Re: Destruction of the Han River Bridge

["Young Kim" <y_s_k@worldnet.att.net>]

Below are 3 'eyewitness' accounts:
1) Col. James Hausman
2) Col. Donald Nichols
3) Gen. Park Jung Hee

The Toland Interview (James Hausman):
The following is Hausman's account of the Hangang Bridge Massacre as given
to John Toland:
HAUSMAN. "The 26th. I entered our office, General Chae was there. We decided
that we would displace our headquarters to Sihung. We formed a convoy,
consisting of American automobiles. I rode with Major George Sedberry,
advisor to ROM Army G-3.

We had a radio in the convoy, and while moving to our new location we
received a message from General MacArthur. Sometime later, after President
Truman had relieved General MacArthur, I was accompanying General Paik Sun
Yup, then ROK Army Chief of Staff, on a U.S. tour. We paid a courtesy call
on General MacArthur, in his seventeenth floor suite in the Waldorf Hotel.
At that time I told General MacArthur about receiving his message while
displacing to our new command post in Sihung.

Then I quoted the message, 'Repair to your former location, you have limited
use of U.S. air and naval forces your area. Momentous decisions are in the
offing, be of good cheer.--MacArthur.' The general was quite impressed. He
stood up and gave me the famous MacArthur handshake, one hand shaking, the
other on my elbow."

TOLAND: "Was MacArthur telling you to return to the front?"

HAUSMAN: "No, return to our headquarters. Now here is an important point, as
it will have a bearing on things to come. We turned our convoy around and
headed back toward our headquarters, . As we crossed the bridge, I had
George Sedberry stop the car."

TOLAND: "This is in Seoul itself?"

HAUSMAN: "Yes. The engineers had prepared the bridge for demolition. Cases
of dynamite were piled on the bridge approaches. I went over to one box of
dynamite and carried it ten yards or so away from the bridge. I told the
Korean Engineer officer to have all the dynamite removed. Needless to say,
this was never done."

TOLAND: "Now would this be on the 26th or 27th, or something like that?"

HAUSMAN: "On the 27th. My idea of moving the dynamite was prompted by
General MacArthur's message. I forgot all about the Dulles Western Defense
Line statement. The U.S., God bless President Truman, is going to do
something. I was certain of this. MacArthur had not visited Korea yet. I was
not aware of any recommendations MacArthur may have made. None of that
mattered. The message gave us the hope, the will, our morale went up several
notches. 'Our' being collective, Americans and Koreans.

I think I have already told you that there is no difference between an
American soldier and a Korean soldier. If a soldier doesn't have a leader,
he will withdraw, refuse to fire his weapon at the enemy. A soldier needs a
leader to tell him what to do. MacArthur was telling us, 'Get the hell back
to your headquarters.'"

TOLAND: "And do something. Yeah."

HAUSMAN: "See what I mean? It was the right message. Now I would like to
relate how this message was delivered to General Chae. To do this I must
digress. Before we, the KMAG advisors, departed for Sihung, I and the ROK
Army high command, held a meeting in our office (remember that General Chae
and I shared the same office). In attendance were, the Minister of National
Defense Shin Sung Mo (he was also concurrently the prime minister), General
Chae Byung Duk, ROK Army Chief of Staff, all of the general staff, and
several of the special staff.

We were all seated around the conference table. Minister Shin made a
hearatrending speech, declaring, 'We will fight until the end, let's pledge
that!' I called in my driver and sent him to my house for a bottle of
whiskey. Within a matter of minutes, my driver returned with the whiskey."

TOLAND: "You pledged with a drink. How many were you, approximately--a
dozen?"

HAUSMAN: "Chae, the Minister, four general staff members, three or four
special staff members, and myself--about eleven or twelve. It must be
remembered that at this time KMAG was really under orders to leave, our
evacuation plan had been initiated. I was still there because I volunteered
to stay along with Colonel Wright and about sixteen other officers. I
believe there were about sixteen enlisted men too, a total of 33."

TOLAND: "So FIRESTONE had already been initiated."

HAUSMAN: "Actually CRULLER was the evacuation plan, FIRESIDE was the
unclassified code word. Its purpose was to get appropriate instructions to
the evacuees. My wife and three children were on their way to Japan. Anyway,
we did make that pledge.

When I left General Chae, he was seated at the head of the conference table,
his .45 pistol, and the empty whiskey bottle were close by. The room was
dark because the windows were covered with blackout material. When we
received General MacArthur's message, the first thing that entered my mind
was to get back to our office and tell General Chae about the message. I
hoped he did not use that pistol, or try to capitulate.

When I arrived at the office, General Chae was still seated at the
conference table, the pistol and empty whiskey bottle were still there. I
gave Chae the message and told him that this must mean that the U.S. is
going to intervene. Just about that time, as if to underscore what I had
just said, a U.S. bomber flew high over our headquarters, headed for the
north. Chae was like a new man, he smiled and then he gave me a bear hug."

