Re: Korean War strategies (response)

[Ed Evanhoe <ede@oio.net>]

John,

No these are not mentioned in my book.  Think you find references to these 
actions in, U. S. Army in the Korean War: South to the Naktong, North to 
the Yalu and in, Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War.  There 
are also a number of excellent oral histories at the Military History 
Institute, Carlisle Barracks confirming these actions.

As for dawn on 25 June 1950, it was approximately 6 AM, Korean Time.  There 
is no way the landings on the East Coast, nor the transport that was sunk 
just before midnight off Pusan, could have reached any of these areas as 
part of a counterattack.  Think logistics.  Not only travel time but also 
the logistics involved in mounting such operations precludes these being 
counterattacks.

> >>Interestingly, the US Ambassador in Seoul did not
>report the attack to Washington until 10 a.m.
>(Korean time). If KMAG reported the attack at 5a.m.,
>I find the delay in Muccio's report very odd.<<

Not odd at all.  It was a peacetime Sunday morning with nothing out of the 
ordinary expected so the Embassy staff was scattered all around Seoul and 
the surrounding countryside.  This included the Embassy communications 
staff.  Also, there was some uncertainty during the first few hours that 
this really was an all-out invasion, not just a border clash.  It took the 
embassy staff some time conclude that war was actually underway.

BTW - In 1951  personally talked with several of the KMAG people who were 
on the east coast the morning of 25 June 1950.  Their accounts back then 
match the official U.S. Army history.

Ed

Ed Evanhoe, PO Box 916, Antlers, OK, 74523
Author: DARKMOON: Eighth Army Special Operations in the Korean War
Life Member: Special Forces & Special Operations Associations
Web site:  http://www.korean-war.com