"Force Protection Implications: TF Smith and the 24th Infantry Division, Korean"

["Mike Yared" <mike_yared@hotmail.com>]

from http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/English/MayJun01/almanac.htm

Force Protection Implications: TF Smith and the 24th Infantry Division, 
Korea 1950

Lieutenant Colonel Edwin L. Kennedy Jr., US Army, Retired

"They were Task Force [TF] Smith, which [General Douglas] MacArthur termed 
an arrogant display of strength, sent ahead into Korea to give the 
Communists pause. [Major General (MG) William F.] Dean had been ordered to 
move his entire 24th [Infantry] Division to the peninsula, but it was 
scattered the length and breadth of Japan, near six separate ports, and 
there were no ships immediately available. It would have to go in bits and 
pieces, of which Task Force Smith was the first."1

Since July 1950, TF Smith and the 24th Infantry Division (ID) have been used 
as examples of poor tactical combat performance. However, instead of serving 
as an indictment, their actions should be reminders of the results of 
operational, national and strategic failure.

Poor operational and strategic intelligence; poor operational planning; and 
a lack of operational mobility and transportation were as much to blame for 
initial US failures in Korea as any problems tactical units might have had. 
The finger should have been wagged at senior leaders all the way up to the 
National Command Authority.

In retrospect, TF Smith performed reasonably well, considering what it 
faced. Survivors of TF Smith have related, and analyses indicate, that even 
a larger, better-prepared force would have still failed, given the 4th North 
Korean People's Army (NKPA) Division's strength.2

Despite the tremendous setbacks in July and August 1950, TF Smith and the 
24th ID played key roles in slowing North Korean forces in the drive to 
Pusan. The North Koreans were thrown off schedule, which permitted the US 
military to establish the Pusan perimeter and led to the NKPA's eventual 
defeat. This is often conveniently overlooked to prove the high cost of 
tactical unpreparedness. However, TF Smith and, subsequently, 24th ID 
elements, successfully conducted what was once called a highrisk delay.

Operational Implications

Operational implications of committing occupation forces in Japan to combat 
in 1950 offer relevant lessons for today. With reductions in unit strengths, 
training readiness and capabilities of current US forces, the Army would do 
well to reexamine historical precedents regarding incremental application of 
force to a conflict.

The situation that faced the 8th Army in Japan bears many similarities to 
situations the Army now faces in force projection. Most notable is the 
severe shortage of strategic transportation assets available for timely 
response.3 This specific problem directly affected the operational concept 
of how the Advanced Command (ADCOM) and 8th Army conducted initial missions 
in the 1950 delay to the Naktong River.

Given the US Armed Forces' current capabilities, force-projection doctrine 
might have to be practiced under circumstances similar to those of July 
1950. Deployment to Saudi Arabia in Autumn 1990 occurred before downsizing 
fully affected the US military. The problem is more critical now with aging 
aircraft and a severely deflated military.

Had the Iraqis taken advantage of the situation early during Operation 
Desert Shield, the 82d Airborne Division's history during that time might 
read more like TF Smith's. The major difference for the Army units was that 
Desert Shield soldiers had received high-quality training and equipment.

Specific analysis of TF Smith and 24th ID actions shows that incremental 
deployment of the 24th ID, especially TF Smith, was the 8th Army's only 
proper operational course of action. Unfortunately, some historians, such as 
author Clay Blair, give their actions short shrift: "The Americans had 
achieved little in this piecemeal and disorganized waste of precious lives 
and equipment. At most they delayed the NKPA a total of three, possibly 
four, days."4

Taken out of operational context, three to four days might seem 
inconsequential, but the 24th ID was only part of the delaying force. The 
1st Cavalry and 25th ID deployed in depth behind the 24th ID. Proper 
analysis must consider the entire delay.

Korea 1950

Deploying units from Japan was key to the 8th Army's ability to establish a 
contiguous defensive perimeter before the North Koreans arrived in force.5 
Therefore, US forces' initial deployment from Japan was time-sensitive 
because of the relatively short distance from the demilitarized zone (DMZ) 
to the southern end of the peninsula. Also, the lack of defensible terrain 
and the presence of natural barriers stymied tactical units' dispositions. 
These factors limited MacArthur's options.