TOLAND: "How about those tanks that came down? Have those been stopped?"

HAUSMAN: "No. We still had to displace. But, the tanks had outrun the North
Korean infantry. They were unprotected and couldn't do much damage. A point
about the bridge. I sat down with General Chae and explained that one
person, and only one person, should have the authority to order the bridge
blown. I reasoned that he and I would be away from headquarters visiting
units. Consequently, he should appoint someone, some one who would remain in
headquarters around the clock. These requirements fit General Kim Paik Il,
the vice chief of staff, perfectly. General Chae appointed him."

TOLAND: "You took him out to the bridge itself, when you said this?"

HAUSMAN: "No. We were in our office. I think both General chae and Kim
understood about the bridge. I recall telling Kim that I was sorry he could
not go home and help his family evacuate to the south. I later learned that
he, as well as other General-grade officers in headquarters, used their
aides to help family members evacuate. President Rhee had already been
evacuated to Taegu. I never discussed the bridge blowing with Kim Paik Il--I
knew nothing about the order, or for that matter, who gave the order. I do
know that I was almost killed when it blew--about 700-800 troops and
civilians were killed."

TOLAND: "How was that?"

HAUSMAN: "I was on my way to Suwon, along with a Lieutenant Colonel Bob
Hazlett, a Lieutenant Lee Soo Yong, and my driver Shin Yong Sun. Our mission
was to contact and brief the Ambassador and General Church. General Church
and his group departed Japan on a peace time mission, and was later
designated General Headquarters Advance Command and Liaison Group
(GHQ/ADCOM).

As our Jeep crossed the Han River Bridge and advanced a short distance, the
bridge blew. It was a tremendous explosion. Our Jeep actually left the road,
vertically. With such a short wheelbase, it's a wonder it didn't overturn.
We apprised the Ambassador and General Church of the situation--about the
tanks in Seoul--evacuation plans, etc."



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The Nichol's Account:
"From June 1950 to May 1951, I was a Special Investigation Officer, and by
this time had attained the rank of Chief Warrant Officer. From 11 May 1951
to the end of the conflict, I served as Squadron Commander of the 6006th
AISS

At 0500 (a.m.) in the morning of 25 June 1950, Korean time, thousands of
North Korean puppet military, directed by USSR and China, came streaming
across the 38th parallel north of Uijonbu and other crossings....

My first responsibility was the immediate and systematic destruction of my
own Headquarters then located in a civilian house at Pupyong (ASCOM). We
destroyed its contents and then the destruction of arms and materials left
behind on the trail as South Koreans and their defenders ran south for
refuge with their BVD's down. The limited roadways were so jammed with
foot-sore, frightened, and fleeing peasants, the military had difficulty in
advancing to the rear.

I was a loner at the rape and destruction of Kimpo Airfield. In a disorderly
advance to the rear, the loner follows the withdrawal leaving a path of
destruction of millions of dollars of aircraft and other supplies, at Suwon,
Taejon and on to Taegu. Among other things, I appointed myself the job of
destroying what others left behind: buildings which contained classified
material, aircraft, vehicles, communication equipment, ammo dumps, fuel
dumps -- anything the advancing enemy might find useful. I used gasoline,
hand grenades and small arms to do most of the destruction.

The first hot days of the battle, I saw few remaining defenders; all other
US intelligence units immediately sought safety in Japan.

The bridges across the Han Gang went up in blood, guts and powder as our
allies (ROKA) destroyed bridges behind them in a vain effort to gain time.
Some made it off the bridges and into the last evacuation boats below:
thousands didn't.

I was on the enemy side of the river when the bridges were blown. I helped
men, women and children get across the river ahead of the advancing enemy
troops. I was the only American there at the time, all others had evacuated.
I stayed there as long as I could -- until the enemy was within small arms
firing range. I obtained a small boat, permitted others to get in, jumped in
the water, held on to the back of the boat and kicked like hell in an effort
to get to the other side in as short order as possible.

South Korean National Police, Seoul City Police, military and government
officials ran like turpentined rats, leaving their posts, their
responsibilities and their families. Defenseless civilians were abandoned by
their defenders to suffer the cruelest consequences at the merciless hands
of the conquering enemy.

The Korean Version - Gen. Park Jung Hee
The following account of the Hangang Bridge Massacre is from Chosun Ilbo
(Spit on My Grave):
The secret crossing of the bridge and then demolishing it, abandoning the
soldiers and citizens of Seoul became the biggest shame of Syngman Rhee, who
had been a strong independence leader. Sixty two members of the National
Assembly were also left behind with eight being killed and twenty-seven
either kidnapped or missing.

