Re: research

[<ChicoRamos1889@aol.com>]

In a message dated 10/20/00 10:40:40 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
Cfbernard@aol.com writes:

<< Subj:     Re: research
 Date:  10/20/00 10:40:40 AM Eastern Daylight Time
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 Please send him the message pasted to this.
 
 Carl Bernard
 
 
 OSAN, CHONUI, AND CHOCHIWON,  THE 21st INFANTRY REGIMENT'S FIRST THREE 
 BATTLES IN KOREA
 
 Who and What We Were
 
 To the Japanese people we were the victorious, occupying army astride their 
 industrious, talented, martial nation.  We say ourselves committed and 
 engaged in reorienting them to become a positive, but peaceful economic 
force 
 in Asia.  We even thought to raise the status of Japan's women by extending 
 them voting and property rights.  Indulgent and overconfident in the 
American 
 nuclear umbrella, we seldom engaged in field exercises, involving ourselves 
 chiefly with housekeeping and garrison duties.  All units were 
under-strength.
 
 Our first fight in Korea was with 540 men who had to move up, locate, and 
 prepare a defensive position in less than five days; naturally, we were 
 roundly defeated. Compare this preparation and result with five months of 
 preparation and the 400,000-plus troops involved in our Persian Gulf conflict
 
 Many of the WWII weapons we took to Korea had been condemned by our own 
 division ordnance inspectors as "unfit for combat."   For example, a 
sergeant 
 and I taught a class on flame-throwers the month before we embarked; but we 
 had to cannibalize all eight weapons in the Regiment to get two that worked. 
 All had "503 PIR" stenciled on them by the 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment 
 that had dropped onto Corregidor with them five years earlier.
 
 General Matthew Ridgway, the splendid soldier who brought us back from being 
 a beaten Army headed off the Korean Peninsula in a near-panic motorized 
 retreat, said we had gone to Korea in a  "... state of shameful 
 un-readiness," striking a forceful corrective theme
 
 Our national age-old tradition that we didn't need an Army once the enemy at 
 hand was beaten. Hiroshima and Nagasaki persuaded us that ground forces were 
 no longer relevant, so we slashed our defense budget and the size of our 
 forces. We filled our intelligence services with incompetents, also 
 traditional, and deliberately chose to assign our least qualified people to 
 infantry units that would be first in combat.  As a final error, personnel 
in 
 Japan were constantly moved, destroying unit cohesion - the most beautiful 
 word in the lexicon of soldiers. Combat units survive on personnel who know 
 and trust each other.   
 
 A capable fighting unit is NOT just a set of well-trained and competent 
 individuals.  A brief illustration:  I was one of two lieutenants in the 
 regiment trained as parachutists.  This got me sent to the airfield at 
Kokura 
 to load out TFS, to which I did not belong.  Colonel Smith said, "Stay on 
the 
 plane.  I've got work for you."  As my fourth platoon in eight months, this 
 ensured me about the same close personal contacts as a hired gun. 
 
 What We Did
 
 The official history is unkind about what happened to my platoon full of 
 strangers in our first fight.  It says we failed to get the word to withdraw 
 and didn't know the rest of the outfit had left.  True, and most of the 
 platoon was destroyed because we stayed too long in a losing fight
 
 The TFS Executive Officer, Major Floyd Martin attributed the reason that my 
 new TFS platoon never received the withdrawal order at Osan to the company 
 commander's telling Brad Smith that I was dead and my platoon gone. This 
 misstatement left my platoon serving as a rear guard for a short time, 
rather 
 than the close-in combat outpost line (COPL) role originally required by our 
 location.  
 
 Before the NK infantry ground attack began, I'd gone back with my bazooka 
 gunner to the ditch that led to a road splitting our company positions, 
 keeping me alive for the horror of Chochiwon six days later.  I had heard 
the 
 Bazookas firing and could see the tanks going on through anyway, making me 
 believe our young gunners were missing their targets
 
 Another platoon leader, 2/Lt Jansen Cox (murdered as a POW) was there 
already 
 with his Bazooka team, and we worked from the relatively safe locale of the 
 ditch.  2/Lt Ollie Connor, another platoon leader originally from I Company, 
 was on top of the hill-knob just south of us. (The T-34's coaxial MGs were 
 Jan's and my only danger, and we were safe as soon as the big tube passed us 
 by.)  The eight hits I got myself with no discernible effect on the passing 
 T-34s corrected my impression of gunners firing wide, and it taught me a 
 valuable lesson for Love Company's fight the following week
 
 In his On To Berlin. General Gavin details burying parachutists in Sicily 
 with bits of Bazookas ground up in their bodies.  The seats in Hell closest 
 to the fire are for Army officers who knew the Bazooka didn't work and did 
 not alert our soldiers to its inability to kill tanks, while keeping the 
 larger, much more effective 3.5-inch rocket launcher back in the States. 
 