The NKPA had the advantages of initiative and momentum. This was especially 
true after it crossed the Han River south of Seoul where organized South 
Korean resistance crumbled in the western corridor. Spearheaded by armor 
forces traveling on Highway 1, the main avenue of approach from Seoul to 
Pusan, the NKPA intended to move swiftly to Pusan, then consolidate with 
followon forces. The 4th NKPA ID led armor and truckmounted infantry units 
as they advanced along this axis.6

The 4th NKPA ID followed the Soviet model when planning operations. There 
was a strict timetable for daily advances, and subordinate units received 
march objectives. If all went well, the 4th NKPA ID hoped to advance an 
average of 20 kilometers a day once it broke through South Korean defenses 
north of the river.7

Meanwhile, in Japan, MacArthur's choices for committing ground forces were 
limited. Although the landing at Inchon was in the planning stage, no ships 
or US Marine Corps troops were available for a seaborne invasion. Like 
today's strained US military, the US Air Force (USAF) did not have enough in
theater lift capability to fly necessary forces to Korea from Japan. Nor 
were airfields sufficiently developed to handle heavier aircraft even if 
they had been readily available.8

MacArthur had to decide quickly whether to send a force—any force—or to 
wait, organize and fully equip an element of the understrength occupation 
forces. Sending units piecemeal into combat is desirable but is what 
happened in Korea as a conscious decision. The decision to send a small 
detachment of US ground troops was based on ration-al suppositions. Acting 
decisively and participating in the ground conflict immediately would 
demonstrate US resolve to deter communist aggression. And, the NKPA would 
not continue the fight if it knew it was fighting a world power in ground 
combat. In retrospect, this assumption was obviously faulty.

The operational implications were fairly clear—establish a presence on the 
Korean peninsula quickly with whatever force was available; slow the NKPA's 
advance; then reinforce forces on the ground deployments from Japan. Failure 
to perform these actions would result in lost seaports and would require 
forced entry from the sea to regain a foothold on the peninsula. Time was 
critical; the last substantial obstacle to the NKPA's southward advance was 
the Naktong River.

Accepting Risk

The solution in 1950 provides a classic example of what might occur for the 
US in the future. The 8th Army was to deploy a regiment of infantry 
immediately. The 24th ID was the closest Army unit in southern Japan to 
ports of embarkation. It was to send a unit by air as quickly as possible 
with the balance of the force to follow by sea.9 Thus began the events that 
placed the ill
equipped and undermanned TF Smith in its predicament.

Military leaders clearly understood the implications of committing forces to 
combat piecemeal, and they willingly took the risk that the unit might be 
defeated in detail. Quantitative analysis of ADCOM and 8th Army's delay to 
the Naktong River shows that the operational objective was met, but at a 
tremendous cost.10

MacArthur and Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker accepted the risk. Figures 
relating to time and distance factors, the method of measuring success in 
this case, are so complex that to limit the study of the delay to the 
Naktong River alone might easily lead to simplistic conclusions. However, 
numbers clearly show that the North Korean advance was exceedingly slow 
under the circumstances and that the incremental application of US combat 
power definitely caused the North Koreans to fall behind schedule.

The July 1950 operational considerations also relate to current 
force-projection scenarios. Timely, incremental deployment into a theater to 
retain a foothold and a less-timely application of greater combat power were 
essentially the tradeoffs the 8th Army faced. Then, as now, strategic lift 
capability was a limiting factor that frustrated planners at all levels.

Along with ADCOM and 8th Army defenses, other factors slowed and prevented 
NKPA units' timely crossing of the Naktong River. From what verifiable facts 
support, a combination of internal and external factors—the friction of 
war—delayed their advance. Internal factors included poor command and 
control, limited communication means, rigid tactical doctrine and artificial 
restraints in their operational plans. External factors included effects of 
weather and terrain, opposing ground actions and direct application of UN 
air power.

