Korean People's Army - 766th Independent Unit - Revision

["Joseph S. Bermudez Jr." <joseph_bermudez@compuserve.com>]

Korean People's Army - 766th Independent Unit - Revision

Copyright (C) 2000, by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.

Latest Revision: March 12, 2000

[Author's note: This revision is a rewrite of the paragraphs concerning the
ROKN Paektusan's sinking of the armed trawler carrying the 3rd Battalion of
the 766th. It also adds a end note and updates another.]


766th Independent Unit [8]

With the failure of the 1949 "September Offensive" the Kangdong Political
Institute was disbanded. It was replaced by the establishment of a special
guerrilla warfare training school in Hoeryong, known as the Hoeryong Cadres
School. This school was under the direction of O Chin-u, a veteran of the
88th Special Independent Sniper Brigade. The mission of the school was to
train personnel for a new special unit in the tradition of the 88th Brigade.
[9]

The 766th Independent Unit (a.k.a., 766th Infantry Regiment, 766th
Independent Infantry Regiment and 766th Guerrilla Unit) is believed to have
been formed in July 1949 at Wonsan. The core personnel for the unit were
obtained by reorganizing an entire infantry officers class from the Hoeryong
Cadres School, including instructors and students. From July 1949 until 12
June 1950 the unit, which was organized into 3 battalions (1st, 2nd and
3rd), conducted basic and advanced training at Hoeryong. On 12 June the
766th moved by rail to Munp'yong (5 kilometers north of Wonsan) where they
were engaged in amphibious training under Soviet supervision until 22 June.
The unit then moved by rail to the area north of the port town of Yangyang.
Here the 766th was augmented by a number of independent guerrilla units
including the 15th Guerrilla Unit, 27th Guerrilla Unit, Nam Don Ue Guerrilla
Unit, and the Namdo Guerrilla Unit. [10] These attachments expanded the
766th to six "battalions" with a personnel strength of approximately
1,200-1,500. [11] 

The 766th and attached units had the mission of establishing beachheads
along the east coast in the rear of the ROKA in order to disrupt rear area
communications and defenses (e.g., destruction of railroad tracks at
crossings, bridges, tunnels, curves and switches, and the disruption of
telephone and telegraph service) and provide intelligence. When this initial
mission had been accomplished, and contact had been established with the
main body of the 5th Infantry Division, units of the 766th were assigned two
additional missions. First they were to function in the reconnaissance and
ranger roles to assist the advance of the 5th Infantry Divisions. Second,
elements were to infiltrate west and south through the mountains in the
general directions of Pusan and Taegu as an ordinary partisan force and join
other elements of the unit landed there.

Prior to its commitment the 766th and its attached units operated under the
direct control of the KPA's General Staff Department headquarters in
P'yongyang with which it maintained contact by radio. Available evidence
suggests that once the war began that the 1st and 2nd Battalions maintained
this subordination until the 766th was disbanded in mid-August. These two
battalions, however, also maintained close contact with the 5th Infantry
Division. The 3rd Battalion of the 766th was apparently subordinated to the
5th Infantry Division at the beginning of the war. Little is known
concerning the control of the various guerrilla units attached to the 766th.
It possibly mimicked that of the 1st and 2nd Battalions.

During June 23-26, the 1st and 2nd Battalions boarded small merchant ships
manned by the Korean People's Navy (KPN) and conducted at least two
amphibious landings in the ROK. The first landing area was near Nakp'ung-ni
(10 kilometers south of Kangnung). From here the force moved inland after
being attacked by ROKA units. This force subsequently moved north to support
the attack on Kangnung. The second landing area was immediately south of the
town of Chumunjin. Although there is some confusion over the operations of
the 3rd battalion during this time period, it boarded ships and set sail for
a landing in the Pusan area. [12]

