolution." Kim Jong Il pushed hard for advances in science and technology.
Military science and engineering were high on the priority in North Korea.
Kim Jong Il understood that modern warfare required advanced technology.
North Korea built its first submarine in 1975. Building submarines requires
advanced engineering. Five subs were built in 1976 alone. In 1970, North
Korea began to produce T-59 battle tanks, RPG-7 anti-tank rockets, 130-mm
and 180-mm self-propelled guns, 152-mm howitzers, M-1973 armored cars,
missile speed boats, 1,500-ton frigates and 1,400-ton R-class large
submarines.
In late 1970, North Korea began to produce K-61 land-sea dual armored
vehicles, T-62 tanks, high-speed landing ships and Frog 5/7 missiles. As
early as 1960, North Korea began to manufacture virtually all parts of its
MiG-15 fighters. Starting in 1970, it began to build MiG planes under a
license agreement with the Soviet Union. By 1980, it could build some 70% of
its MiG parts and in 1990, it began to build MiG-29 fighters.
North Korea has made considerable advances in electronics. Kim Jong Il said:
"We must build the most modern plants for electronics. We must take our
electronics industry to the most advanced level in the world." North Korea's
#69 Electronics Plant is comparable to South Korea's Samsung plant. It makes
50-Meg DRAMs. In 1986, the Mirim College was established for electronic
warfare.
In April 1955, North Korea established an atomic and nuclear research
institute in spite of the devastation of the Korean War. On March 26, 1956,
North Korea and the USSR signed a joint-research agreement and over 200
North Korean scientists went to the Dubna Nuclear Research Institute. North
Korea signed a joint nuclear research pact with the USSR in September 1959,
and by 1960, North Korea had acquired the Soviet Purex reprocessing
technology.
In January 1962, the Soviet Union helped North Korea build a civilian-use
IRT-2000 research reactor at Yongbyon. A nuclear research lab was
established in February 1964. North Korea has invested more than 5 billion
dollars in nuclear research.
In September 1980, North Korea began construction of the #2 reactor at
Youngbyon and tested it in 1986. It went into operation in October 1987.
South Korea's first reactor went into operation in December 1994 with
thermal power output of 30 MW. The South Korean reactor had a core of 0.5
meter in diameter and 0.7 m high. In comparison, the #2 reactor is 6.6
meters in diameter and 6 meters tall. The South Korean reactor fuel capacity
was 50kg and the #2 capacity is 50,000kg.
In 1984, North Korea began construction of the #3 reactor at Yongbyon. This
was to be a gigantic 50-200-MW monster. By the time the US intelligence
discovered it, it was already half completed. It was projected to be
completed by 1995. Nuclear experts estimated that this reactor could produce
7-8 kg of plutonium per year enough for one or two nuclear bombs.
Former CIA director James Woolsey stated that North Korea has most likely
enough plutonium for at least one bomb. The Russian intelligence reported in
1990 that North Korea had bombs. Das Stern magazine of Germany wrote that
North Korea secretly acquired 56 kg of plutonium from Russia in 1992. The
International Peace Research Center in Sweden estimates that North Korea has
4-5 bombs.
It should be noted that Pakistan and North Korea embarked on a nuclear
program at about the same time. Pakistan's military technology is less
advanced than North Korea's, but it managed to build nuclear bombs. It is
unlikely that North Korea with its advanced military technology lagged
behind Pakistan in the nuclear race.
In 1974, South Korea started its nuclear program, but the United States shut
it down. Had it not been for the United States, South Korea would have built
its first bomb by 1980. North Korea's military technology was not behind
South Korea's and it is plausible that North Korea would have built its
first bomb in the 1980's.
(c)North Korea's First Bomb
When did North Korea begin its nuclear program?
The Nuclear Chemical Defense Division of the KPA General Staff was
established in 1961, which had a command and 7 sections, the 55th Research,
the 710th Research and the 398th Research labs. From this fact, one may
assume that North Korea's nuclear program was initiated around 1960 and
nuclear weapons were developed in the 1970's.
According to a Russian intelligence report, in 1970, Kim Il Sung ordered
North Korea's Academy of Sciences, military and security agencies to build
nuclear weapons. In May 1981, North Korean officials told a visiting East
German delegation that "We must have atomic bombs". The critical point here
is whether North Korea's nuclear program began in 1990 or 1970. It was no
doubt 1970 when the program was launched.
What was the political situation in the 1970s?