The results of the 8th Army's delay to the Naktong River can be 
quantitatively assessed and contradict assertions that TF Smith and the 24th 
ID's initial actions were of no consequence. Simple mathematical analysis 
supports a generalization regarding the operational conduct of the delay and 
whether the example offers legitimate lessons. Because we know the NKPA's 
doctrine and have access to captured NKPA orders for the offensive, this 
information becomes control data with which to evaluate the NKPA's actual 
performance. We can compare the effect of US operations against NKPA units 
with the actual communist plan. We can make logical assumptions to determine 
what would have happened had ADCOM and the 8th Army not fought as it did 
along Highway 1—for example, if the force had waited for sufficient combat 
power before moving against the North Koreans.

On 1 July, Dean's 24th ID was alerted to send elements to Japan immediately 
by air.11 The commander of the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, 
Lieutenant Colonel Bradley Smith, quickly cobbled together a task force and 
flew to Pusan on 2 July. Smith, a former Infantry School instructor, was a 
World War II combat veteran of the South Pacific.12 His battalion was one of 
the best-trained infantry battalions in the 24th ID, despite personnel 
shortages, a lack of serviceable equipment and an unavailability of good 
maneuver areas for training.

The lack of air transportation reduced battalion personnel initially 
deployed to a relatively small, two
company, one-artillery battery task force pared out of the 1st Battalion, 
21st infantry. On 2 July, these forces were sent north from Pusan with 
orders to block NKPA units moving south out of the Seoul area on Highway 1 
toward Taejon.13 Highway 1 runs from Seoul to Taejon then to Waegwan through 
the mountains that parallel a rail line. This small but primary avenue of 
approach runs diagonally across the southern peninsula from the northwest to 
the southeast, terminating at Pusan. Based on poor intelligence and broad 
guidance, Dean intended to conduct a series of delays along this major 
corridor to aid the arrival of his remaining his force.

Juk-Mi Pass

Smith emplaced his forces along the high ground dominating both Highway 1 
and the rail line, which ran through a relatively long tunnel under the 
extreme right flank of his position. Highway 1 bisected a saddle in the hill 
known as Juk-Mi Pass. The task force's two infantry companies were situated 
abreast about four kilometers south of the pass on each side of the highway. 
One platoon was sited west of the highway, but the majority of the infantry 
troops were sited east of the road. An artillery battery was disposed to the 
rear.14 The terrain was undeniably the most defensible available.

The 4th NKPA ID and the 107th Tank Regiment were approaching TF Smith. 
Having crossed the Han River on 1 July, these units were leading the advance 
down Highway 1. Between 14 July, the 4th NKPA ID fought the remnants of the 
1st and 7th IDs that were defending the Han River's south bank.15 By 4 July, 
the North Koreans had overcome South Korean resistance, entered Suwon and 
were visible from the hills adjacent to JukMi Pass.

The North Koreans had moved 30 kilometers in four days, much less than the 
planned movement rate of 20 kilometers a day. However, they had to break 
through the South Korean main line of resistance, fight numerous actions 
north of the Han River, cross the river and move up initial logistic support 
from the DMZ. Under the circumstances, these movement figures are well 
within norms.

The distance from Suwon to Osan is just over 10 kilometers. The 4th NKPA ID 
left Suwon early on 5 July about the time TF Smith was settling into 
position on the hillside at JukMi Pass. Tanks led the North Korean movement 
followed by motorized infantry then dismounted infantry. To maintain order, 
the armor and motorized infantry moved slowly so the dismounted infantry 
could follow closely. Still, by the time the North Koreans encountered TF 
Smith, a gap had developed between mounted and dismounted elements.

Movement was confined mostly to main roads because of poor traffic-ability. 
Most of the countryside was covered with rice paddies. Off
road movement was difficult for infantry and virtually impossible for 
armored vehicles. Smith knew this and disposed his antitank (AT) weapons to 
cover Highway 1 and the rail line.

The battle began at 0816, 5 July. North Korean tanks initially broke through 
US positions and continued to Suwon without slowing appreciably. With the 
exception of the artillery battery's direct fire on the tanks, the North 
Koreans suffered no losses. The old, understrength bazooka and 57-millimeter 
recoilless rifle shells just bounced off the Soviet-designed armor. After 
two heavy engagements, TF Smith began a withdrawal under pressure at 1400.

