Re: Yes, John, it does:-)

["ysk" <ysk@spiker.net>]

Mike, you may be wrong on this;  see below, from the horse's mouth <g>


ysk
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---------------------------------
Headquarters

Far East Command Liaison Detachment (Korea)
8240th Army Unit
Guerrilla Section
11 April, 1952

To: Commander, Leopard
Commander, WolfPack
Commander, Kirkland
Commander, Baker Section



Subject: Guerrilla Operations Outline
1. General:

The increased activities of the guerrilla units with the advent of spring
weather has been noted favorably by this and higher headquarters. The severe
Korean winter understandably curtailed many of our operations during
January, February and early March. We are now entering the most favorable
time of the year for launching guerrilla and partisan projects. We are able
to strike the enemy an even more telling blow this year than we did in 1951.
The experience and training gained in our operations during 1951 will enable
guerrilla commanders to take seasoned men into combat this rear.
Communications have improved and our supply levels are higher by far than
they were at the beginning of the 1951 operational season.

2. Supply:

As is normal in partisan operations, plans will be made for obtaining the
bulk of supplies from the enemy. This reduces the UN logistic burden and at
the same time creates a shortage of supplies to the enemy. This is
especially true of commodities that are produced in USSR and China. Ordnance
and foodstuffs are in short supply in North Korea today. Any supplies that
can be denied the enemy will further the war effort. Stress to your
guerrilla leaders that if they can not evacuate enemy supplies and if they
can not be given to loyal civilian supporters, that the supplies are to be
destroyed. Medical supplies and signal and ordnance equipment will probably
become scarce during the summer but sufficient supplies will be available to
enable you to perform your basic mission. It is a principle of guerrilla
warfare to live off the land and to re-supply from captured arms and
equipment to the maximum. Complete logistic support is unnecessary.


3. Shipping:

Shipping will continue to be insufficient to carry out all the missions you
would like to execute. Local facilities must be exploited to the fullest.
Shipping is being outfitted in Japan and at Inch'on for our use but the
critical shortage of certain items required for refitting will prevent our
receiving a substantial number of seaworthy craft prior to mid-May.
Commanders will utilize vessels that they now have plus those that can be
liberated from the enemy for their early operations. Use of Native sail
craft should be encouraged for initial reconnaissance and projects in
infiltration. Heavier supply shipping will continue to be adequate. APD's
may be requested for major raids through this headquarters. Make certain
that you place your request early, with detailed plan that will be required
to secure approval at higher headquarters.

4. Air Support:

Air support will continue to be adequate. This will include airdrops of
agents and supplies as well as tactical airborne operations. Air strikes
will continue to be requested through your local naval support unit.
Additional air support can be obtained from JOC through this headquarters.
JOC will divert a substantial portion of their air attacks to support our
operations if we clear the project with them in ample time to do the
necessary coordinating. Emergency supply drops are available.

5. Medical Support:

Medical support will continue as at present unless the UN forces become
heavily engaged in a major offensive with its resultant casualties. Wounded
can be evacuated by air to the 121st Hospital at Yongdongp'o where they will
receive the same medical treatment as US wounded. Advanced treatment will
normally be given at the Italian Red Cross Hospital or the Korean hospital.
Local medical support is believed to be adequate for our current needs. You
will continue to exploit the services of Korean doctors. Emergency copter
lift is available upon radio request.

6. Training:

All commands will qualify paratroopers. A desirable number is one company
each for Leopard and Wolfpack and one platoon for Kirkland. Baker Section
will continue jump training along with demolition and infantry minor
tactics. CW radio operators be trained at Seoul. Commanders will be advised
of quotas. Voice procedure operators will be trained by commanders. Radio
communications will be stressed and will be the normal communication. CW
will be used in longer ranges and radio phone for lower units.

7. Liaison:

Liaison will be maintained with naval and/or marine elements based on same
or adjacent islands. Liaison will be maintained with supporting naval
vessels. Let us strive to improve coordination with these elements; their
friendship and trust is desirable for a united effort.

8. Privateering:

Individual privateers will be encouraged to engage the enemy for the purpose
of either seizing enemy small craft or destroying them. The cargo should bb
given to the privateer to encourage further attacks on shipping. Captured
vessels can be repaired with our facilities in order to enable the privateer
to better attack additional targets.

9. Civilians:

Non-guerrilla civilians will be well treated. The guerrillas will assume the
role of friend of the people and attempt to assist them in their resistance
to the Communist movement. When guerrillas capture more supplies than they
can use for their own purposes they will turn the excess over to sympathetic
civilians.

10. Chinese Guerrillas:

Efforts will be made to develop Chinese guerrillas from deserters from the
CCF. Reports reaching this headquarters indicate that limited number of
former Nationalists are deserting the CCF and forming guerrilla bands. These
will be supported and encouraged to enlarge their guerrilla tactics. The
locations, strengths and activities of Chinese guerrillas will be reported
as obtained in order that action can be taken to establish liaison with
them.

11. North Korean Currency:

Due to the large requirements for North Korean currency and the limited
sources available, commanders will encourage bank robberies and other
suitable means of procuring this currency.

12 Enemy Radar:

All commands will be alert for opportunities to seize enemy radar equipment.
Such projects will be coordinated with 5th Air Force through this
headquarters. This is a high priority project.

13. MiG 15.:

A complete MiG-15 is still one of the highest priorities established by the
Air Force. Air Force and Navy will offer complete support for any feasible
project that will secure a MiG-15. The MiG-15 technical orders are highly
desirable. These are sometimes carried in the cockpit.

