Re: The Bridge at No Gun Ri - A Book Review

[Ed Evanhoe <evanhoe@korean-war.com>]

>Vince,

> >>Did you read the ad?  The author began with the 7th Cavalry and Little Big
>Horn and Wounded Knee and stuff and then uses that to explain supposed
>actions at No Gun Ri.<<

The Little Big Horn and Wounded Knee were used by the author/PR team to set 
up an emotional appeal to a certain group of potential readers but had 
nothing to do with No Gun RI.

And it is obvious the author(s) haven't the slightest idea of what goes on 
at the infantry squad/platoon/company/battalion level in war, especially a 
war like the Korean War.  In infantry combat the outside world quickly 
fades into the background because the infantryman doesn't know what is 
going on the "Big Picture," only what is happening in few hundred 
feet/yards he can see.  His world becomes the men around him and he fights, 
not for God, country and apple pie, but to stay alive.  And he quickly 
learns staying alive means keeping his buddies alive (even if he hates 
their guts) because they may just keep him alive.  He also learns that 
killing whoever is out there first is a survival. Thus, he and his buddies 
will, more often than not, shoot first and ask questions later.

Another fact:  The infantryman rarely sees the people he kills since he is 
generally shooting at movement or "to whom it may concern."  In doing so, 
he sometimes kills or wounds civilians but doesn't know it.

And a final fact:  Unlike Vietnam where much of the action was "close 
combat," much of Korean War was a war fought at long distance by air and 
artillery chewing up the countryside several hundred or several thousand 
yards in front of the infantryman so when the enemy closed on the 
infantryman's position, he opened fire at 200-400 yards (or farther.)  At 
these ranges it is often hard to identify targets, especially in the early 
dawn, dusk or night.  Thus, the only time the infantryman knew he was 
killing enemy soldiers was when they were a less than a hundred yards or 
when he was attacking and closed on their positions.

What I am pointing out, albeit poorly, is too many people try to interpret 
history in the light of today's moral/ethical codes and their own personal 
beliefs instead of using the moral/ethical codes as they existed at the 
time the historical event took place and trying to understand what happened 
within that context.

Ed

Ed Evanhoe, PO Box 916, Antlers, OK, 74523
Author: DARKMOON: Eighth Army Special Operations in the Korean War
Life Member: Special Forces & Special Operations Associations
Co-list owner: KOREAN-WAR-L discussion list (Hosted by Univ. of Kansas)
Web Site:  http://www.korean-war.com