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Korean People's Army - Guerrilla and UW Units, Part 1
Korean People's Army Guerrilla and Unconventional Warfare Units, June 1950 -
September 1950 [1]
Copyright (C) 2000, by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.
Latest Revision: March 1, 2000
Background
Immediately prior to onset of the Fatherland Liberation War DPRK guerrilla
activity within the Republic of Korea (ROK) declined to almost zero, and
contrary to expectations continued to be infrequent during the first days of
the war. On the other hand, Korean People's Army (KPA) unconventional
warfare operations were intensive from the very first hours of the war and
played a significant role in most operations. These operations initially
displayed a considerable degree of cooperation between various units and
controlling headquarters. This, however, would quickly change as units
sustained casualties and advanced further from their supply centers. By
August, the majority of the highly trained independent army-level and
divisional guerrilla units which enjoyed considerable success during the
early stages of the war were absorbed into regular KPA combat divisions as
individual or unit replacements. Most notable were the operations of the
766th Independent Unit which made a significant contribution to the
successes of KPA operations on the east coast (see below).
Guerrilla Activity June - September 1950
For all the effort expended in training, supporting or infiltrating the
multitude of independent guerrilla units operational in the ROK prior to the
war, they served a relatively minor role during the initial fighting. This
was probably the result of the rapid KPA advance, their inability to sustain
combat operations against regular United Nations Command (UNC) troops, and
their inability to secure sufficient quantities of food, arms and
ammunition. When the war later turned against the DPRK, Kim Il-song would
blame Pak Hon-yong for a lack of guerrilla support, since Pak had stated
that 200,000 Communist would rise up in revolt when the KPA attacked. One
role in which the independent guerrilla units proved to be of considerable
value was that of acting as local guides for advancing regular KPA units.[2]
Interestingly, there was a gradual increase in guerrilla strength during
July and August as a result of both "victory enthusiasm" and pragmatic
survivalism by essentially neutral civilians who joined the Communist cause.
As the KPA advance compressed UNC forces into the Pusan perimeter there was
a noticeable increase in guerrilla activities. These activities were
primarily the work of divisional guerrilla units and the survivors of the
766th Independent Unit, however, independent guerrilla units were also
evident in many operations. Despite a desperate front-line situation, this
increased guerrilla activity forced the UNC Command into action to protect
its rear areas. On 19 July 1950, the office of Coordinator, Protection of
Lines of Communication, Rear Areas, was set up by the Eight United States
Army Korea. Its mission was to coordinate ROK and U.S. efforts to protect
railroads, highways, and bridges. It also protected UNC signal communication
units against sabotage and guerrilla operations. One of the first steps
taken by this office was to form Korean Police Battalions. At first, one
provisional ROK police company was assigned to the 24th and 25th U.S.
Infantry Divisions with the mission of procuring local guides, securing
information on guerrillas, and familiarizing the respective commanding
generals with local terrain conditions and road nets. After approximately
two months, the ROK police companies were returned to the ROK National
Police. [3] Guerrilla activities within the UNC rear areas continued until
the 15 September 1950 Inch'on landing and subsequent breakout from the Pusan
perimeter. At which point the character of guerrilla warfare changed.
Unconventional Warfare Chain-of-Command, 1950
At the beginning of the war guerrilla and unconventional warfare operations
were controlled through five distinct yet inter-related chains of commands.
The Korean Workersą Party (KWP) Central Committee controlled all guerrilla
units and Communist sympathizers through its' Liaison Department. This
department was responsible for all subversion operations against the ROK,
including the collection of political intelligence. The personnel who manned
this department were drawn primarily from former members of the Workersą
Party of South Korea (WPSK). The Liaison Department exercised its control
through two subordinate sections - Guerrilla and Military. The Guerrilla
Section (a.k.a., People's Guerrilla Command) was responsible for all
political aspects of the guerrillas and KWP within the ROK, including:
establishing overall political objectives, indoctrination and propaganda,
training, ensuring the development and expansion of the KWP within the ROK,
etc. The Military Section was operationally subordinate to the KPA's General
Staff Department and was responsible the military and operational aspects of
the guerrillas and KWP within the ROK, including: training and infiltration
of agents, couriers and guerrillas for operations within the ROK,
communications with personnel and units dispatch to the ROK, and
miscellaneous support functions. [4] The KPA's Reconnaissance Bureau
(a.k.a., the 560th Army Unit) was responsible for military reconnaissance
operations and espionage activities concerned with the collection of
military intelligence. It controlled a small number of specially trained
reconnaissance battalions and agent teams. The reconnaissance battalions did
not operate as tactical formations, but rather detached companies to forward
divisions. Next, a majority of the KPA's infantry divisions formed organic
guerrilla units. These units operated primarily as reconnaissance or ranger
units rather than as traditional guerrillas and were seldom divorced from
the parent unit. Finally, there were at least three units which were
specially trained in unconventional warfare operations and directly
subordinate to the General Staff Department - the 766th Independent Unit and
the 945th and 956th Independent Naval Infantry Regiments. [5] These units
and their operational experiences during the Fatherland Liberation War
formed the foundation upon which the KPA's present day Special Purpose
Forces were built.