 We could not bring one wounded sergeant with us. We left him with a Korean 
 farmer with a wheelbarrow.  We gave him my rose gold Longines wristwatch 
 (poker game) with a note asking the first American unit he met to give the 
 farmer $100 cash for delivering the sergeant.  They arrived in Pusan on the 
 8th, making it to the coast and down on a fishing boat!  I don't know if the 
 farmer got his money.  It took me and the stragglers I had gathered up three 
 days of prudent walking around North Korean units to reach our retreating 
 forces. 
 
 Our group was too large.  After the third time we were nearly caught, I 
 detailed a very young first-rate soldier who had been walking scout for us 
to 
 take about five men with him and another trail south.  This was buried in my 
 memory until 1985 at a TFS reunion in Ohio when a tall old man came up to 
ask 
 if I remembered him.  It was the same guy; they got back a day before usI 
met 
 the 34th Infantry Regimental Commander very early in the morning three days 
 later at Chonan.  We had broken into a schoolhouse near Ansong and torn a 
 large map from a geography book that had the road south to Chonan on it.  
 Scraps of a South Korean recon unit had been with us the day before, helping 
 with locations.  Their CO shot one of his men who wanted to surrender and 
 turn us in as proof they were willing to become good communists.  
 
 We had gone sharply east from Osan and were in hilly country until forced to 
 go west to regain the main road.  I had located all the NK tanks we had seen 
 (only tanks; we would not have been able to evade infantry) on my map, and 
 explained their location to the Colonel. Some were just outside Chonan!  
(The 
 Colonel was killed fighting them later that morning.)  I described the fight 
 at Osan to him as well as I could, with a particular emphasis on the 
 invulnerable tanks.  I was adamant about the impossibility of our Bazooka 
 killing tanks, even from the flank where I had been shooting.  He asked 
 whether I had pulled the rocket's safety clips before loading and firing, 
and 
 speculated that the fuses were possibly too old or had been badly stored, 
 hence damaged in Japan.  The fragments I had in my face and hands helped me 
 assure him that they were exploding.  I showed him how we were perfectly 
safe 
 firing from down in our ditch after the big gun with the co-axially mounted 
 MG had dragged by
 
 I thought that some of our bazooka rounds had not exploded, and attributed 
 this to the warhead not having time to arm because we were too close.  Jan 
 had said something like this at the time. The Colonel had someone with him 
 who knew these were T-34s, describing a slanting, hexagonal turret.  I had 
no 
 idea earlier what kind of tank it was.  
 
  My discussion with him was also about the artillery FO who had been with 
me, 
 and the fact that we had lost communication, hence had almost no support 
 after the first tanks went through us. They tore up our wire while the rain 
 was taking out our obsolete radios.  Combined arms training could have 
 identified the problem of mixing tank treads and telephone wire; alas, 
 housekeeping in Japan left little time for such things
 
 Artillery would have made a difference when the Korean infantry dismounted 
 and moved in those long lines around us.  I mentioned that my platoon's .30 
 caliber machine gun, and the BARs were not effective once the North Koreans 
 first got off their trucks some 1000 yards out.  The .50 cal might have 
 reached them (firing from a knob several hundred yards behind me) but the 
 Koreans were well out of my range until dispersing just before their 
assault. 
  This is almost the same story as at Chochiwon, particularly the long 
columns 
 walking around us.  We fired, and they kept going on their course
 
 I had thought I was on loan to "B" Company and went on back to "Love" after 
 Doc Duerk had finished patching me up and dosing me with medicinal alcohol, 
 thoughtfully keeping me overnight on one of his stretchers.  Captain Cox had 
 given away my platoon, but said there would be one available shortly; very 
 true
 
 A and D Companies, the still usable elements of the 21st Infantry Regiment's 
 First Battalion, not committed at Osan, were in a blocking position at 
Chonui 
 when they were attacked early on 10 July by a force they could not contain.  
 Their forced withdrawal caused a number of their men to be left in 
 uncoordinated fragments on position; not a defense.  The Regiment's Third 
 Battalion was directed to counterattack to recover the blocking position 
 about noon on 10 July.  This well-done effort succeeded despite considerable 
 resistance by North Koreans who had not yet established a coherent defense 
on 
 the positions they had seized.  We rescued about ten men from A Company.  We 
 found four men on the 4.2 heavy mortar position with their hands tied behind 
 them with telephone wire, each shot in the head.  One was a corporal in 
 khaki, a reporter from the Stars and Stripes.
 