The independent guerrilla units attached to the 766th had a more convoluted
experience. The Nam Don Ue Guerrilla Force arrived in the Yangyang area in
early June where it was combined with the 15th Guerrilla unit. On 21 June
the combined force of 400-500 personnel left the Yangyang area for the port
of Changjon (70 km north of Yangyang). Two days later, on 23 June, the force
boarded small ships for landings in the ROK. On 25 June the force landed at
Imwonjin (28 km north of Ulchin) and reorganized itself into two units. It
then proceeded southwest into the mountains towards Andong. The 27th
Guerrilla Unit arrived in the Wonsan area on 21 June. The following day it
boarded eight boats and sailed south to land at Mukko, near Kangnung. During
the next two weeks it proceeded south towards Ulchin, where it arrived on 5
July. The Namdo Guerrilla Unit was formed at Yangyang on or about 18 June.
On 23 June the unit consisting of approximately 200 troops moved north to
the port of Kosong. Here the unit was augmented by the addition of 400
troops. On, or about, 24 June the unit embarked on four diesel steamers and
landed in the Samch'ok area on the 25th. The unit proceeded south along the
coast arriving at Yonhae (14 km north of Yongdok) on 1 July. [13]

The seaborne phase of these operations were relatively crude. Elements
embarked upon small coastal freighters (some of which were lightly armed)
manned by the KPN. They then sail south under the cover of darkness,
sometimes with an escort of P-4 class motor torpedo boats from the 2nd Naval
Squadron based at Wonsan. Once they arrived at their destination the actual
amphibious landings were generally conducted in company sized units (80-120
troops each), using small power boats, fishing craft, etc. Apparently, some
troops even waded ashore or landed at fishing piers at small villages.

In general the amphibious landings of the 766th and attached units proceeded
smoothly and successfully. There was, however, one significant setback. On
the evening of the 25 June the ROKN submarine chaser Paektusan (PC-701),
under the command of Commander Nam Choi Yong, intercepted a KPN 1,000 ton
armed transport a short distance to the northeast of the port of Pusan. The
armed transport was carrying an estimated 600 troops of the 766thšs 3rd
Battalion as well as ammunition and equipment. [14] After a running battle
the Paektusan sunk the armed transport. This was the first naval engagement
of the war and possibly one of the most far reaching. Since Pusan, already
Koreašs largest port, would become the primary point of entry for supplies
and reinforcements to the ROK during the war. It was also essentially
defenseless since the majority of the ROKAšs combat units were deployed
elsewhere. The mission of the 3rd Battalion was to interdict the port of
Pusan, prevent the landing of supplies and reinforcements, and prepare the
advance of the 5th Division and the remainder of the 766th. Had the 3rd
Battalion been successful, and the port of Pusan interdicted even for a
short period of time, the course of the conflict would have been
significantly different. [15]

At approximately 0500 hours on 25 June 1950, the 5th Division attacked
across the 38th Parallel down the main road that parallels the ROK's rugged
east coast. This attack was supported not only by the amphibious landings of
1st and 2nd Battalions of the 766th Independent Unit, but apparently with
ground operations by elements of the 766th. With the 766th leading, the 5th
Infantry Division crossed the 38th Parallel and entered Chumunjin, without
incident, shortly before noon on 25 June 1950. Continuing the drive south,
both units entered Kangnung on 26 June 1950, after an all-night battle. With
the 766th still leading the attack, both units continued south until they
reached the approaches to Samch'ok. Here the 766th was joined by elements
which had made an amphibious landing near the town. The reconstituted unit
then proceeded into the hills, from where the troops, after changing into
civilian clothes, infiltrated into Samch'ok, in order to gather
intelligence. The division entered Samch'ok on about 5 July 1950. On 9 July
1950, after a large-scale engagement which involved the 766th only, the
division and the 766th occupied Ulchin.

The 766th Unit, after undergoing a reorganization at Ulchin, infiltrated
small units westward into the mountains with the mission of cutting
communications between Pusan and Taegu, and P'ohang-dang. It continued to
operate as the spearhead for the 5th, and later 12th infantry Division, in
the P'ohang-dang area for 2 months of intensive and costly fighting. During
17-19 August 1950 both the 12th and the 766th, after having suffered serious
losses, were reorganized. During this reorganization, the 766th was
disbanded and its personnel absorbed by the 12th Division.