In those days, North Korea was not behind South Korea economically. The
United States was defeated in Vietnam and North Korea's star was rising high
among the non-aligned countries. President Carter wanted to take out US
troops from South Korea. President Park Jung Hee's nuclear program was under
fire by the United States and the US-ROK relations were at a low point. It
was under these favorable conditions that North Korea inaugurated its
nuclear program.
Prof. Lee Young Hee states that: "In 1991, the Soviet Union informed North
Korea that it would stop providing nuclear umbrella to North Korea, upon
which North Korea launched an all-out program to develop nuclear-missiles.".
Prof. Lee is wrong on two points:
First, unlike the US-ROK treaty, the USSR-DPRK pact never included nuclear
protection. The former USSR nuclear weapons in the Far East were not for
providing protection for North Korea and Lee's claim is groundless.
Second, North Korea's nuclear program began in 1970, not in 1990 as claimed
by Lee. Lee's claim that North Korea was forced to develop nuclear weapons
as a desperate defensive measure against American aggression misses the
point that North Korea's main strategy is offensive, direct nuclear attacks
on America.
The reason why we dwell so much on when North Korea's nuclear program began
is that we can infer from it just when North Korea began to produce nuclear
warhead from the average time it took other nations to develop nukes. It
took the United States four years to build the bomb. It took other nations
6-7 years to fabricate nuclear bombs from the day they acquired fissionable
materials.
It is therefore safe to assume that it took North Korea 6-7 years to build
its first bomb, which puts North Korea's first bomb at 1986 or so. It was
1979 when North Korea acquired plutonium extraction technology and 1983 when
North Korea completed high-explosive tests for nuclear triggers. In 1989,
North Korea became the fourth nation to conduct a high-altitude fusion test.
In spite of these facts, foreign experts claim that North Korea's nuclear
program began in 1990. In February 1989, then Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard
A. Shevardnadze stated that North Korea will have nuclear capability soon,
but a classified Russian intelligence report in the same time period stated
North Korea already had one or two bombs. High-ranking Chinese officials
visiting the US War College in February 1994 told the Americans that North
Korea had one or two bombs.
America's foremost expert on North Korean military, Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr.,
said that North Korea built its first bomb sometime between 1990 and 1991.
The German magazine Das Stern published an article on March 14, 1993, which
states that North Korea built its first nuclear warhead in February 1990.
This article was based on a KGB report, which also said that North Korea had
already deployed 6-7 nuclear weapons.
Even though both China and Russia acknowledged North Korea's nuclear
capability, the United States refused to go along. The 1993 National
Intelligence Estimate showed that the US intelligence community was split in
two camps: the CIA and the DIA believed that North Korea had the bomb,
whereas the State Department and the White House believed otherwise. In
March 1992, the US State Dept stated that it would take North Korea at least
two more years to build the bomb.
On December 12, 1993, then Secretary of State Espens told NBC that North
Korea had enough plutonium for one or two bombs and it might already have
one nuclear device. In 1992, the US State Dept stated that North Korea had
the technical capability to build crude nuclear explosives that can be
mounted on trains or transport planes.
In contrast, the US CIA accepts that North Korea has the bomb but refuses to
divulge any details. DCIA Robert M. Gates told a congressional committee on
February 25, 1992 that North Korea had a plenty of bomb materials and it
could make nuclear bombs in a matter of two-three months. In a closed
session, Gates stated that North Korea already had the bomb.
After the Gulf War, the US intelligence learned that Iraq's nuclear program
was far more advanced that what they had believed. The CIA was taken aback
by this startling fact and formed the Nonproliferation Center of more than
100 nuclear experts to reevaluate its nuclear intelligence on North Korea.
It was concluded that North Korea had a large stockpile of fissionable
materials and that it had one or two bombs.
However, the CIA went on to emphasize that the North Korean bombs were
crude. The reason why the CIA qualifies North Korean bombs as "crude" or
"primitive" is to convey the notion that the North Korean bombs pose no
threat to the United States.
Now we come to the question of North Korea's bomb test. It is known that
North Korea has not test-fired any nuclear weapon. Some people use this fact
to negate North Korea's bombs. On March 14, 1992, the Russian weekly
"Argumenty i Fakty" wrote that North Korea built a bomb test site about a
year ago and that it did not explode any test bomb for fear of revealing its
secret nuclear program. A classified CIA document states that North Korea
already has nuclear bombs and an underground test site ready to go.
There are two points to consider here:
First, test explosion is not required for making the bomb. India conducted a
test explosion in 1974 and became a nuclear power. Israel and South Africa
joined India soon after even though neither had test-fired a bomb. Enriched
uranium bombs are so easy to make and no testing is required. The problem is
acquiring enough enriched uranium for the bomb. This requires enormous
amount of electricity far beyond the capability of North Korea, but it is
likely that North Korea found a chemical way to enrich uranium.
