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RE: RAdm Arleigh Burke - 5 October 1950
I would say also that the US military depended on the A-Frames that were on
the backs of the Korean Service Corps workers that hauled ammunition, water,
and food up the hills to the positions and then carried down the wounded.
In our HQ here in Korea we keep an A-Frame on the wall to remind us that no
matter how high tech we think we are in the next war things are likely to
regress to the more basic forms of warfare and it is the simple things that
are likely to bring success.
As far as the numbers of South Koreans that supported the KPA I would have
to agree that any figures that exist must be a well kept secret. However, I
do recall that Kim Il Sung did not get the kind of popular uprising upon
which he counted after hostilities began. I would venture to say that many
that "supported" the KPA were more likely pressed into service and did the
work in order for the chance to survive. I do not believe that there was
significant popular support for the north (there was surely a lot of
opposition to Rhee's regime but I do not think that translated directly to
support for Kim).
David S. Maxwell
LTC, US Army
SOCKOR SOJ5
Unit #15622
APO AP 96205-0328
DSN 315-723-5649
NIPRNET: maxwelld@sockor.korea.army.mil
SIPRNET: okj5dmax@hqsockor.sockor.socom.smil.mil
Personal Email: max161@aol.com or max161@hushmail.com
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Young Kim [SMTP:y_s_k@worldnet.att.net]
> Sent: Sunday, May 14, 2000 23:13
> To: KOREAN-WAR-L@raven.cc.ukans.edu
> Subject: Re: RAdm Arleigh Burke - 5 October 1950
>
> My friend Col. Donald Nichols says in his bio that the backbone of the KPA
> and CPA was the "A" frame.
>
> This little gismo made of a few sticks in the shape of the letter "A"
> helps
> one to carry a load about his body weight. Korean farmers have been using
> it for millennia to carry farm things (honey, woods, hays,,,,,) . An army
> of A-frame porters can do wonders.
>
> However, as Joe mentions, the KPA engineers were fairly capable and
> creative. And contrary to the common belief, KPA had significant support
> in
> SK - at least while the fortune of war was in its favor.
>
> One aspect of the Korean War to be cleared up is the support given to KPA
> by
> South Koreans. This topic is 'too painful' to discuss in South Korea and
> it
> is still shrouded in secrecy in North Korea. The Americans don't want to
> admit that many South Koreans (civilians, troops, politicos,,, - how
> many?)
> welcomed and joined up with KPA.
>
> How many Americans know of the People's Volunteers Army (of South Koreans)
> led by Gen. Song Ho Sung (formerly the ROKA COS) against the Yanks?
>
>
> ysk
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Joseph S. Bermudez Jr." <joseph_bermudez@compuserve.com>
> To: "Korean-War-List" <KOREAN-WAR-L@UKANS.EDU>
> Sent: Saturday, May 13, 2000 10:40 PM
> Subject: RAdm Arleigh Burke - 5 October 1950
>
>
> I think that the list members might be interested in this 5 October 1950
> evaluation of the KPA by Rear Admiral Arleigh Burke. It was (and is) quite
> remarkable for its forthrightness and insight. If it weren't too late, I
> would have used it in my latest book. ;-)
>
> "SAnother lesson of equal importance has come from the North Koreans
> themselves. On a battleground of smaller scale, but significantly similar
> to
> Europe's western peninsula, the Red troops were able to march 200 miles
> against overwhelming odds to within an unpleasant range of our last
> outpost,
> Pusan, before being stopped. Against them was an angry populace conducting
> vicious guerrilla warfare. Against them was geography, rugged mountains,
> many rivers, [and] narrow, rough roads funneling through points vulnerable
> to both air and sea attack. Against them were countless strategic bombers
> hitting at their supplies and industrial potential, [and] tactical
> planes-although proportionately fewer in number-effectively spreading
> napalm, shooting rockets and bullets, all with deadly accuracy. Besides
> all
> this, they were confronted with the omnipresent and omnipotent military
> problem of maintaining, with each day of advance, a longer and more
> tortuous
> line of communications. They had to support a large body of troops in a
> large area far from their source of supply. They had to bring up tanks and
> artillery to oppose our heavy supporting forces. They had virtually no sea
> force, no air force, little antiaircraft protection-and still they came.
>
> Although it is regrettable that some of our own strategists had to learn
> the
> hard way that an army can advance against an overwhelmingly superior air
> forceS"
>
> Rear Admiral Arleigh Burke, 5 October 1950
>
> Source: Burke, Rear Admiral Arleigh. "Burke Speaks Out on Korea,"
> Proceedings, May 2000, pp. 68-72.
>
>
> Regards,
> Joe
>
> Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.
> joseph_bermudez@compuserve.com
> PGP key available on request
>