Re: Formosa (Taiwan) during the KW

[<geminiad@whidbey.com>]

Ref:  Taiwan and Lin Biao,

Invading Taiwan -
* First, will amend my earlier ref to CCP Fourth Field Army
being designated to invasion of Taiwan - that should be the
THIRD FIELD ARMY (3rd) according to various Chinese material
I went over last couple days, which would have been under
the command of General Ch'en Yi. 

* Yet to find Chinese source stating likely invasion month.
The East China Field Army was reorganized in February 1949
to become the 3rd Field Army. Only five of 35 or so senior
commanders in the new 3rd Field Army are associated with
Lin Biao. The Army had been the center of the Nanking and
Shanghai campaigns in 1949, later focusing on Chekiang and
Fukien provinces - later focusing on the offshore islands. 

QUEMOY was included in an October 17th landing, which
involved units of the 28th and 29th Corps. an invasion force
of some 7,000 were captured and left 2,000 dead. The operation
had been conceived by Ch'en Yi's political commissar, Jao Shu-shi.
(Jao became East China Military and Admihnistrative Committee 
chairman in Dec. 1949, and First Secretary, Shanghai Municiple
Committee, later in 1950 First Secretary of the new East China Bureau.
He power base remained in Shanghai.  

In May 1950, the 3rd Field Army focus was Chousan Islands,
east of Ningpo, Chekiang. Some 150 aircraft were brought to
Chekiang province, ans some 9,000 sanpans were made available.
Given the problem of logistics to the 125,000 Nationalists on the
islands, Taipei decided evacuation was a wiser policy and from
May 13-17, 1950, withdrew all units to Taiwan. 

>From the triangle of Shanghai - Ningpo - Nanking would have
come the force for invading Taiwan. Had not the Chousan islands
been evacuated, the Nationalist effective combat force on Taiwan
would have number but @ 40,000, drawn in April 1950 from Hainan
Island.  A rather precarious situation for Chiang Kai-shek, when the
3rd Field Army had 5 corps (20th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd and 25th) 
previously involved in moping operations throughout East China
from late-1949 into Spring 1950. 

* Outbreak of the Korean War caused a shifting of PLA forces northward,
including 3rd Field Army's 11th Army to Shantung Peninsula, from
Shanghai.
Key commands remained, however in Fukien Province - opposite Taiwan -
for  fear of an American invasion. Three Corps survived the shift
northward:
22nd (Chousan Island off Chekiang) - 28th and 31st on garrison in Fukien
Province. Through 1952, these corps added some 120,000 troops to the
permanent defenses of the East China coast. 

Timing for an invasion of Taiwan would have likely followed occupation
of
the Chousan Group islands. Given other obligations and movements,
invasion between late-July or early-August would have been the earliest
period. Given the assembly of nine thousand sanpans along the coast,
keeping those assembled and prevented from engaging in normal
economic activity would have forced the earliest possible date to be
chosen, in my judgement. And, it had to come before the monsoon 
season begins.

LIN BIAO - Can't agree on Lin "was cool" to Korean invasion and his role
in the CPV. 

 U.S. war histories state that Lin Biao was CinC,
Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV). In that the Fourth Field Army
spearheaded the drives of the CPV during the first four campaigns
had the flare and style of Lin's earlier campaigns against the
Nationalists.

While I know the USG makes mistakes in history, the great number of
POW  interrogations of CPV officers stated Lin Biao was commander-
in-chief and would equate it equivelent to US POWs stating MacArthur
was their commander in chief.  In this, I am referring to only the first
5 to 6
months of CPV involvement. Unfortunately, CCP records are  "slim to
none"
on Lin's activities during this period. 

A  review of South China newspapers during the period 							would
indicate he was not in the area of either Canton
or Wuhan  headquarters during these months. Remember, 4th Field Army was
split in both Manchurian and South China areas at the time.
CPV losses during Jan & Feb 1951 campaigns may also have
placed him into an "out of favor" category, one he had not worn
off even after his return from Moscow in 1953. His later fall from
disfavor (and death) over the coup probably will not help in clearing
up his role in the early months of the CPV in Korea. 
----
Keith Jacobs
 
ysk wrote:
> 
> Interesting info.
> 
> Regarding Lin Piao:
> 
> Lin was cool to Mao's plan to send troops to Korea, and feigning an
> "illness", abstained from Mao's military decisions.  Ironically, some
> American texts state, even today, that Lin commanded CCF in Korea!
> 
> ysk
 
> The CCP Fourth  (4th) Field Army would dominate Canton  Military Region
> -
> under Lin Piao - from 1950 to 1969. I mention this because Lin Piao
> (Biao)
> was apparently a strong supporter of the NKPA's Korean invasion. Had not
> the invasion occurred, its likely 4th Field Army would have returned to
> its
> roots in Manchuria.
> -------------
> 
> Keith Jacobs