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Subj: Changjin Journal 11.30.00
Date: 12/02/2000 1:43:55 AM Mid-Atlantic Standard Time
From: jonrasula@earthlink.net (jon rasula)
To: rasulag@earthlink.net
CHANGJIN JOURNAL 11.30.00
The Changjin Journal is designed to disseminate and solicit information on
the Chosin campaign. Comments and brief essays are invited. Subject matter
will be limited to history of the Chosin campaign, as well as past or present
interpretation of that history. See End Notes for distribution and other
notices.
Colonel George A. Rasula, USA-Ret, Chosin Historian
Byron Sims, Contributing Editor
IN THIS ISSUE
The Time Line reveals two offensives taking place on November 27, the morning
attack by 2/5 Marines to the west of Chosin where they uncovered heavy
Chinese resistance, followed by major Chinese attacks late that night. During
the day the Yudam-ni garrison grew in firepower. The balance of 5th Marines
east of the reservoir began moving to Yudam-ni after daylight, with the last
of its units arriving just before dark. The rifle companies manning the high
ground were backed by a total of 66 artillery pieces in addition to heavy
mortars of the two regiments. On November 27 the last units of the 7th
Marines arrived at Yudam-ni, with F/7 being dropped off in the Toktong Pass
and C/7 taking its position at the bottom of the pass, four miles south of
Yudam-ni, covering a threat at Hasang-ni revealed the day before. 3/1
Marines(minus G Company) and others arrived at Hagaru-ri. East of the
reservoir similar movements were taking place. As soon as the RCT 5 units
cleared the road, units of RCT 31 moved north to occupy assigned positions.
This sector was quiet with the enemy in hiding. The last convoy to arrive
about midnight was the RCT 31 Medical Company which was ambushed at Hill
1221. The Chinese offensive had begun.
THE CHOSIN TIME LINE
NOVEMBER 27 MONDAY
YUDAM-NI
At 0815 2/5 Marines began the attack to the west where they were able to
progress about one kilometer against heavy resistance. Units of 7th Marines
attacked key hills of the northwest and southwest ridges where they too
encountered resistance. General Almond arrived by jeep from Hamhung to
witness the attack, visited the 7th Marines CP departed at 1630. By the end
of the day there were ten rifle companies on the high ground, two battalions
of the 5th Marines on the low ground, and two rifle companies (C/7 and F/7)
isolated. The 11th Marine Artillery batteries, 18 - 155mm and 24 - 105mm
howitzers, were dug in between the village of Yudam-ni and the reservoir.
Forward air controllers with each battalion were prepared to call for air
strikes. The temperature continued to fall to 25 degrees below zero.
As soon as the last units of the 5th Marines had cleared the east road, the
1/32 Infantry moved to the forward position previously occupied by 3/5
Marines. They were followed by 3/31 Infantry which occupied the Inlet area
previously occupied by 1/5 Marines. Because 2/31 Infantry was still on the
road, the southern sector remained unoccupied except for the schoolhouse at
Hudong-ni which became the main command post of RCT 31, enclosed within the
perimeter of the 31st Tank Company and service troops. Although the X Corps
offensive began on November 27, Colonel MacLean did not plan to launch his
attack until the arrival of his third infantry battalion, 2/31.
THE CHINESE ATTACK
For those who don't have a map and are not familiar with the terrain around
Yudam-ni, three major terrain features are the North Ridge, Northwest Ridge
and Southwest Ridge, each resembling a small mountain. To the southeast is a
river that flows into the Chosin Reservoir, and directly south is the valley
which contains the road to Toktong Pass and Hagaru-ri. The initial objective
of the CCF 79th Division was the North Ridge, this being the major assault on
the Marines at Yudam-ni. The secondary attack was on Northwest Ridge by the
CCF 89th Division.
Reports of the CCF attacks on North Ridge reveal they had problems knowing
where the Marines were dug in. For brevity we look at the action on Hill 1240
as an example of the heavy action in the area of North Ridge.
The Chinese attack began in typical Chinese manner - small fire teams probed
for the positions and especially for boundaries between units. Once they had
located these, the Chinese formed for assault. As the enemy attack formations
climbed the hill, bugles, horns, and whistles blared and a strange Chinese
chant reached the ears of the fascinated but nearly frozen Marines. At first,
Marine 81-mm mortar illuminating shells, requested to light up the scene,
were needed. When flares in front of E Company were set off as the sound of
shuffling feet grew louder, an awe-inspiring and chilling sight flashed into
view. A line of Chinese skirmishers was caught in the glow, 15 yards behind
it was a second line, and behind the second, a third line. And beyond, still
more shadowy forms could be seen advancing. When the trip flares were pulled,
the previous silence, save for a feet shuffling or padding in the snow, gave
way to a bedlam of bugles, shepherd horns, and whistles sending forth their
orders and signals.