14. Escape and Evasion:

E&E efforts will be assisted by all elements of the command. Possibilities
of liberating PW camps will be reported immediately. Attempts to liberate
non-Korean PW from PW camps will be carefully coordinated with all agencies
concerned. This does not apply to normal evacuation of air crewmen and
others who are forced down in enemy held territory. If desired by
commanders, $50.00 worth of trade goods can be given to the partisan unit
that safely evacuates a member of the US Armed Forces from behind enemy
lines.

15. Safe Houses:

The maximum number of safe houses will be established in enemy territory.
These will serve couriers and can be utilized as stop-over points for UN
personnel being evacuated via E&E channels.

16. Oxen and Carts:

Continuing efforts will be made to capture enemy oxen and other cattle.
These cattle offer a source of fresh meat for partisans and deny oxcart
transport to the enemy. Also, with the anticipated food shortage in North
Korea during 1952, shortage of oxen will hamper farm production as the enemy
has insufficient tractors. Oxen still remain a good trade item and can be
used in trading for side dishes Commandeers will authorize the guerrillas to
trade excess liberated cattle for items required.

17. Demolition Targets:

Locomotives, trucks and personnel are considered the most lucrative targets
for demolition. Demo teams will be trained in techniques of placing
demolition to derail locomotives and selecting sites for using AT mines for
the destruction of motor vehicles. When sufficient explosives can be
transported to the target area, tunnels and bridges will be attacked .
Destruction of bridges and railroad tunnels should be coordinated with Air
Force. Our effort will be directed at targets least readily destroyed by
aerial attack. Enemy shipping that can not be liberated will be destroyed.
Demolition training will include instruction in placing charges to inflict
the maximum damage to surface craft (This is normally along the keel line
where the back can be broken).

18. Assassination:

Primary assassination targets are Korean Communist leaders. Communist or
North Korean Labor Party leaders who will not render partisan assistance to
our forces will be assassinated. If succeeding Communist leaders are
assassinated, the ambitions of minor leaders will be dampened. This has
already been demonstrated by our efforts in some sectors. Terrorist tactics
of focusing attention on the high mortality rates of enemy leaders are to be
encouraged. Only selected Soviets should be assassinated. They should be of
sufficient rank or possess sufficient technical knowledge that the gain will
compensate for the resultant counter-measures that will be taken by the
enemy. Soviets shelled be assassinated in areas that abound with
pro-Communists. This creates doubt between the Soviets and their satellite
Korean followers. Korean communist leaders should be assassinated wherever
found.

19. Burning Supplies:

POL dumps are always good targets for incendiary attacks. Motor vehicles,
once fired, burn well. Ammunition dumps are difficult to ignite but should
be attacked when sufficient explosion and/or heat can be developed to ignite
the ammunition. Supply dumps containing combustible items along with
foodstuffs offer good targets as food continues to be a critical target.

20. Intelligence Collection and Reporting:

Intelligence collection and reporting remains the secondary mission of
unconventional warfare. Adequate intelligence is required to mount sound
operations. The intelligence required, if promptly relayed through this
headquarters, will enable supporting services to attack tactical targets.
Speed is essential in transitory targets such as moving troops. Teach your
guerrilla leaders to forward all information that they have back to your
headquarters so that this by-product of guerrilla warfare may be fully
utilized by this headquarters.

21. Adjustment of Naval Gunfire:

Each major command will train guerrillas in the technique of adjusting naval
gunfire. This will be a continuing requirement and will be coordinated with
local support vessels. Leopard and Kirkland offer the best opportunities for
placing naval gunfire spotting teams on the mainland. Damage assessment
after naval gunfire is valuable in that it permit naval commanders to
determine the amounts of ammunition to expend on given targets. This
information will be given directly to Navy and also will be forwarded to
this headquarters.

22. Prisoners of War:

Continuing efforts will be made to the maximum number of prisoners of war.
CCF forces are especially desired. Commanders will be particularly alert for
opportunities of capturing Soviet or other Europeans. MiG-15 pilots are
especially desired.

The above is intended as a guide, rather than a restriction on subordinate
commanders. Initiative and aggressiveness tempered with calm judgment will
be encouraged. Avoid trying to win the war by yourself; pace the attack in
accordance with your advantage; when the advantage has passed, get away to
fight another day. Hit and run: those are guerrilla tactics. The- planning
of such operations should include an escape route and rallying point.
Substitute speed and surprise for mass. Our missions are outlined. Other
missions will be assigned in fragmentary instructions as occasion arises.

J. Y. D. Vanderpool, Lt. Col. Artillery

Officer in Command



----- Original Message -----
From: <DasHaas@aol.com>
To: <KOREAN-WAR-L@raven.cc.ku.edu>
Sent: Friday, May 04, 2001 11:38 AM
Subject: Re: Yes, John, it does:-)


John!

       The mission of the Royal Marine Commandos along North Korea's eastern
coastline was the sabotage of the all-important railway ferrying supplies
down to frontline units. The tracks were right on the coastline, thereby
making amphibious raids a feasible proposition.  One spin-off of these raids
was the large number of troops diverted for rear area security.  The odd NK
civilian or soldier may have been picked up by the Commandos during these
raids, but I have found no records to suggest that a "prisoner snatch" was
the objective of any mission; likewise a planned assassination of a
communist
official.


Col. Mike Haas, USAF, ret., author
In the Devil's Shadow: UN Special Operations during the Korean War
Apollo's Warriors: U.S. Air Force Special Operations during the Cold War
Member: Air Commando, Special Forces, UDT-SEAL, and Special Operations
Associations