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Re: RAdm Arleigh Burke - 5 October 1950
I also want to add that my outfit also benefited from the Korean "A
frame". My outfit hauled ammunition to the front lines & forward air
strips; although it was a very dangerous job; we relied of Koreans with
their "A frames" to haul our ammo loads the last mile (so to speak) to
the lines. These Koreans were brave beyond words. Because the front lines
changed so quickly; they were never where we were first told to make the
delivery. There were times we would drive right through the lines & find
ourselves in enemy territory. We lost some men to that & other actions;
but the Koreans & their "A frame" were a God send to us. They were all
over the place; on the air strips; in the fields with honey buckets etc.
Korean War Vet & ever thankful to my Lord Jesus that I got home.
On Sun, 14 May 2000 08:19:07 +0900 "Maxwell, David S. LTC"
> I would say also that the US military depended on the A-Frames that
> were on
> the backs of the Korean Service Corps workers that hauled
> ammunition, water,
> and food up the hills to the positions and then carried down the
> In our HQ here in Korea we keep an A-Frame on the wall to remind us
> that no
> matter how high tech we think we are in the next war things are
> likely to
> regress to the more basic forms of warfare and it is the simple
> things that
> are likely to bring success.
> As far as the numbers of South Koreans that supported the KPA I
> would have
> to agree that any figures that exist must be a well kept secret.
> However, I
> do recall that Kim Il Sung did not get the kind of popular uprising
> which he counted after hostilities began. I would venture to say
> that many
> that "supported" the KPA were more likely pressed into service and
> did the
> work in order for the chance to survive. I do not believe that
> there was
> significant popular support for the north (there was surely a lot
> opposition to Rhee's regime but I do not think that translated
> directly to
> support for Kim).
> David S. Maxwell
> LTC, US Army
> SOCKOR SOJ5
> Unit #15622
> APO AP 96205-0328
> DSN 315-723-5649
> NIPRNET: email@example.com
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> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Young Kim [SMTP:email@example.com]
> > Sent: Sunday, May 14, 2000 23:13
> > To: KOREAN-WAR-L@raven.cc.ukans.edu
> > Subject: Re: RAdm Arleigh Burke - 5 October 1950
> > My friend Col. Donald Nichols says in his bio that the backbone of
> the KPA
> > and CPA was the "A" frame.
> > This little gismo made of a few sticks in the shape of the letter
> > helps
> > one to carry a load about his body weight. Korean farmers have
> been using
> > it for millennia to carry farm things (honey, woods, hays,,,,,) .
> An army
> > of A-frame porters can do wonders.
> > However, as Joe mentions, the KPA engineers were fairly capable
> > creative. And contrary to the common belief, KPA had significant
> > in
> > SK - at least while the fortune of war was in its favor.
> > One aspect of the Korean War to be cleared up is the support given
> to KPA
> > by
> > South Koreans. This topic is 'too painful' to discuss in South
> Korea and
> > it
> > is still shrouded in secrecy in North Korea. The Americans don't
> want to
> > admit that many South Koreans (civilians, troops, politicos,,, -
> > many?)
> > welcomed and joined up with KPA.
> > How many Americans know of the People's Volunteers Army (of South
> > led by Gen. Song Ho Sung (formerly the ROKA COS) against the
> > ysk
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "Joseph S. Bermudez Jr." <firstname.lastname@example.org>
> > To: "Korean-War-List" <KOREAN-WAR-L@UKANS.EDU>
> > Sent: Saturday, May 13, 2000 10:40 PM
> > Subject: RAdm Arleigh Burke - 5 October 1950
> > I think that the list members might be interested in this 5
> October 1950
> > evaluation of the KPA by Rear Admiral Arleigh Burke. It was (and
> is) quite
> > remarkable for its forthrightness and insight. If it weren't too
> late, I
> > would have used it in my latest book. ;-)
> > "SAnother lesson of equal importance has come from the North
> > themselves. On a battleground of smaller scale, but significantly
> > to
> > Europe's western peninsula, the Red troops were able to march 200
> > against overwhelming odds to within an unpleasant range of our
> > outpost,
> > Pusan, before being stopped. Against them was an angry populace
> > vicious guerrilla warfare. Against them was geography, rugged
> > many rivers, [and] narrow, rough roads funneling through points
> > to both air and sea attack. Against them were countless strategic
> > hitting at their supplies and industrial potential, [and] tactical
> > planes-although proportionately fewer in number-effectively
> > napalm, shooting rockets and bullets, all with deadly accuracy.
> > all
> > this, they were confronted with the omnipresent and omnipotent
> > problem of maintaining, with each day of advance, a longer and
> > tortuous
> > line of communications. They had to support a large body of troops
> in a
> > large area far from their source of supply. They had to bring up
> tanks and
> > artillery to oppose our heavy supporting forces. They had
> virtually no sea
> > force, no air force, little antiaircraft protection-and still they
> > Although it is regrettable that some of our own strategists had to
> > the
> > hard way that an army can advance against an overwhelmingly
> superior air
> > forceS"
> > Rear Admiral Arleigh Burke, 5 October 1950
> > Source: Burke, Rear Admiral Arleigh. "Burke Speaks Out on Korea,"
> > Proceedings, May 2000, pp. 68-72.
> > Regards,
> > Joe
> > Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.
> > email@example.com
> > PGP key available on request