Unfortunately, the direct support artillery battery, A Battery, 52d Field 
Artillery, was defeated. The tanks cut the landlines to the forward 
observers, and all radios went dead. The tanks continued engaging the 
105-millimeter guns in direct-fire duels. The 4.2-inch heavy mortar section 
ran out of ammunition. After the initial engagement there was no indirect 
fire support. Close air support (CAS) was nonexistent. Because of recent 
fratricide incidents, CAS was restricted from operating south of the Han 
River. This prohibition effectively hobbled US ground maneuver elements and 
gave communist forces a distinct advantage.

A withdrawal in contact is probably the most difficult tactical maneuver to 
conduct even for well-trained units. For untrained units, the sequenced 
withdrawal quickly degenerated, becoming a rout. Grossly outnumbered US 
soldiers were overrun. The entire fight lasted from six to seven hours, 
actually a reputable showing based on simulations. By about 1500, organized 
resistance ceased, and TF Smith scattered.16 After executing captured US 
wounded, the 4th NKPA ID continued to Osan where it reorganized after 
covering approximately 15 kilometers.

>From Osan to Taejon

While TF Smith was fighting to the north at JukMi Pass, the 1/34 Infantry, 
24th ID, was digging in about 10 kilometers south of Osan. Their positions 
were about halfway between Osan and P'yong'taek. The 34th Infantry Regiment 
had followed the 21st Infantry Regiment to Korea and was rushed forward 
along Highway 1 to back up TF Smith.

The North Koreans moved out of Osan early on 6 July and encountered the 
1/34th Infantry between 0600 and 0800. On 6 July, the 107th Tank Regiment 
led the movement south, only to find a blown bridge north of P'yong'taek. 
The 1/34th Infantry encountered the same problems as TF Smith had: they had 
no AT weapons that could stop T34s, and more important, they could not 
tie-in flank defenses. They fought no more than three hours before 
withdrawing.17 Meanwhile, the 34th Infantry Regiment was falling back to 
Ch'onan, about 20 kilometers south of P'yong'taek. The North Koreans spent 
the remainder of 6 July repairing the blown bridge and finding fording 
sites.18

Fearing envelopment, the 3/34th Infantry, which was supposed to defend 
Ansong in a parallel position to the east of the 1/34th Infantry, withdrew 
without fighting. The 4th NKPA ID moved against relatively light resistance 
and covered the 20 kilometers expected of it during the day's march. On 7 
July, the 4th NKPA ID left P'yong'taek moving south toward Ch'onan 20 
kilometers away. By evening the North Koreans were in Ch'onan. The 3/34th 
Infantry succeeded in engaging only the 4th NKPA ID reconnaissance elements 
north of the town, then withdrew into Ch'onan.

While the North Korean march figures for 6 and 7 July do not belie the total 
picture, traveling 20 kilometers a day was costly. They were getting farther 
from their base of supplies. Their artillery required bulky ammunition, and 
their vehicles needed fuel, which had to be transported over roads 
increasingly interdicted by UN air power. Also, the 4th NKPA ID was forced 
to fight, causing them to deploy and reorganize along Highway 1 after each 
engagement. These timeconsuming deployments slowed them down and broke their 
momentum. To continue to meet the goal of 20 kilometers a day they would 
have had to press soldiers who were already suffering from the physical 
effects of combat and constant marching in the monsoon heat.

Small engagements and battles occurred that continued in a similar manner 
for other elements of the 24th ID as they were committed piecemeal against 
the North Koreans. On 9 July, the first elements of the 25th ID arrived in 
Korea. At Chonui (10 July), Choch'iwon (1112 July), the Kum River Line (1516 
July) and Taejon (1920 July), US units engaged and slowed the North Korean 
advance. The fights from Osan to Taejon covered about 100 kilometers and 
took the North Koreans 15 days. While these desperate battles were being 
fought, the 1st Cavalry Division boarded ships for Korea on 15 July. In 
Toyko, MacArthur's staff began plans for an amphibious assault to conduct an 
operational envelopment of the North Koreans.19