 Our night withdrawal back to our original positions north of Chochiwon was 
 tightly controlled, despite the dislocations caused by the numbers we had 
 killed, wounded  and evacuated during the counterattack.  K Company's 
 positions were partially occupied by the North Korean soldiers able to flank 
 us when we were focused at Chonui.  They fought much of the night; K Company 
 was forced into locations slightly different from where they had prepared 
 defenses on 9 July
 
 The Koreans attacked our just-evacuated positions at Chonui at first light, 
 and moved on through them to our new locations in heavy fog.  One of their 
 elements moved as close to our front as they could and kept us under 
sporadic 
 fire.  As the fog cleared, and we could see something over three hundred 
 yards to our front, trotting formations were visible scurrying eastward 
 parallel to our positions.  This was almost the same situation as at Osan on 
 the 5th.  My light machine gun and that of the third platoon were not able 
to 
 stop their flanking movement here either.  The company mortars were shooting 
 for first platoon. Our artillery, unknown to us, had already been taken out 
 by infiltrators.  Our problematic ally, the USAF took out its own FAC early. 
 
 It was not the last time the magic pill of air power would fail us
 
 Love Company's idiotic "hold at all costs" order kept us in place.  We got 
 relief from this at 1100 hours, and were authorized to pull back at 1130. 
 Captain Cox gave me the artillery FO and instructions to stay on my position 
 until then. We were defending against what the official history later 
 described as: "This attack on the 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry was one of 
the 
 most perfectly coordinated assaults ever launched by North Koreans against 
 American troops." Our defense was later described as "...the most impressive 
 performance yet of American troops in Korea"; small comfort to the company's 
 men who paid its costs.
 
 Unknown to us the Koreans had already flanked our positions and had machine 
 guns on the ridge behind us before launching their "pinning" attack.  Our 
 ammunition was already diminished by the previous day's fight, and the well 
 installed North Korean roadblocks to the company's rear kept us from being 
 resupplied.  Most survivors of this fight went due south in small groups 
into 
 the NK force behind us that had gotten there by going around our flanks.  
 Twenty-seven of these men found they had no option but surrender.  A dozen 
of 
 these did not survive the stay in "Tiger's Camp." ('Johnny's list,' kept in 
 his toothpaste tube by one of the 15, tells when, how, and where these and 
 other POWs died.  See the Readers Digest of January, 1998
 
 The lucky handful with me who covered the final withdrawal went west 
 immediately across the road from where the BN CP had been, crossed the 
 railroad track and the river,  surviving to fight again.  The lessons: first 
 be lucky; then keep a clip of ammunition for the pullout you may have to 
 make; and never willingly  take the desperate possibility of living as a 
POW. 
  The official history intoned: "One officer of L Company [me] who came out 
 with some men said that after he and others had removed an enemy machine gun 
 blocking their escape route, some uninjured men by the side of the road 
 simply refused to try to go on.  One noncom said, 'Lieutenant, you will have 
 to go on, I'm too beat up.  They'll just have to take me.'" I never learned 
 if he survived prison camp since he was not from Love Company, but the odds 
 were grim
 
 Two months later I identified the bodies of a number of those still there 
who 
 had been KIA or wounded early in the fight.  All the wounded had been 
killed, 
 and also many who had surrendered.  Graves Registration led me by the hand, 
 sobbing much too hard to see, through our abandoned positions and the 
 battalion aid station to name the ones I could
 
 Almost all of the men captured from Love Company were taken after we had 
 stayed much too long above Chochiwon because of the order that kept us in 
 place. Captain Cox, some of our veteran NCOs, and the replacements we had 
 received made a great difference, and the company fought surprisingly well.  
 We delayed the North Koreans for two days, but at great cost
 
 What We Learned
 
 Regarding rifle companies, taking data still true today, almost 90 % of 
 WWII's war casualties (killed, captured, and wounded) were in the Army.  Of 
 these, about 90 % were in the infantry's rifle platoons.  I suspect that 90 
% 
 of the other casualties were Marine infantrymen.  Essentially, these numbers 
 say that being in an infantry rifle platoon in combat means you are going to 
 be killed or wounded; not if you will be hit, but when and how bad
 
 The most effective leader of fighters I've ever known was the sergeant who 
 had deserted the 24th Infantry Division's headquarters to come forward to 
our 
 rifle company.  My watching everything he did, understanding why, and 
 imitating him is likely why I'm alive today.  Even though he was younger 
than 
 I, his previous experience with Merrill's Marauders was far more relevant 
 than my non-fighting role in the 7th Marines. You may never encounter such 
an 
 exemplar of military virtue when you need him most, but borrow the right 
 things from each of the best you do come across. 
 
