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Fwd: [kwvets] Fwd: Changjin Journal 11.26.00



Ed - suggest you contact George Rasula with a view to posting his journal 
here too. Marty

X-Sender: jonrasula@pop.earthlink.net
Date: Sun, 26 Nov 2000 23:20:36 -0500
To: rasulag@earthlink.net
From: jon rasula <jonrasula@earthlink.net>
Subject: Changjin Journal 11.26.00


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CHANGJIN JOURNAL 11.25.00
The Changjin Journal is designed to disseminate and solicit information on the Chosin campaign. Comments and brief essays are invited. Subject matter will be limited to history of the Chosin campaign, as well as past or present interpretation of that history. See End Notes for distribution and other notices.
Colonel George A. Rasula, USA-Ret, Chosin Historian
Byron Sims, Contributing Editor
IN THIS ISSUE
We continue the Chosin Time Line through the movements and preparations for the attack west and north of the Chosin Reservoir. You will see four major players develop in this action (RCT 7, RCT 5, RCT 31 and RCT 1), with one of the players (RCT 1) being divided into three separate locations (BCT 1/1 at Chinhung-ni, BCT 2/1 at Koto-ri and BCT 3/1 at Hagaru-ri). The use of the terms RCT and BCT are very helpful in identifying organizations, a term used in General Smith's Aide Memoire.
Sub-units grow out of these RCTs such as F/7 and C/7 of RCT 7 initially isolated in the area of the Toktong Pass; the Tank Company and Main CP of RCT 31 which were initially located at Hudong-ni; and Task Force Drysdale which was made up of units which arrived at Koto-ri before the final destruction of the bridge in the Funchilin Pass.
Although these are the main characters in this drama of Chosin, there are peripheral characters who play an important role in the outcome. First and foremost are the tactical air support units which played a role far beyond that realized by participants, for the area beyond observation of the friendly perimeters belonged to them, except during darkness and hours of low visibility. The shelter that the enemy needed during daylight hours did not last very long as the scorched earth policy existed throughout the Chosin campaign. The airlift arm made it possible to deliver much-needed supplies to the many isolated perimeters, later providing airlift for thousands of wounded from Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri.
Thirty miles south of Yudam-ni was the village of Sachang-ni which was reached by the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry (1/7) of the 3d Infantry Division, backed up by 2/7. Although the Marines at Yudam-ni believed they were being attacked by the 89th CCF Division, one of its regiments had bypassed and moved south toward Sachang-ni in search of a deep envelopment route to cut the Marine MSR. There they ran into and were stopped by the 3d Division units.
The final actors in the play are Task Force Dog of the 3d Infantry Division which moved up to Chinhung-ni to relieve 1/1 Marines, as well as the 65th Infantry Regiment which provided units to keep most of the Chinese at arms length from the MSR during the final withdrawal.
THE CHOSIN TIME LINE
NOVEMBER 25 SATURDAY

BCT 1/7 led the RCT 7 on its move from Hagaru-ri to Yudam-ni during November 23-25, during which they encountered about 200 Chinese in the Toktong Pass, scattering them and clearing undefended roadblocks and booby traps. On November 25 against minor resistance, the battalion seized Yudam-ni, a deserted town destroyed by air strikes.

The important activities of November 25 and 26 seem to merge into one flowing parade of marching troops, all directed to positioning units in preparation for the attack west on November 27.
On the 25th the 1/32 Infantry moved north from Oro-ri and occupied a position in the BCT 2/5 area south of Hill 1221. This enabled the BCT 2/5 to move to Yudam-ni the following day.
It was this day when a platoon-size patrol of BCT 3/5 encountered a Chinese soldiers along the road north of the RCT 5 zone east of the reservoir. From here we begin to see an increase in indicators of CCF presence while hindsight tells us there was a dire need for deep reconnaissance rather than combat patrols.

There were many other units on the move, two of which related to the establishment of the X Corps forward command post at Hagaru-ri. These were D Company, 10th Engineer Battalion of the 3d Infantry Division, a platoon of the 4th Signal Battalion, as well as separate signal detachments to provide long range communications between the Marine division and major units far to the south. Supply convoys were also important to the positioning of units, carrying ammunition, fuel and food. This followed the principle of pushing supplies forward when preparing for an attack.

More units were on the way to build up the bases at Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri. The 3/1 Marines urgently needed to establish the perimeter at Hagaru-ri had not yet arrived. At Koto-ri the defense capability would be expanded by the addition of Army engineer and signal units and eventually an infantry battalion, all still on the move far to the south.
NOVEMBER 26 SUNDAY

Although chaplains were conducting services for some units in the Corps area, others were on the move to the Chosin. On this day major moves began in the Chosin area. BCT 2/5 moved to Yudam-ni where they prepared for the attack the following day, to be followed by the remainder of the RCT on November 27. Colonel MacLean and his forward command party arrived east of Chosin where they occupied a schoolhouse at Hudong-ni. Commanders of all four RCTs in the Chosin area had their staffs hard at work developing detailed plans and orders for the attack. General Almond was coming up the next day to witness the beginning of the attack west from Yudam-ni.

Critical areas needed to be manned. Toktong Pass was not yet occupied. Hagaru-ri, where engineers were already beginning work on the airstrip, was in dire need of additional defense units. Southwest of Yudam-ni near Hansang-ni, Marine patrols of platoon and company strength responded to civilian reports of Chinese troops, investigated and were driven back with losses. North of Yudam-ni a Marine patrol along the reservoir also encountered Chinese. These indicators of Chinese presence were increasing by the hour.

In the 7th Division sector General Barr was informed by civilians that thousands of Chinese were crossing the Yalu River to his west, moving south. He adjusted unit dispositions to protect his MSR from that direction.
The Chosin Time Line continues.
END NOTES

In hindsight, the grand envelopment by X Corps turning west to meet Eight Army may have been a poor plan, but in the end it caused the 1MarDiv to have two regiments at Yudam-ni, whereas in the original plan one regiment would have been on each side of the reservoir, each facing two CCF divisions-or more. Hindsight also tells us that the Chinese commander had reserves available which were not used in the Chosin battle. We should not lose sight of the fact that the original Chinese plan called for the attack to take place the night of November 26, not the 27th. General Smith may have been very fortunate to have received the order to attack west, for the move resulted in having two Marine RCTs there for the breakout. In this case the principle of mass had a decided advantage.
DISTRIBUTION [CFassoc]

END 11.25.00

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