After becoming president, Park Chung-hee established the doctrine of
defending Seoul to the death and built a safe capital, learning from Rhee's
mistakes. He said many times that if there was a war, he would stay in Seoul
and fight to the death. On April 29, 1975, one day before the collapse of
South Vietnam, Park pledged to defend Seoul to the death and wrote in his
diary,

'We have witnessed the stark reality and truth that a nation that is not
determined to protect itself cannot survive. As admiral Lee Soon-shin said
if you seek to die you live and if you seek to live you die. This land is a
precious place that we will be buried in and will leave to our descendants
to last forever. We have to keep this land until the end of the world. It
should never be trodden on by the ignorant communists. If we fail to defend
this land we will die.'

In his brain, there was a map of hell caused by the national leaders
abandoning the people during the Korean War. He had tried to prevent it
happening by predicting what would happen and felt lost because he had not
been listened to.'The Official History Of The Korean War' volume I states,

'Because of the demolition of the bridges over the Han 44,000 soldiers fight
in Seoul were missing. In the 7th division 500 out of 10,000 managed to
cross the river carrying just four machine guns. From the 1st division,
5,000 crossed, but had to leave their artillery behind. The 2nd, 3rd and 5th
divisions managed to cross the river in a disorderly manner. Government
officials and citizens abandoned in the city were either massacred or went
into hiding.'

The leaders of the country escaped from Seoul secretly in accordance with
their position of power. Syngman Rhee left at 2:00am on June 27, defence
minister Shin at 2:00pm the same day and army chief of staff Chae Byong-deok
at 2:00am, June 28. Chae even failed to order a withdrawal of front-line
units before he left, though there may have not been a communication system
set up.

Those who suffered the most among the abandoned were the wounded. On June
24, there were 1,300 patients in the army hospital in Seoul. After three
days of fighting 3,200 wounded soldiers were placed in civilian hospitals
including Seoul National University Hospital, which was protected by one
platoon. When the North Korean soldiers entered Seoul, eighty or so wounded
who could walk went up a mountain and continued to fight until they were all
killed. The remaining wounded were then massacred in their beds.('The
History Of The Korean War' volume I)

On September 15, 1950 the martial law high court sentenced chief engineer,
Choi Chang-shik to death for gross misconduct in the face of the enemy. The
main culprit, Chae Byong-deok had already been killed two month before in
the battle at Hadong. Colonel Choi was executed on September 21, 1950.

After the May 16 coup, Choi's wife Ok Jeong-ae appealed for a reversal of
the conviction which she won. The appeal decision said that the action to
demolish the bridge was,

'in accordance with operational orders from a superior officer. Choi tried
to stop people and cars approaching the bridge by firing over people's heads
and delaying the explosion for forty minutes. His behavior was according to
military behavior.'

Many witnesses say that Choi could not evade moral responsibility, knowing
that many people were on the bridge. If communications could have been
maintained then the blast could have been prevented. After Chae Byong-deok
escaped to Shiheung and ordered the bridges blown, staff at headquarters
suddenly realized that they should delay demolition until a withdrawal of
forces was achieved.

They sent operational chief Chang Chang-kook and section chief Chung
Lae-hyok to the bridge to prevent the blast, but the two failed to contact
Choi due to a paralysed communications network. When the two arrived at a
police box near the bridge, they were prevented going any further by
military police who would not listen to them. All Chae Byong-deok thought
about when giving the order was to prevent North Korean tanks crossing the
river.

In the early morning of June 28, first-lieutenant Kim Ki-dam, an ordinance
officer of the capital defence command was able to cross the Han on foot. He
contributed to the book 'Witnessed By Old Soldiers' compiled by Kim
Jon-pil's classmates,

'After the Hangang bridge was blown I went to the railroad bridges. As I
neared them it was obvious the two outer ones had been blown up, but I was
not sure about the central one. I walked on the wooden sleepers and about
halfway across I found boxes of dynamite with a fuse leading to the other
side. I couldn't run because I had to stay on the sleepers. The bridge save
my life, but allowed the tanks across.'

This one railroad bridge was intact, and if people had known, many lives
would have been saved. Several days later, North Korean tanks rolled across
this bridge, making the blasting of the other bridges no consequence.



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----- Original Message -----
From: "Ed Evanhoe" <ede@oio.net>
To: <korean-war-l@UKANS.EDU>
Sent: Tuesday, May 23, 2000 11:18 AM
Subject: Destruction of the Han River Bridge


There is considerable question about who exactly ordered the Han River
Bridges
blown. At the time these were destroyed there were still 56 KMAG people,
including Hausman, plus General Chae and his staff still in Seoul. They
had to cross the Han east of Seoul via ferries, this according the U.S.
Army In the Korean War: South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu. A
different story from KMAG IN PEACE AND WAR says that Hausman
and General Chae had just crossed the Han River Bridge and was on the south
bank of the Han when the bridge was destroyed. In this account, Chae was