Re: KW KLO Operations - ROK Comments

["Joseph S. Bermudez Jr." <joseph_bermudez@compuserve.com>]

Mike,

> What's your assessment of the article?

Overall (and excusing the poor translation job by FBIS) I believe the
gentleman is who he says he is and has done the things that he says he has.
I've been able to confirm some of the information in the article concerning
his more recent activities (information I deleted since it didn't relate to
the Korean War). I do think, however, like all of us who are gracefully
growing older that his memory has confused a few facts. (I'm only 45 and I'm
having trouble already - just ask my wife!). This is compounded
(understandably) by not having access to written documentation.


> Two things in particular caught my attention.  The first was that I wasn't
> aware that UN forces had captured a MiG pilot (of any nationality) during the
> war.

Either am I. I believe that he is in error here.

 
> The second was his description of the airplane he parachuted from.  My first
> thought was that he was describing a B-26, not a B-29. I'm fairly
> knowledagable (I think) of AR&CW operations during the war, and don't recall
> any of the records researched or interviews held with the 581st AR&CW vets
> that suggested that they dropped agents.  Yet this agent's description of a
> bombshell loading booth sounds similar to a setup the AR&CW B-29s had for
> parachuting agents.

He's probably confusing B-29 with B-26. I know that a number of regular B-26
units were occasionally used to drop agents. I think Robert (Bob) C. Mikesh
wrote something about his personal experiences as a B-26 bombardier in Korea
and discusses this.

To the best of my knowledge (admittedly limited in this area, in fact, I
would have deferred to you or Ed if asked this question) almost all airborne
insertions were by B-26 or C-47. Their were apparently also a few by C-46,
light planes (L-5s, etc.), and possibly 1 or 2 by helicopter. I know of no
B-29 drops in Korea. If there were any, they were probably have been deep
within the DPRK since the B-26 and C-47 covered most of the country.

As a point of interest. Most, if not all, deep insertions were abysmal
failures. This was due to: security breaches within the ROK, failure in
vetting the agents properly, and DPRK internal security procedures. These
procedures were quite extensive in many areas and certainly were the
downfall of any successful and reliable insertions. This internal security
measures included: internal road checkpoints, frequent changes in identity
papers, a extensive anti-agent propaganda program, etc. There were multiple
layers (often redundant) within the internal security system. Military units
were responsible for internal security within their area of operations. In
addition their were,

- Security units directly subordinate to the Ministry of National Defense's
Security Bureau. Among these was the Railroad Security Brigade (with six
Railroad Security battalions).
- The Ministry of Internal Affairs ran an extensive civilian and
paramilitary organization which was responsible for everything from fire
departments, police force, civil defense and internal security. The internal
security forces were subordinate to the Ministry's Internal Security Force
Office. They were organized as battalions in provinces (with the possible
exception of Yangyang-do) and major cities (P'yongyang, and later Kaesong
had regiments).
- Local Central Committees of the Korean Workers' Party ran extensive
extensive anti-agent propaganda campaigns, conducted internal surveillance,
and reported any anomalies to a higher level.

I'm probably not telling you anything you already don't know and which Ed
could probably explain better.

Regards,
Joe

Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.
joseph_bermudez@compuserve.com
PGP key available on request