The view of these operations from the "other side of the fence" is
interesting. In his letter to Deputy Chief-of-Staff of the Soviet Armed
Forces General M.V. Zakharov, dated 26 June 1950, Soviet Ambassador to the
DPRK T.F. Shtykov states the following, [16]

    "On the very first day the DPRK navy made two landings on the coast of
the Sea of Japan. The first landing party was in the Korio [Kangnung ?] area
and consisted of two battalions of naval infantry and around a thousand
partisans. The second landing group was in the region of Urutsyn [Ulchin]
and consisted of 600 partisans."

    "The landings took place at 5 hours 25 minutes and were carried out
successfully."

    "The group of partisans took the city of Urutsyn [Ulchin] and a number
of districts adjoining It."

    "The landings were carried out with a battle between warships of the
People's Army and ships of the South Korean army. As a result of the battle
one Southern trawler was sunk and one was damaged. The DPRK fleet had no
losses.""


--------------------------

End Notes

8    "North Korean Guerrilla Operations," pp. 18-20; U.S. Army. "North
Korean 5th Infantry Division," GHQ, FEC, MIS, GS, Allied Translator and
Interpreter Section, Research Supplement, Interrogation Reports, Issue #96,
28 February 1951, pp. 37-45; U.S. Army 500th MISG. Full Translation of
Military History in Korea, Translation date 5 September 1952, p. 48; U.S.
Army. History of the North Korean Army, HQ, FEC, MIS, G2, 31 July 1952, pp.
80-83; U.S. Army. Handbook on the North Korean Armed Forces, DAPam 30-52, 11
July 1962, pp. 33-34; Enemy Tactics, p. 120; and Thompson, Royce L.
Intelligence Factors Underlying Operation Chromite of 15 September 1950,
U.S. Army OCMH, 30 January 1956, pp. 10-11.
9    Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader, pp. 103-104. Some sources
indicate that O Chin-u was the commander of the 766th, while others state
that he was the commanding officer the 3rd Infantry Division. He may have
been both. "Choe Kwang's Biographic Data Detailed," Pukhan, July 1990, pp.
102-112, as cited in FBIS-EAS-90-187, 26 September 1990, pp. 37-42.
10    One source suggests that in mid-June 1950 the Hoeryong Cadres School
was ordered to concentrate its forces in the vicinity of Yangyang, and that
at the time of the war these forces were designated the 766th Unit. See:
Full Translation of Military History in Korea, p. 48.
11    U.S. Army. "Documentary Evidence of North Korean Aggression," Allied
Translator and Interpreter Section, Research Supplement, Interrogation
Reports, GHQ, FEC, MIS, GS, 30 October 1950, pp. 46-48.
12     Most intelligence reports indicate that 3rd Battalion supported the
5th Infantry Division's attack along the coast (see below). One
interrogation report suggests, however, that at least some elements of the
766th remained in the Yangyang area until 29 June and then departed by
truck.
13    "Documentary Evidence of North Korean Aggression," Allied Translator
and Interpreter Section, Research Supplement, Interrogation Reports, pp.
48-50.
14    "ROK Navy Operations Chief Interviewed," Wolgan Choson, January 1,
2000, pp. 499-507; and Field Jr., James A. History of United States Naval
Operations: Korea, GPO, 1962, p. 51. The figure of 600 troops appears to be
excessive. Regardless, the landing of any KPA troops in the Pusan area would
have had a significant effect upon the course of the war.
15    Ibid., The Paektusan was purchased for the ROK Navy with donations
from navy personnel and civilians. Since its retirement its mast has been on
display at the ROK Naval Academy.
16     See document No. 14 in, Weathersby, Kathryn. "New Russian Documents
on the Korean War," Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issues
6-7, Winter 1995/1996, pp. 30-84.