7,726 South Korean Agents Confirmed Lost in North Korea

["Young Kim" <y_s_k@worldnet.att.net>]

7,726 South Korean Agents Confirmed Lost in North Korea
South Korea has been waging covert war on North Korea since 1948. This is in
addition to the covert war waged by the United States against North Korea.
Recent disclosures indicate that the scale of these operations was
astronomical.
The ROKA Intelligence Department keeps files on 49,892 agents and the
anti-North spy operation is still active. Records show that 5,576 agents
were confirmed lost in the 1950's, whereas 2,150 agents were confirmed lost
since 1960 at a rate of 10%. The loss rate was probably 90% during 1950's
and the 'confirmed' figure of lost agents does not represent the total
picture. Furthermore, these figures are in addution to the Korean agents
handled by the US intelligence units.

Source: Hankyoreh, August 15, 1999,  Issue #269



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 Photo: Students of the First Training Center, The ROKA Intelligence Unit in
operation since the Armistice.

The Korean War ended on July 27, 1953. We thought that the War that took
several million lives in a fratricidal nightmare had ended. But the fact is
that the War went on in covert actions conducted by both sides, and the
killing fellow countrymen continued.

The main casualties were among the covert action agents dispatched to North
Korea. These agents are forgotten.

2,150 Agents Missing in North Korea Since 1960
How many agents are MIA and what were their missions in North Korea?
 Photo: ROKA Intelligence Agency HQ huidden in a forest

When the secret covert actions against North Korea became public after 50
years of operation, we were shocked by its large scale.

7,726 agents dispatched to North Korea are missing and presumed captured or
killed by North Korean security forces. A high-ranking officer if the spy
agency said that the operation continued until 1970's and during this time
frame, 7,726 agents were confirmed lost. ROKA has files open on these
agents.

He said that even after 1960 when the hostile actions officially stopped,
agents were sent north on a large scale, and 2,150 agents were confirmed
lost by July 4, 1972 when the first North-South agreement was signed.

Until now we thought that only a few thousands agents were lost. The figure
of nearly 8,000 confirmed lost is indeed astonishing in view of the fact
that this figure does not include unconfirmed losses. What is more shocking
is the large number of agents lost since 1960. Even seven years after the
Armistice, South Korea sent about 180 agents to North Korea per year for 12
years.

One may argue that the 1950's were still war years, but 1960's and on were
thought to be years of no hostile actions. The fact that more than 2,000
armed agents were sent north shows that the war continued. An intelligence
officer stated that this casualty figure is not too high in light of the
large scale covert actions.

If so many agents had been lost, why their operations had remained secret
for so long?

The reason is that the Armistice agreement forbids confrontations. For 20
years South and North Koreas conducted covert operations aimed at
unification via absorption and communization, respectively. Covert actions
by their very nature are secret.

They are neither confirmed nor denied. Admitting to their existence amounts
to admitting violating the Armistice agreement.

The 'Water Color' Unit - Six-Month Evaluation Period
During 20 years of operation, South Korea's covert operations went through
evolutionary changes. The covert operation of the 1950's are fairly
well-known from eyewitness accounts of the participants, but the operations
in the 1960's and later years are sketchy.

The eyewitness account of a former agent Mr. X shows a glimpse of the later
operations. Mr. X states that the main difference between the operations
during 1950's and later decades is the sharp decrease in the rate of the
agents list in North Korea. In the 1950's, the loss rate was as high as 90%,
In contrast, the loss rate was only about 10% after 1960.

Mr. X states that the lower loss rate was due to the better training of the
agents in later years, The Agents in the 1950's received limited training.
An official stated that the agents of the earlier years were man-handled and
mismanaged, whereas the newer agents received scientific training and more
advanced management.

The agent recruiting method changed in the 1960's, too. Agents were selected
after a six-month observation by a special team code-named "Water Color
(mul-saek)" unit. . Agents candidates underwent intensive one-one
interrogation prior to their final selection. Mr. X was with a Labor
Reconstruction Battalion when he was approached by the Water Color unit and
asked if he would serve the country on a special mission.

In the 1950's, agents were recruited from single refugees from North Korea.
After 1960, agents were selected from North Korean refugees as well as South
Korean unemployed, prison inmates and youth gangs. Agent candidates were
expected to be young, healthy and bright. Since 1960, agents were hired on a
3-4 year service contract. Agents received substantial signup bonus and also
additional bonuses for exceptional performance in North Korea.

Agents were asked to keep their service secret for ever. Agents were
released after completing their contract and if they wanted, they were
enlisted in the regular army. Ex-agents were never rehired, a universal rule
practiced by most intelligence organizations of other nations.

Agents after 1960 received better training. Mr. X states that he received
about 8 hours of training a day. Map reading, radio communication,
photography and survival methods were taught in depth. He said that he could
survive for a year living off the land. The most difficult part of the
training was crossing 12km of mountain terrain in one hour carrying a 30kg
sandbag. After six months of practice, he was able to run the length with
ease.

July 4, 1972 North-South Agreement?
The covert operations continued unchanged. There were two classes of
missions for the agents. A class A mission was to infiltrate key government
and military installations and obtain secret documents or capture key
personnel. A class B mission was to counter the North Korean troops crossing
the DMZ and to capture enemy equipment. Class B missions were conducted by
special agents, while class B missions were done by lesser agents.
Mr. Kim was a typical class A agent. He crossed into North Korea 51 times
since 1951 and achieved outstanding results. He became a hero among the
agents. For example, he captured a North Korean colonel Lee in May 1954 near
Wonsan. This feat was classified the top achievement.

Class B missions were normally conducted near the DMZ. The agents retaliated
against intrusions by the People's Army. They also observed the enemy
training methods and captured new equipment in order to evaluate their
characteristics. Class B missions usually lasted for 8-9 days. Critical
missions were directed by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency.

The camp life of the agents differed greatly from the army camp life. The
agents were never beaten by their superiors (as in the army) because the
agents carried weapons at all times. All items used by the agents had their
tags removed so their origin could not be traced.

Information on each agent hired after 1960 - contract date, release date,
home town, family, performance, mission dates and so on - were recorded on
microfilm and preserved to this day. In contrast, agents in the 1950's were
not fully documented due to the fog of war and poor agent management method.
This suggests that figure 7,726 of the agents confirmed lost is a
conservative number and the actual number would be much higher.

The military made a grave stone for every agent confirmed lost whether they
had a family or not. In 1993, a memorial service was held at the Mang-wol
Temple, U-i-dong, Seoul, for the 7,726 agents confirmed lost. Their grave
stones were moved there.

The Army Intelligence Unit is still in operation at a secrete site in
Kang-won-do. Are agents still being sent North? The officials are mum on
this point but claim that the agents are needed for emergency and repeated
the official line that no armed agents have been sent since the 1972
declaration.


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For further information
a.. Korean Covert Action MIAs (http://www.kimsoft.com/kr-ccrak.htm)
b.. Jun In Sik, Baik-gol Bying-dan Jun-tu Sang-bo, Korea Junk-San Research
Center, Seoul, Korea, 1997.