The North Koreans moved the greatest distance during the campaign to the 
Naktong River in the two days following the battle at Osan—20 kilometers 
each day. On both days they fought engagements before continuing. However, 
for the following 13 consecutive days, the North Koreans covered only 60 
kilometers, fighting three more battles en route. This movement to Taejon 
averaged only 4.6 kilometers per day. This was a substantial decrease in 
march tempo, which appears to correlate with the increasing application of 
air power and the resistance encountered from newly arrived 24th ID units.20

After the battle for Taejon on 20 July, where Dean was captured, the North 
Koreans faced 1st Cavalry and 25th ID elements that took up the fight from 
the 24th ID along the TaejonTaegu corridor. The 1st Cavalry and 25th ID 
continued to delay the North Koreans as additional US units arrived. The 
24th ID was withdrawn behind Taegu to refit and reorganize. The 25th ID also 
blocked the Chunchon/Wonju approach, the route of a North Korean supporting 
attack toward Taegu.

On 31 July, the 2d ID arrived, and on 2 August the 29th Regimental Combat 
Team arrived. US strength was building slowly and forces were being deployed 
into the line along the Naktong River. On 1 August the 1st Cavalry withdrew 
over the river at Waegwan and destroyed the bridges.

TF Smith's Value

Numbers prove that Blair was only partially correct in his analysis of the 
24th ID's contribution to the delay of the North Koreans. His overall 
assessment is questionable. First, the physical and mental effects of 
numerous engagements and battles took the edge off NKPA forces and 
physically tired them. Also, the constant losses in personnel and supplies 
degraded the NKPA's fighting potential. How then can we ascertain whether 
the operational decision to hastily commit the 24th ID piecemeal into Korea 
was the correct decision? It becomes a costbenefit analysis.

If the North Koreans planned to move about 20 kilometers a day along the 
route from Seoul to the Naktong River, and the route is approximately 230 
kilometers by road, then the NKPA should have reached the Naktong River in 
approximately 11 to 12 days. This assumes they were conducting an 
exploitation after initially defeating ROK forces that were defending well 
forward—north of the Han River.

If the North Koreans had moved unimpeded by ground combat to the Naktong 
River, they might have been able to launch a large-scale, coordinated attack 
from the march. Overwhelming the defenders along the Naktong River would 
have allowed them to secure a bridgehead quickly. Instead, they arrived 
tired and offbalance from the numerous contacts they had experienced during 
their advance.

Instead of arriving at the Naktong River within 12 days of leaving Seoul, 
the North Koreans did not arrive in strength until after 1 August, 24 days 
after their first engagement against TF Smith. The 24th ID was directly 
responsible for delaying the North Koreans about half the distance from 
Suwon to the Naktong River, approximately 90 kilometers from Osan to Taejon. 
The North Koreans took 15 days to cover this distance, more than three times 
as long as it would have taken them to reach the Naktong River crossings 
near Waegwan had they achieved their goal of 20 kilometers a day.

Those 15 days allowed more than two additional US divisions to arrive in 
Korea. If the North Koreans had not been slowed and attrited before they 
reached the Naktong River, UN forces would have lost the chance to establish 
a reasonable defense along the last natural terrain barrier en route to 
Pusan, which would have been catastrophic. Instead, the North Koreans were 
forced to conduct an opposed river crossing after their momentum had been 
broken. Instead of crossing on about 18 July, they did not attempt a major 
crossing until 26 August.21

What contributed to the North Koreans' failure? Poor communications and a 
desire to maintain strict command and control were two reasons. Reporting 
was poor, largely because not enough radios were available for timely 
reports. For example, at Osan the 4th NKPA ID's advance guard was engaged, 
and the infantry was separated from the tanks. Later, two North Korean 
regiments of the division's main body marched into the area without having 
received any communication about TF Smith's location.

