Korean People's Army - Guerrilla and UW Units, Part 4

["Joseph S. Bermudez Jr." <joseph_bermudez@compuserve.com>]

Korean People's Army Guerrilla and Unconventional Warfare Units, June 1950 -
September 1950, Part 4

Copyright (C) 2000, by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.

Latest Revision: March 1, 2000


945th and 956th Independent Naval Infantry Regiments: [16]

Little is known concerning the 945th and 956th Independent Naval Infantry
Regiments (a.k.a., Marine Regiments). The 945th is believed to have been
established in July 1949 at Wonsan and subordinated to the newly established
Naval Headquarters (a.k.a., 599th Unit) located at Chinnamp'o. It is
probable that the 945th received amphibious training under Soviet
supervision in the Wonsan area prior to the war. Along with the 766th
Independent Unit, the 945th, was responsible for the amphibious landings
along the ROK's east coast at the beginning of the war. Most sources
indicate that the 945th landed in the wrong sector and proved ineffective,
however, they provide little additional information. It is conceivable that
the 945th may, in fact, have been the unit assigned to the Pusan landing and
was sunk en route to its landing site (see above). If this is correct, then
the 945th proved "ineffective" because it was destroyed. Regardless, the
unit was disbanded the following month, August 1950, and its personnel
incorporated into the newly established 24th (a.k.a., 249th) Brigade.

The 956th Independent Naval Infantry Regiment was established in the west
coast port city of Chinnamp'o during July 1949 and subordinated to Naval
Headquarters. Little is known of its activities during the first two months
of the war, however, it appears to have remained in the general area of
Chinnamp'o and did not engaged in offensive amphibious operations as had the
945th. Sometime during August 1950 the 956th was redesignated the 23rd Naval
Infantry Brigade (239th Army Unit). At this time the battalions of the
brigade were deployed from the Chinnamp'o to the Ongjin, Haeju, Kunsan, and
Kwangju areas.

It is interesting to note that Kim Il-song placed significant importance to
naval infantry units. Just one after the war had begun, he sent a letter to
Stalin requesting arms for the "... formation of two divisions, 12
battalions of naval infantry and for the formation of security detachments."
Two days later, Stalin responded that the establishment of new units should
not be the main concern, but rather "...to fill out the existing divisions
and to increase their strength approximately to 12,000." The deteriorating
war situation would, however, settled the question and postpone the
establishment of new naval infantry units. [17]

Airborne Capabilities: [18]

Although virtually nothing substantive is known concerning this subject, the
Korean People's Aviation Association (later to become the Korean People's
Air Force) apparently began very limited parachute training for its pilots
sometime during 1946-1947. By early 1949 this capability was expanded with
the construction of an airborne training center located in P'yongyang, on
the west bank of the Taedong-gang River, opposite the P'yongyang airfield.
Reportedly, it was here that an estimated 500-600 KPA personnel and KPAF
pilots received parachute training. At present there is no evidence to
suggest that an actual KPA paratroop unit was established during this
period. There were no KPA paratroop operations during the Fatherland
Liberation War.


