Re: RAdm Arleigh Burke - 5 October 1950

["Young Kim" <y_s_k@worldnet.att.net>]

My friend Col. Donald Nichols says in his bio that the backbone of the KPA
and CPA was the "A" frame.

This little gismo made of a few sticks in the shape of the letter "A" helps
one to carry a load about his body weight.  Korean farmers have been using
it for millennia to carry farm things (honey, woods, hays,,,,,) .  An army
of A-frame porters can do wonders.

However, as Joe mentions, the KPA engineers were fairly capable and
creative.  And contrary to the common belief, KPA had significant support in
SK - at least while the fortune of war was in its favor.

One aspect of the Korean War to be cleared up is the support given to KPA by
South Koreans.  This topic is 'too painful' to discuss in South Korea and it
is still shrouded in secrecy in North Korea.  The Americans don't want to
admit that many South Koreans (civilians, troops, politicos,,, - how many?)
welcomed and joined up with KPA.

How many Americans know of the People's Volunteers Army (of South Koreans)
led by Gen. Song Ho Sung (formerly the ROKA COS) against the Yanks?


ysk

----- Original Message -----
From: "Joseph S. Bermudez Jr." <joseph_bermudez@compuserve.com>
To: "Korean-War-List" <KOREAN-WAR-L@UKANS.EDU>
Sent: Saturday, May 13, 2000 10:40 PM
Subject: RAdm Arleigh Burke - 5 October 1950


I think that the list members might be interested in this 5 October 1950
evaluation of the KPA by Rear Admiral Arleigh Burke. It was (and is) quite
remarkable for its forthrightness and insight. If it weren't too late, I
would have used it in my latest book. ;-)

"SAnother lesson of equal importance has come from the North Koreans
themselves. On a battleground of smaller scale, but significantly similar to
Europe's western peninsula, the Red troops were able to march 200 miles
against overwhelming odds to within an unpleasant range of our last outpost,
Pusan, before being stopped. Against them was an angry populace conducting
vicious guerrilla warfare. Against them was geography, rugged mountains,
many rivers, [and] narrow, rough roads funneling through points vulnerable
to both air and sea attack. Against them were countless strategic bombers
hitting at their supplies and industrial potential, [and] tactical
planes-although proportionately fewer in number-effectively spreading
napalm, shooting rockets and bullets, all with deadly accuracy. Besides all
this, they were confronted with the omnipresent and omnipotent military
problem of maintaining, with each day of advance, a longer and more tortuous
line of communications. They had to support a large body of troops in a
large area far from their source of supply. They had to bring up tanks and
artillery to oppose our heavy supporting forces. They had virtually no sea
force, no air force, little antiaircraft protection-and still they came.

Although it is regrettable that some of our own strategists had to learn the
hard way that an army can advance against an overwhelmingly superior air
forceS"

Rear Admiral Arleigh Burke, 5 October 1950

Source: Burke, Rear Admiral Arleigh. "Burke Speaks Out on Korea,"
Proceedings, May 2000, pp. 68-72.


Regards,
Joe

Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.
joseph_bermudez@compuserve.com
PGP key available on request