On 7 July, air interdiction also began taking a serious toll just when the 
North Koreans' momentum seemed to be building. Between 7 and 9 July, during 
the battle of Ch'onan, North Korean columns moving down the western axes of 
advance received a tremendous blow. UN fighterbombers caught North Korean 
armored and motorized columns on the roads, destroying an estimated 44 tanks 
and 197 trucks. On 10 July, during the battle at Chonui, North Korean 
followon and logistic elements were caught in march column on the roads near 
P'yong'taek and were devastated. USAF fighterbombers were credited with 
destroying 38 tanks, 7 armored carriers and 117 trucks. Interestingly, the 
vehicles were backedup at the bridge, which withdrawing 34th Infantry 
Regiment forces had blown up on 7 July.

There is no doubt that continued destruction of roadbound North Korean units 
greatly helped relieve the pressure on 24th ID units. While air power was 
not directly decisive against the large numbers of infantry forces in the 
North Korean army, it certainly appears to have helped slow them down by 
indirectly affecting their support.

Several other factors must also be considered. The North Koreans were forced 
to follow Highway 1 in column because offroad mobility was impossible. Once 
dismounted infantry deploy tactically, reorganizing for renewed movement 
becomes time consuming. This was especially so for the North Koreans who had 
to rely on vocal, whistle, and hand and arm signals to communicate with 
troops moving through rice paddies.

The 4th NKPA ID deployed not once or twice, but as many as eight times 
against 24th ID delay positions. Cumulative effects of smaller deployments 
cost the North Koreans more time than one or two larger deployments. 
Everyone in the followon elements had to stop and wait while lead forces 
fought through. While the 8th Army might not have specifically intended for 
this to occur, it was a welcome byproduct of piecemeal commitment of 
battalions and regiments.

Under these circumstances, 24th ID deployments of battalion-size forces 
provided the depth to blunt an armored attack and prevented the North 
Koreans' allout pursuit. Had the North Koreans defeated one or two large 
units in delaying positions, they might have been able to envelop, bypass 
and move to the Naktong River before US troops could prepare another 
delaying position. Fighting a number of smaller engagements tired the North 
Koreans, hurt their efficiency and slowed their momentum.

It might be presumptuous to assume that quantitative analysis of the North 
Korean's movement to the Naktong River can reveal hard evidence that TF 
Smith and the 24th ID decisively affected the North Korean advance. However, 
numbers show that TF Smith and the 24th ID's efforts were critical to 
successfully establishing a defense on the Naktong River. If the 24th ID was 
successful, then TF Smith was integral to that success. TF Smith's actions 
were the first in a series of actions. When taken together, these actions 
caused the North Koreans to fail.

The implications for operational planners at higher levels are evident. 
Committing the 24th ID piecemeal, employing the division unsupported on 
either flank and failing to provide proper joint or combined arms 
requirements caused the 24th ID and the 8th Army to pay a severe price. 
During the delay from Osan to Taegu, the 24th ID lost almost 2,000 men 
killed, wounded and missing during 18 days of combat. The division was 
reduced to about 4,000 men by the time it was withdrawn from Taegu and 
replaced in the line.22 Yet, the 24th ID did what it was supposed to 
do—delay the North Koreans along the most dangerous avenue of approach to 
Pusan.

No More TF Smiths

Former Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) General Gordon R. Sullivan's 
statement, "No more Task Force Smiths!" is a metaphor intended to reflect 
the US Armed Forces' condition rather than being a specific criticism of TF 
Smith. Unfortunately, many misinterpret Sullivan's quote as a specific 
criticism of TF Smith. TF Smith's performance is often attributed solely to 
equipment, training and troop fitness factors. These contributing factors do 
not change the fact that US soldiers had to fight an overwhelmingly superior 
enemy force under terrible conditions.

Computing rough force ratios shows the disadvantage under which TF Smith and 
the 24th ID labored. Still, they slowed the North Korean advance until two 
other divisions could arrive in the Pusan perimeter. In fact, the 24th ID's 
contribution must be measured in hours and days. In the end, the delay by 
the 24th ID, 1st Cavalry Division and 25th ID directly contributed to North 
Korea's failure to reach the barrier the Naktong River provided.

