[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
Re: WWI-L - The Veteran and American Society Conference (fwd)
Gentlemen,
Do see what I said about the 21st Regiment's early battles in Korea. A
version in the Soldier of Fortune of July has much of my perspectives on this.
My attitudes on Vietnam are focused on our taking the wrong lessons from
Korea there. Send me a snail mail address and I will share my beliefs about
our follies there. Do see Chalmers Johnson's Blowback for a far more
sophisticated view of our post WWII efforts in Asia.
My reaction to a cri de coeur by an intelligence officer is pasted below.
Best regards,
Carl Bernard (Task Force Smith; "Love" Company, 21st Infantry; 7th Special
Forces, Laos, 1961; Province Senior Advisor, Hau Nghia, Chao Duc, Vinh Binh
1967-1969)
"TO KILL SOMEONE, PERSUADE HIM THAT WHAT HE IS DOING IS WORTHLESS"
Voltaire's words were meant to capture the importance and psychic power of
habit and inertia, two of the more powerful forces that affect and disable
American military and their supporting intelligence services, hence our
decision makers. Examples of the might of this phenomenon are legion; they
certainly abound in the bureaucracies everywhere in our government's service.
Challenges to elements bent on preserving their roles, especially those
serving our military, are regarded as slurs and attacks on the patriotism of
those who have dedicated their lives to protecting the nation.
A former intelligence officer, Robert Steele, has aggravated his old
profession with a suggestion that it has taken on and adhered to a set of
procedures that are not serving the nation. He makes a powerful case that
"open sources" contain most of the information (95%!) our decision-makers
need. He implies that the vast elements assembled to process and protect
data acquired clandestinely are wasting our country's resources in failed
efforts by our intelligence services to carry out their responsibilities.
Even more striking, the data from open sources can be found on remote parts
of the world a few days. One damning paraphrase from the Navy Wing Commander
who led the lead flight over Baghdad: If it is 85% accurate, on time, and I
can share it, this is a lot more useful to me than a compendium of Top Secret
Codeword materials that are too much, too late, and requires a safe and three
security officers to move around the battlefield.
Steele makes his powerful case for integrating open source material in a just
published work: ON INTELLIGENCE, Spies and Secrecy in an Open World. His
illustrations make those of us who have served on military operations cringe
as we think of the costly errors, large and small, in which we were involved.
Steele is certain to make many converts among us. My concern, however, is
that there are so few who will understand that what happened to us was as a
result of repairable and inadequate faulty intelligence. This will allow the
erring and ignorant responsible bureaucrats responsible to keep using the
inertia inherent in their structure to continue mis-serving the nation.
Sun Tzu enjoined soldiers to know their enemy and themselves. Modern
politics and war add another element that we must know, our allies. Our
folly in Vietnam was the direct result of our intelligence services inability
to understand how ignorant and innocent they were. The culture of the
Vietnamese, allies and enemies alike, remained as much a mystery to our
intelligence elements as the strange language they spoke. Their explanations
to our political and military chiefs of the impact of various actions before
they were taken, often proved to be inane. And their expertise, described in
the miserable summary of John Paul Vann, was that "we had one year of
experience, ten times."
WHAT CAN BE DONE? This is the right question. The answer comes in two
parts: first, who are the open sources whose knowledge can be applied?
Second, how can their information be acquired? Steele offers a program for
each that would certainly serve our decision makers far better than what they
are being told today. The obstacle is the existing structure; the most
effective enduring enemy we have to overcome is US.
The belief expressed by Bismarck: "God takes care of fools, drunks and the
United States of America" still seems reasonable enough. We have certainly
been able to avoid payment for our various errors. The CIA invented a term,
"Blowback," for the unintended consequences that accompany many of our
actions. One of our (the?) foremost Asian scholars, Chalmers Johnson, used
this term as the title for his recent work about our post-WWII follies in
Asia.
Steele provides an opportunity to augment/improve enormously our intelligence
data bases at very little cost. His case is undeniable. The nation would be
well served if both Presidential candidates and their staffs read his work
and faced what has to be done during the upcoming debates. It would be
devastating for the other if it is only known to one of them.
The post-election draft letter (page 269) to the incoming President could be
redrafted and sent now. The draft bill Steele proposes (Pages 304 -334) for
the Senate and Congress to send the new President is certainly presumptuous.
It is also worth a close reading by everyone aware of our intelligence
agencies' situation in regard to OSINT (Open Source Intelligence).