Marine 81-mm and 60-mm mortar shells rained down on the Chinese soldiers, and
the heavy and light machine guns, Browning Automatic Rifles (BARs), rifles,
and grenades all joined to form a curtain of steel fragments and lead
bullets-a curtain of death. Chinese losses in this sudden holocaust were very
great. Chinese bugles called an end to the assault. The quilted uniformed
figures that survived scurried back down the hill. The dead and wounded lay
about on the snow, now illuminated by 81-mm mortar shells that burst
overhead. Some dead lay within ten feet of Marine positions. Silence
prevailed on the hill.
This is but one example of the action that took place the night of the first
Chinese attacks, although enough to reveal the violence that existed on many
of the ridges surrounding Yudam-ni. Both sides lost men, the Chinese far more
than the Americans. By daylight the Chinese withdrew to safeguard themselves
from American air strikes. As the night attacks continued, studies reveal a
gradual reduction in intensity as well as casualties, all related to the fact
that the Chinese did not have the capability to sustain themselves in
extended combat. As units ran out of ammunition, the unit would be replaced.
It's not within the scope of this Time Line to get into detail, but rather to
paint a broad picture of happenings important to the outcome. In each of
these battles, there were many small activities essential to unit survival.
The corpsmen were busy seeing casualties back to the battalions surgeon's
tent or shack, the surgeon's fingers numbed by the cold trying their best to
connect those parts which combat had torn apart. The ammo bearers trudged up
the ridges with heavy loads so gunners could continue manning their weapons.
And not forgetting the men who made the warming tent possible, who stoked the
stove and heated the coffee and cans of rations so a fortunate few could warm
stomachs. They all played a part until they too met the urgent call and
became riflemen.
EAST OF CHOSIN
The situation east of the reservoir was different from Yudam-ni. East of
Chosin soldiers of RCT 31 had just completed a 140-mile journey at the time
the enemy was already on the move from assembly areas, moving to his attack
positions from which he would follow the instructions of bugles and whistles.
RCT 31 companies were still waiting for their supply train to arrive with
warming tents and stoves, food and fuel. Fortunately most of the units
arrived with more than a basic load of ammunition, for that too would soon be
in short supply.
THE CHINESE ATTACK
East of Chosin the Chinese efforts were directed at four locations. The first
was from the north against the 1/32 Infantry. The second was down the valley
from the northeast (route from the Fusen Reservoir) through I and K
Companies of 3/31, with one deep thrust through the CP of 3/31, when the
battalion commander and his executive officer were wounded , on to A Battery
of the 57th FA Battalion. The third was around the east side of Hill 1456
turning into the CP of the 57th FA Battalion where the gun carriages of
D/15th AAA Bn were located, there also wounding the commander of the 57th FA
Bn. All of these attacks were similar to those described above against North
Ridge at Yudam-ni.
The fourth was the silent thrust, moving east of Hill 1456 to Hill 1221,
arriving near midnight at the time a convoy of Medical Company, 31st
Infantry, was negotiating the hairpin turn. This ambush seriously damaged the
medical support capability of the regiment. The regimental surgeon with a
bullet in his brain made it to the forward battalion, reporting he knew
exactly where the bullet was lodged. Fortunately, he was one of the few
evacuated by helicopter on November 30.
The CP at Hudong-ni first learned of the Chinese attacks when an officer
following the medical convoy walked in and reported the ambush. Brigadier
General Hodes who was there for the night was immediately awakened, shortly
after which the radios began reporting heavy attacks to the north. It was
shortly after that when General Hodes decided that Tank Company would attack
north the next morning to relieve the forward units.
CHINESE SHUT THE DOOR
Between Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri the CCF 60th Division made its silent move to
close the road and build roadblocks and position its fireblocks against
movement from either direction. Years later we learned that the 59th CCF
Division was to attack Hagaru-ri that same night, but they were not prepared
and the attack had to be postponed.
On this night of November 27-28 the Chinese made their first move in the
envelopment of the forward units west and east of the reservoir, executing a
plan which was meant to isolate the 7th Marines at Yudam-ni and the 5th
Marines east of the reservoir. Fate dictated that this should not happen, as
the 5th Marines made it to Yudam-ni before the attack, and the 31st RCT
replacing an entire regiment of Marines faced odds that will never be
forgotten.
END NOTES
The Chosin Time Line continues.
DISTRIBUTION [newiceman]
END CJ 11.30.00
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