 This sergeant burned the first tank we killed an hour after we had wasted 
its 
 crew.  He had poked a loaded carbine's muzzle through the pistol port they 
 opened to shoot us off the back of their tank, and his ricochets took out 
the 
 crew.  I asked him later why he was burning it, as the crew was already 
dead. 
  He answered: "I want them others to know where this one is, what happened 
to 
 it, and for them to be discouraged about the idea of coming where we are." 
 
 The only flaw in his theory was the noxious brown trail of smoke that helped 
 US Air Force pilots see it.  They strafed it in the middle of our position 
 for the next two hours!  We were dug in so well by then that none of us were 
 hit.  DOUBLE LESSON: dig yourself in if any aircraft overfly the area, as 
 they do not discriminate well.  Do not count on your own planes to solve 
your 
 problem with dug-in enemy infantry.  This only happens in Hollywood scripts. 
 
 Note also, that much of the advantage we think our airplanes should provide 
 disappears as the enemy quickly learns to dig in too.  
 
 Simply stated: decorations for the infantry's fighters at platoon level are 
 awarded in an erratic manner, and too few of those earned are ever granted.  
 Most are not because men in rifle squads see a world few others do, and many 
 at these levels are often not able to describe what they have seen even if 
 they are aware of its significance.  Also, there are few persons with whom 
 they can talk
 
 S/Sgt. Hugh Brown had deserted forward from the Division's headquarters on 
 July 1st  to join "Love" company.  We found this out when proposing a 
 battlefield commission for him while we were still on the Naktong.  He left 
a 
 hospital without permission after his second wound in late September, 
because 
 being promoted required 30 days on the line; he did not want to return to 
 Japan as the junior officer in the company (we innocents thought the war was 
 over after Seoul was retaken
 
 The backbone of the Army is its rifle squads and platoons.  Their leadership 
 is "absolutely critical."  The words: your team has to function after you 
get 
 hit. This means you must prepare all of them to lead it when you are gone.  
 Few circumstances let men prepare their people for this, the ultimate 
 responsibility of a leader
 
 My purpose is to tap my experience, exposure, and observations, to help 
 soldiers and Marines better learn and prepare for the world in which they 
 must work.  General Ridgeway called this "the aimed fire war," the focus of 
 which is to help fighters think about what it takes to carry out their 
 greatest responsibility, leading their fellows for some of what may be the 
 last minutes of their lives.  By the circumstances of this work, fighter 
 leaders are vulnerable, and often short lived.  The term "leader" is  a 
 formal designation, but its affirmation is always in the hands of those who 
 are led.  
 
 Men fight for comrades, those with them in the battle; they do not fight for 
 larger and more glorious goals.  Note that the "fighting" I am speaking of 
is 
 an intimate horror to which only walking infantry are exposed and must 
 endure.  My word picture of fighting: "Crawling on your belly like a serpent 
 close enough to throw a grenade at the hostile wretch with the noisy machine 
 gun."  This narrow view allows for one to throw the grenade and another to 
 stand up and shoot the gunner when he swings his tube around to kill the 
 grenadier.
 
 Machine gunners come with support crews who stay by knowing and countering 
 your form of attack.  Being outfought comes at high cost, with no appeals!  
 Such roles are ultimate unnatural acts that neither you nor the grenade guy 
 may survive.  There are no other solutions, however; do not expect Rambo to 
 come up to do it for you.  You and your team are the only sure resource you 
 have for staying alive.  Fighting means moving in isolation with the rest of 
 your rifle squad into a lonesome, menacing void.  Your psychic or material 
 resources may be few: what you have at hand, acquired, hoarded, and fully 
 mastered.  
 
 Your most valuable asset is earned confidence in yourself, bolstered by what 
 you know of your fellows.  The sound of a machine gun includes the screams 
of 
 the men it hits.  This makes your confidence transient at best, and subject 
 to getting used up.  The role and responsibility of the leader in all this 
is 
 to earn, acquire, and share this critical confidence with all of his men.  
 The operative word is earn. 
 