Endnotes

1    U.S. Army. "The Role of Guerrillas in the Korean War," Intelligence
Review, #181, June 1951, pp. 17-26; "North Korean Guerrilla Operations,"
GHQ, FEC, MIS, GS, Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, Research
Supplement, Interrogation Reports, Issue #3, 15 November 1950, pp. 15-22;
U.S. Army, Pacific. North Korean Army Handbook, Special Report Nr. 303,
ACS-G2, 1 July 1957, pp. 26-27; and Schuetta, Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence V.
Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower in Korea, 1950-53, U.S. Air Force, Aerospace
Studies Institute, Concepts Division, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama,
January 1964, pp. 7-60.
2    Pak Hon-yong was a rival of Kim Il-song and previously headed Korean
Workers' Party of South Korea (WPSK), which is commonly known as the
"Domestic" faction.
3    The ROK National Police was organized in 1945, but did not expand until
the outbreak of hostilities. By August 1951 it consisted of 63,000
personnel, as compared to 40,000 in 1945. The National Police, besides
guarding fixed installations and conducting counter-guerrilla activities was
also tasked with railroad security. Several thousand National Police were
attached to U.S. Corps to control civilian population, screen indigenous
personnel, and conduct counter intelligence missions.
4    The Military Section is frequently identified as the Guerrilla Guidance
Bureau in contemporary U.S. intelligence documents. This, however, may be a
mistake since the exact roles of this section and the Guerrilla Department's
Guerrilla Guidance Bureau were often confused. The possibility exists that
both organizations were named the same to create confusion.
5    Several sources also identify a "Zennan Unit" (or Zennam Unit),
however, little is presently known concerning this unit. Given the time and
locations of the Zennan Unit's operations it is probable that it was either
part of the enlarged 766th or another title for elements of it. U.S. Army.
Enemy Tactics, HQ EUSAK, 26 December 1951, p. 120; and North Korean Army
Handbook, pp. 26-27.
6    Ibid.; Suh, Dae-sook. Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader, New York,
Colombia University Press, 1988, pp. 103-104; and "North Korean Guerrilla
Operations," pp. 18-20.
7    Ibid.; U.S. Army. Enemy Tactics, HQ EUSAK, 26 December 1951, p. 120;
and "North Korean Guerrilla Operations," pp. 18-20.
8    "North Korean Guerrilla Operations," pp. 18-20; U.S. Army. "North
Korean 5th Infantry Division," GHQ, FEC, MIS, GS, Allied Translator and
Interpreter Section, Research Supplement, Interrogation Reports, Issue #96,
28 February 1951, pp. 37-45; U.S. Army 500th MISG. Full Translation of
Military History in Korea, Translation date 5 September 1952, p. 48; U.S.
Army. History of the North Korean Army, HQ, FEC, MIS, G2, 31 July 1952, pp.
80-83; U.S. Army. Handbook on the North Korean Armed Forces, DAPam 30-52, 11
July 1962, pp. 33-34; Enemy Tactics, p. 120; and Thompson, Royce L.
Intelligence Factors Underlying Operation Chromite of 15 September 1950,
U.S. Army OCMH, 30 January 1956, pp. 10-11.
9    Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader, pp. 103-104. Some sources
indicate that O Chin-u was the commander of the 766th, while others state
that he was the commanding officer the 3rd Infantry Division. He may have
been both. "Choe Kwang's Biographic Data Detailed," Pukhan, July 1990, pp.
102-112, as cited in FBIS-EAS-90-187, 26 September 1990, pp. 37-42.
10    One source suggests that in mid-June 1950 the Hoeryong Cadres School
was ordered to concentrate its forces in the vicinity of Yangyang, and that
at the time of the war these forces were designated the 766th Unit. See:
Full Translation of Military History in Korea, p. 48.
11    U.S. Army. "Documentary Evidence of North Korean Aggression," Allied
Translator and Interpreter Section, Research Supplement, Interrogation
Reports, GHQ, FEC, MIS, GS, 30 October 1950, pp. 46-48.
12     Most intelligence reports indicate that 3rd Battalion supported the
5th Infantry Division's attack along the coast (see below). One
interrogation report suggests, however, that at least some elements of the
766th remained in the Yangyang area until 29 June and then departed by
truck.
13    "Documentary Evidence of North Korean Aggression," Allied Translator
and Interpreter Section, Research Supplement, Interrogation Reports, pp.
48-50.
14    Field Jr., James A. History of United States Naval Operations: Korea,
GPO, 1962, p. 51.
15     See document No. 14 in, Weathersby, Kathryn. "New Russian Documents
on the Korean War," Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issues
6-7, Winter 1995/1996, pp. 30-84.
16    Author's correspondence with Kathryn Weathersby and Steven Zaloga;
History of the North Korean Army, pp. 80-83; and "New Russian Documents on
the Korean War," pp. 30-91. Since the KPA of 1950 was closely modeled after
the World War II Soviet Army the Korean term which is commonly translated as
"marine" in contemporary U.S. intelligence documents should, more correctly,
be translated as "naval infantry." In fact, in his messages to Kim Il-song,
Stalin refers to these units specifically as "...naval infantry." The term
"naval infantry" will be used here.
17     See documents No. 17 and 19 in, "New Russian Documents on the Korean
War," pp. 30-84.
18    U.S. Air Force. "Airborne Training Center in Pyongyang, North Korea,"
HQ 5th AF, Deputy for Intelligence, A-2, Special Activities Unit, letter
dated 6 March 1951.