A South Korean military expert said that North Korea's explosives have
extremely high initial velocity of 900 m/sec. Such high explosives are used
in gun type assembly of nuclear bombs. Such a device is basically a heavy
gun with fissionable materials propelled to high speed, temperature and
pressure for chain reactions. Gun type devices are much easier to trigger
than spherical (implosion) devices that require advanced triggers.
The bomb dropped on Hiroshima was a gun barrel assembly and the one dropped
on Nagasaki was an implosion type. The latter was built after a test
explosion whereas the former did not require any test. It is assumed that
North Korean bombs are of gun barrel assembly and did not require test
explosion.
Second, North Korea could rely on the test data gathered by other nations.
Pakistan began its nuclear program in 1970. Its then president Bhutto said:
"Even if we had to live on grass, we must build the bomb." Pakistan acquired
nuclear technology from Germany and England. It obtained bomb design data
from China. Pakistan's first bomb was made in 1980. The Pakistani bomb
test-fired on May 18, 1998 was a gun assembly uranium bomb. Today, Pakistan
is known to have about 20 nuclear warheads.
It is assumed that Pakistan shared its nuclear data with North Korea in
exchange for North Korea's missile technology. In October 1982, Pakistan and
North Korea signed a science, technology and culture agreement. North Korea
dispatched its scientists to Pakistan to observe its nuclear program.
(10) Conclusion
>From the armistice till 1980, the Korean peninsula was subjected to American
nuclear threats and North Korean threats of invasion with conventional
weapons. There were numerous touch-and-go war crisis. In the face of the
incessant nuclear war threat by the United States, North Korea's
revolutionary offensive strategy evolved.
North Korea's military might surpasses that of South Korea. North Korea's
offensive strategy is to mount massive nuclear strikes on the continental
USA in the event of US attacks on North Korea. North Korea has military and
civilian nuclear programs in parallel.
North Korea built its first nuclear bomb in 1986 or so. The main reason why
North Korea keeps its nuclear arsenal secret is that it had developed its
bombs on its own without any help from other nations and that the United
States has decided to accept this fait accompli.
After building its first bomb in 1986, North Korea spent ten years to build
underground nuclear facilities for military applications. By 1996, North
Korea's emphasis turned to long-range missiles to carry the bombs. It is
likely that North Korea has developed more advanced nuclear devices suitable
for missile delivery.
It is well-known that the Big Five - The US, Russia, China, England and
France - have nuclear bombs. These nations sit as the permanent members of
the UN Security Council and control the world's political and military
order. There are other nuclear nations: namely, North Korea, India,
Pakistan, Israel and South Africa. These nations belong to the Little Five
nuclear club.
Canada, Sweden, Switzerland, Italy and Japan can go nuclear but the US
nonproliferation policy prevents them from building their own bombs. Among
the Little Five nations, India was the first to explode a test bomb in 1974
and conducted three tests in 1998. India announced its nuclear status on
August 17, 1999. India was helped by Russia.
India's arch-enemy Pakistan developed its nuclear program with the tacit
approval of the United States. It conducted an underground test in 1980.
Israel and South Africa were covertly aided by the United States. After the
collapse of the Apartheid in South Africa, Nelson Mandela's black government
made public of its nuclear program. Thus, of the Little Five nuclear
nations, only North Korea and Israel remain silent on their nuclear program.
Israel neither confirms nor denies its membership to the nuclear club. The
United States helped Israeli nuclear program and accepts its nuclear
membership. For 30 years, the United States has pretended that it had no
knowledge of the Israeli bomb. Israel is surrounded by hostile Arab nations
and had to fight four wars of survival between 1948 and 1973. It is assumed
that Israel exploded an atomic bomb in 1974. Since then Israeli military
superiority has prevented the Arab nations from mounting another war. The
Israeli bomb forced the Arabs to conference tables.
In the Far East, a similar situation prevailed in the 1980s. North Korea,
South Korea and Taiwan were on the road of nuclear development. Even though
the United States covertly aided its allies Pakistan, Isabel and South
Africa to the nuclear club membership, it refused to allow its client states
Taiwan and South Korea to become nuclear.
The United States was firmly opposed to North Korea's nuclear program and
attempted to scrap North Korea's nuclear program by military means. However,
it was too late for the United States, for North Korea already had nuclear
weapons and the United States was forced to back down from nuclear
confrontation with North Korea.