Korean People's Army - Guerrilla and UW Units, Part 2

["Joseph S. Bermudez Jr." <joseph_bermudez@compuserve.com>]

Korean People's Army Guerrilla and Unconventional Warfare Units, June 1950 -
September 1950, Part 2

Copyright (C) 2000, by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.

Latest Revision: March 1, 2000


Independent Guerrilla Units [6]

As a result of the early efforts of Pak Hon-yong's Kangdong Political
Institute, and the subsequent efforts of the KWP's Liaison Department, there
were approximately 5,000 guerrillas, agents and sympathizers operating
within the ROK at the start of the war. These were led by a core of some
1,700 specially trained personnel. These guerrillas were organized into a
multitude of independent guerrilla units, the majority of these units were
loyal to Pak Hon-yong rather then Kim Il-song. This ideological split,
however, had no appreciable effect upon either their operations or there
desire to reunify the Korean peninsula under Communist control. Aside from
predominantly southern Koreans, personnel for these units came from a wide
variety of sources including former members of the People's Liberation Army
(PLA), bandits, conscripted civilians, and Republic of Korea Army (ROKA)
defectors. It should be noted that a number of so-called "Independent
Guerrilla Units" where in reality simply groups of professional bandits who
were exploiting a unique opportunity to obtain weapons and supplies and to
extend their influence.

These independent guerrilla units varied considerably in their composition,
strength, training and efficiency. In general they were comprised of varying
numbers of "battalions" and "companies," with one unit reportedly having 12
"battalions." Personnel strengths range from approximately 50 up to a high
of 3,000 reported for the Chiri-san Organization, which was formed from
elements involved in the October 1948 Yosu mutiny. In general all these
units were loosely organized, lightly equipped and, once assigned an area of
operations, generally conducted operations at the discretion of the local
commander. Few, if any, were known to have direct radio communications with
higher headquarters and centralized control appears to have been limited.
During the first two months of the war many independent guerrilla units
received logistic support not only from local Communist sympathizers but
reportedly from a mountain village in the area of Pohyan-san, located
southeast of Kusan-dong (20 km northeast of Taegu). There is, however, no
evidence to suggest that there was a headquarters located here.

Divisional Guerrilla Units [7]

The majority of all KPA infantry divisions at the beginning of the war
possessed an organic, or attached, guerrilla unit. The tables of
organization for these units varied considerable among the various
divisions. Personnel for these units selected from former Chinese-trained
guerrillas and WPSK members who had escaped north. These troops were
thoroughly trained in infantry as well as guerrilla tactics. The length and
type of training for individual guerrilla units apparently followed no
uniform schedule, although their curriculum was somewhat standardized.
Training was generally divided equally between political indoctrination and
guerrilla tactics, such as sabotage methods and intelligence collection
process, the procuring of supplies, and the selection of camp sites.
Infantry training evidently was not included since many of the troops had
received basic infantry training before assignment as guerrillas. Many of
the units were apparently trained individually with the assistance of
experienced instructors who had fought with the Chinese Communists and a
manual entitled "Guerrilla Tactics." Typical missions assigned to these
units included: the disruption of lines of communications supply;
intelligence collection; the ambushing of withdrawing UNC elements and
establishment of roadblocks; and - within unit capabilities - the taking of
limited high-value objectives. To insure maximum coordination with the
parent division, several portable radio sets were carried by each unit. In
effect, the designation "divisional guerrilla unit" is somewhat of a
misnomer since these units - insofar as tactics and cooperation with their
parent divisions are concerned - functioned as divisional reconnaissance or
ranger units.

KPA infantry divisions employed their guerrilla units intensively throughout
the war. During normal combat operations, members dressed in standard KPA
uniforms and carried the usual weapons. However, to reconnoiter towns,
villages, and rear areas of UNC forces in daylight, members would wear
civilian clothes or ROKA uniforms. These soldiers returned to the hills
before dark and guided the main body back to the objective. In the approach
to the objective, three scouts were sent out first, each approximately 5
meters apart. Companies were separated by 20 to 25 meters; platoons 15-20
meters; and squads, about 10 meters. After the attack, the guerrillas
withdrew into the hills before daylight. At other times, guerrilla units
mingled with refugees and infiltrated into UNC rear areas. At a
predetermined point, they would separate from the civilian column and
assemble their weapons which had been hidden in oxcarts and bundles. After
reconnaissance of the target was complete an attack was launched. Units were
given specific missions and a specific time limit to accomplish each
assignment. These units also provided guides for the infiltration of
"enveloping units" behind UNC lines.

There is no evidence that during the first two months of the war that any
divisional guerrilla units were ever detached from their parent divisions
for the purposes of either establishing or supporting indigenous guerrilla
movements or operations.