 In a body of fighting men, be it a four-man fire-team, the remnants of a 12 
 man squad, or even a large unit like the 22 men still left in your platoon, 
 everyone is responsible for all the others.  Survival is mutually dependent. 
 Your role is taking care of yourself and each of them as you sort out how to 
 accomplish your mission, and then set about carrying it out.  A crucial 
 phrase is mutual trust, and again, this must be earned.  Bobby Burns: "Wad a 
 gift the giftie gie us, to see oursels as others see us," is precisely what 
 each leader must distill within himself: the burden and exultation in the 
 eyes of the men responding.  
 
 The attention a leader gives the mission and those responsible for executing 
 it is the first part of hostilities, indispensable mutual confidence 
 building.  The building blocks must be both psychic and physical.  Mastering 
 needed tools may including some as simple as treating blisters or wounds, 
 clearing a jammed rifle, and hitting what one shoots at, but it must be 
 automatic and done very well.  Observe everyone, but especially the most 
 effective of the leaders in your outfit.  Imitate these gifted and/or 
 experienced ones!  Put yourself in their shoes to better understand what 
they 
 do.  Think about how to orient yourself to do the same things.  Such men may 
 be above or below you in rank.  Relative status does not and should not 
limit 
 what you can learn from any of them
 
 Fighting that "distinguishes" soldiers from their fellows is too seldom 
 recognized in the field.  This stems from the fact that those who fight, the 
 routine activities of rifle squads, often heroic, encounter those that far 
up 
 front who are not writers and may not  recognize what actions merit 
 recognition.  Nevertheless, combat decorations have great importance; 
nowhere 
 is the strict truth about what has happened more important.  
 
 Napoleon remarked to the effect that a man would go to the "...gates of hell 
 for a bit of ribbon to wear on his chest," a mystique of combat.  
Infantrymen 
 are the persons who earn these honors, yet these usually fail to be awarded. 
 
 That is the main reason the Combat Infantry Badge is so important and the 
 reason why some qualified men wear it only. 
 
 Being terrorized by the circumstances in which you find yourself in battle 
is 
 natural and wholly concentrates the mind, but it must not numb it.  Just 
 knowing this may happen is the best protection from it you can muster.  Good 
 enough, leave your shelter and as you crawl towards that tank, keep looking 
 for an open port; and look hard for the infantry he may have deployed to 
 protect his precious hardware from hard cases like you.  
 
 Note that my focus on tanks is not incidental.  The most terrifying sound 
you 
 will ever hear is the crunching sound of tank tracks very close by.  Do not 
 think that their crews have become evil by confinement in their steel boxes, 
 but they are looking to grind your body dead or alive under their treads.  
 This is simply the most effective psychological warfare they can practice on 
 those infantrymen who survive.  A tanker's immediate intention is to lower 
 the morale of those of you who are still able to watch and every man is a 
 large sack of blood, alive or not.  This nasty fraud has been often known to 
 work
 
 Can such psychic shocks be overcome?  Yes, indeed.  Errant thoughts such as 
 anticipating ones own sudden death can momentarily paralyze the mind, making 
 the outcome even more certain, or they may make it easier to throw down an 
 empty rifle to plead for life; bad outcomes better avoided by thinking and 
 planning in advance.  
 
 A former Army Chief of Staff acknowledged a heartfelt theme our nation needs 
 to embrace:   "NO MORE TASK FORCE SMITHS."  The following quote is from the 
 manual the troops in the Gulf used
 
 "History has shown that sometimes the troops are misinformed on the 
 capabilities of a piece of equipment or a unit's capability to execute a 
 mission in a specified time.  This misconception is enhanced by limits to 
 training and shortcuts in training to meet mission goals.  As an example 
Task 
 Force Smith, which as a well-trained unit, was not told of the inability of 
 the 2.36 inch rocket to penetrate the frontal armor of North Korean tanks, 
 panic set in after rounds bounced off the front of the tanks
 
 One might well interpret this to mean that we shouldn't buy exotic Stealth 
 bombers just to keep aerospace workers employed.  It certainly means that 
our 
 intelligence must take on new qualities and become adequate and timely.  It 
 means that we must retain and assign our most competent leaders and soldiers 
 to man "first to fight" units.  And it means that our Senators and 
 Congressmen must insist on fielding an Army that is well equipped and 
 properly trained.  It is certain to be needed again one day
 
 Think about the wastebasket in your office catching fire from one careless 
 person still smoking cigarettes; a cup of coffee puts it out with little 
 fuss.  The garden hose is required  if the office is burning,  the fire 
 department if the building itself begins to flame. You'll be dynamiting the 
 buildings that are not burning to stop the conflagration if the whole block 
 goes up.  The lesson for the Army in this: Prepare well and ahead of the 
 crisis. 
 
 
 
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