Re: Korean War Causes & US Involvement

[Ed Evanhoe <ede@oio.net>]

>John,

><< You are confusing "implementation" with "decision." >>
>
>Ed,
>
>What do you mean by that?<<

The meeting you referred was to implement a decision made months earlier.

> >>According to Cuming's book on "The Origins of the Korean War,"(pp. 472-473)
>S.Korea had the following forces:
>
>           ROKA..........50,000 in 8/1948; increased to 100,000 by 7/1949
>           ROKA Reserve......33,000
>           National Police(which included combat battalions)........51,000
>           Navy........6,700
>           Air Force.........1,800
>           Youth Corps......ukn
>
>Thus, S.Korean armed forces numbered at least 200,000 in June 1950.
>In July 1949, the US transferred some $110 million in military equipments &
>supplies to S.Korea, including anti-tank weapons. If the US had given tanks &
>fighter airplanes, the balance of military forces would have shifted 
>decisively
>in favor of the S.Korean forces. This is probably why the US didn't give
>any tanks & fighter planes to Rhee. In any case, it is apparent that the
>S.Korean forces outnumbered the N.Korean soldiers in terms of personnel.
>Thus, the real question is why the S.Korean forces didn't put up a good
>fight and retreated so fast.<<

Cummings numbers are completely wrong.  As 1 May 1950, there was a total of 
46,968 men and officers on active duty with the South Korean Army. 
(Compiled from stats in "KMAG in Peace and War)"  There men and officers 
were assigned to a total of 76 battalions  of all branches (Infantry, 
artillery, engineer, etc)  Of these 76 battalions, only 37 had completed 
battalion level training.  Of the five infantry divisions, none were any 
where near authorized strenght -- 2 regiments instead of 3 and so on.  The 
National Police had approximately 21,000 men.  Of these there were 14 
combat police battalions with an average strength of 112 per 
battalion.  The Army was equipped with a mixture of Japanese weapons and 
U.S. weapons with U.S. being the majority.  But the National Police were 
equipped with Japanese weapons.  ROK Navy had one 105-Patrol Craft (PC 701) 
and 3 LST's plus some harbor craft.  The ROKAF consisted of a dozen or so 
L-4 and L-5 obervation aircraft and 2 T-6 trainers, none armed.  There was 
a three day supply of ammunition in South Korea, most in warehouses in the 
Pusan area.
As for the anti-tank weapons, there were three anti-tank battalions on 
paper but only one trained. And it was equipped with the U.S. Army WW Two 
75mm pack howitzers.  There was not a single round of anti-tank ammunition 
in South Korea when the war began.

Along the 38th Parallel, ROKA had 4 understrength divisions deployed with a 
total strength of approximately 26,000 men and officers, these scattered 
along 168 miles of front.  No tanks, no heavy artillery, no air 
support.  These divisions lost approximately 2/3rds of the men and officers 
in the first two days of the war trying to stop T-34 tanks, supported by 
Su-76 selp propelled artillery, heavy mortars and fighting against odds as 
high as 20 to 1 since North Korean forces were concentrated while ROK 
forces were scattered.  ROKA forces delayed the NK advance more than could 
be reasonably expected.  In other words, the ROKA put a good fight but were 
overwhelmed by superior numbers and firepower.  As for your "retreating so 
fast."  It was fight and delay, fight and delay over a two month period as 
ROK and US forces withdrew to the Pusan Perimeter.   That is not 
"retreating so fast" or, as you implied, running.  Especially since the 
North Korean high command expected to occupy all of South Korea in three weeks.

Smile









Ed Evanhoe, PO Box 916, Antlers, OK, 74523
Author: DARKMOON:  Eighth Army Special Operations in the Korean War
Life Member:  Special Forces & Special Operations Associations
Co-list owner:  Univ. of Kansas-hosted KOREAN-WAR-L
Web Site: http://www.korean-war.com