KPA Paramilitary Railroad Units, Part 3

["Joseph S. Bermudez Jr." <joseph_bermudez@compuserve.com>]

Korean People's Army Paramilitary Railroad Units, 1946-1953
Part 3

Copyright (C) 2000, by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.

Latest Revision: April 24, 2000



15 September 1950 to 31 July 1953

With the successful UNC landing at Inch'on on 15 September 1950, and
subsequent breakout from the Pusan Perimeter, the entire KPA was thrown into
a panic. The majority of the regular KPA forces in occupied areas were
either annihilated, or forced to withdraw to the north. Only a small
proportion remained south of the 38th Parallel to engage in guerrilla
operations. This was especially true for the security and engineer assets of
the Security Forces Headquarters (Forward) which were both dispersed over a
wide area and neither trained nor equipped for combat. The Inch'on landing
had the added effect, especially as UNC forces moved north of the 38th
Parallel, of effectively disrupting, temporarily at least, the entire rear
area security and railroad engineer organization.

At the time of the Inch'on landing the 584th Railroad Engineer Regiment was
dispersed throughout the liberated area. It along with all the forces of the
Security Forces Headquarters (Forward) were ordered to withdraw north. While
some elements of the 584th may have succeeded in reaching assembly areas
north of the 38th Parallel the last information available on the regiment,
dating from 6 October 1950, indicates that a majority of its members were
captured and the unit effectively destroyed. The seven security battalions
of the 10th Railroad Security Brigade deployed in the liberated areas were
likewise destroyed and many of their personnel captured.

For those units subordinate to the Security Forces Headquarters (Rear) the
situation was slightly different. The five battalions of the 10th Railroad
Security Brigade which had remained north of the 38th Parallel, although
suffering significant losses, were able to withdraw in front of the UNC
advance north of the 38th Parallel. They were aided in their withdrawal by
the fact that they were already deployed in depth throughout the DPRK and
were in some cases withdrawing into themselves. As best as can be presently
determined the five battalions of the 10th Railroad Security Brigade
withdrew in three directions following the three major rail lines. The 1st
and 2nd Railroad Security Battalions withdrew,

- Northwest to the Yalu River along the P'yongyang - Sinuiju (An-tung,
China) - Mukden route and,
- North to the "Kanggye pocket" along the P'yongyang - Kanggye -Manp'ojin
route, where the remnants of the KPA were reorganizing and re-equipping.

The 3rd, 4th and 5th Railroad Security Battalions withdrew,

- Northeast to the Ch'ongjin - Hoeryong area along the Wonsan - Hamhung -
Ch'ongjin - Tuemen route.

On 1 October 1950, the 3rd Battalion was located near Hyesanjin, the 4th
Battalion between the Fusen Reservoir and the village of Hwangsuwon-ni, and
the 5th Battalion between Kilchu and Ch'ongjin.

Following the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) intervention and subsequent
drive south to the 38th Parallel both the DPRK governmental structure and
armed forces underwent extensive reorganization and re-equipment. Due to the
critical requirement to supply the massive CPV armies, the importance of the
DPRK rail system increased dramatically. As a result those units concerned
with railroad repair and security were quickly reconstituted as railroad
recovery brigades and railroad security regiments respectively. Personnel
for these new units came from three sources: remnants of the 10th Railroad
Security Brigade and 584th Railroad Engineer Regiment; Korean nationals
drawn from Chinese Communist security and railroad engineer units; and
Recent conscripts. Each new unit was placed under the command of a cadre of
experienced personnel drawn from the former 10th Railroad Security Brigade
and 584th Railroad Engineer Regiment. [5] All these new railroad recovery
security units were subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs'
Railroad Recovery Bureau and Railroad Security Division-the Security Forces
Headquarters (Rear) having been dissolved. [6]

The effectiveness of these railroad security and engineer units is apparent,
in that despite heavy losses in personnel and material to UNC air and naval
gunfire attacks and partisan raids they were able to keep the main rail
lines passable, although weaknesses and irregularities often restricted
traffic to low speeds. Construction and repair of the rail system was
characterized by speed and simplicity. Materials were readily available at
the scene of the repairs and no steel was needed except for the rails
themselves. To facilitate repairs, construction supplies were stockpiled at
strategic locations and units were positioned where they could quickly start
reconstruction work after bomb damage had occurred. Other advance
precautions included the prefabrication of bridge spans (mostly of wood
construction) and the construction of by-pass bridges even before the
originals were damaged. These by-passes, although not connected to the main
line could be connected in a matter of an hour or two after the main bridges
were damaged. Often, at important crossings, as many as three or four
by-passes were built. This tactic minimized the vulnerability of these
potential choke points, and presented a dispersed target. Additionally,
authority was given to these new units to draft civilian labor as required.
[7]

The units subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs' Railroad Recovery
Bureau and Railroad Security Division continued to expand throughout the
war. At the time of the 31 July 1953 truce these forces totaled an estimated
28,900. With the Railroad Recovery Bureau consisting of 22,100 troops and
the Railroad Security Division of 6,800 troops.

Endnotes

1.     This structure emulated a similar division of responsibilities within
the Soviet Union between the MVD and Ministry of the Armed Forces.
2.    The possibility exists that at the time of the recapture of Seoul
there was a second construction regiment, although this has not yet be
verified.
3.    Pak Fun-il was a former member of the Chinese Communist 8th Route
Army.
4.    The reasons for the change in designation is not entirely clear. Major
General Lee was formerly a political officer within a Chinese Communist
Division.
5.    It is probable that the many of the Chinese Communist security
assistance personnel were detached from the Communist Chinese 2nd Security
Regiment, which was stationed in the DPRK at the time. Additional
engineering assistance was provided by Soviet and Chinese Communist
technical advisors.
6.    Some sources indicate that the Railroad Recovery Bureau was
subordinate to the Ministry of Transportation and Communication. If correct,
this was most likely an administrative subordination since operational
control was with the Ministry of Interior.
7.    The air assets required to destroy these multiple crossings were far
greater than for a single bridge.