At a high cost, TF Smith and the 24th ID accomplished their missions. 
Colonel James T. Stewart's view differs from Blair's in this regard: "The 
NKPA around Pusan perimeter was nothing more than a skeleton which had been 
depleted by direct destruction and starved by the air interdiction 
program."23 The earlier tragedy in no way reflects poorly on soldiers of a 
neglected army that had been serving as a constabulary occupation force.

Situations confronting the US Army today have the potential to repeat at 
least some of the actions of 1950. As the Army prepares for conventional 
missions and takes on the competing requirements to act as an international 
police force, it suffers from diminishing resources, is subject to 
shortfalls in strategic deployment transportation and, consequently, suffers 
declining readiness.

Committing lightly armed or grossly outnumbered delaying forces is a 
possibility senior commanders and planners must consider during risk 
analysis. The risk assessment might not allow a bloodless operation, which 
many leaders, soldiers and citizens expect. US forces might not have the 
luxury of a 6-month buildup like that which occurred before Operation Desert 
Storm.

Is the US Army prepared psychologically, and has it prepared the nation 
psychologically, for the costs of a conflict in which our military does not 
hold the initial advantage? It happened before. What makes us so sure it 
will never happen again? While we hope we can trade space for time when 
outnumbered, there might be little or no space to trade, in which case force 
attrition might be the result. In this regard, "No more Task Force Smiths!" 
rings hollow.

1.T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedeness (New York: 
Macmillan, 1963), 98.

2.Brigadier General (Retired) Bradley Smith, in a 16 November 1990 letter to 
me, states: "Without AT mines and 3.5-inch rocket launchers, my whole 
battalion would not have done much better than we did with two companies." 
Smith's dispositions would have met today's standards for infantry battalion 
defensive positions. The units and weapons were best sited to take advantage 
of elevation, fields of fire and observation. Task Force Smith's ability to 
delay as long as it did is remarkable. TF Smith members interviewed for this 
article include retired LTC Duane Scott, commander, Battery A, 52d Field 
Artillery; retired COL Jack Doody, heavy mortar platoon leader; retired COL 
Philip Day, rifle platoon leader, C Company; and retired COL William Wyrick, 
platoon leader, C Company. I also corresponded with retired BG Lynch, rifle 
platoon leader, B Company.

3.Robert Frank Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea 19501953 
(Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 67. The USAF had 
limited lift capability in June 1950. The 8th Wing, 5th Air Force, had 12 
C54s at Ashiya Air Base, Japan. The 374 Troop Carrier Wing at Tachikawa had 
two squadrons of C54s. The 21st Troop Carrier Squadron at Clark Field, 
Philippines, was also alerted. In a telephone interview on 18 November 1995, 
Day said the C54s could carry 50 troops or a limited number of troops with a 
couple of jeeps and trailers.

4.Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: 
Times Books, 1987), 115. Actually, 8th Army elements slowed the North Korean 
advance three times longer than Blair gives them credit for.

5.William Glenn Robertson, Counterattack on the Naktong, 1950 (Washington, 
DC: US Government Printing Office, 1985), 9.

6.General Headquarters, Far East Command Intelligence Section, Intelligence 
Summary, 4th North Korean ID, 4150. Declassified 20 August 1975. Document 
provided by Joe Bermudez. The 4th NKPA ID was TF Smith's primary antagonist. 
With 3d NKPA ID elements, it fought the 24th ID until 22 July. The 4th NKPA 
ID, organized as a typical North Korean division, was composed of the 5th, 
16th and 18th Infantry Regiments and the 4th Artillery Regiment. T34s that 
preceded the 4th NKPA ID were from the 107th Tank Regiment. The 4th NKPA 
ID's total strength at the outbreak of the war was approximately 11,000 men. 
It suffered about 3,400 casualties in the opening week of the war and was 
given the honorific title Seoul Division for its part in the capture of 
Seoul. On 3 November 1950, US forces destroyed the 4th NKPA ID, the remnants 
dispersing into the hills.

7.Operations Order No.1, 4th ID (NKPA), 22 June 1950. ATIS Translation No. 
200045, 30 October 1950. Provided by Joe Bermudez.

8.Charles E. Miller, Airlift Doctrine (Washington, DC: Air University Press, 
1988), 195. Except for those near Seoul, the few airfields in Korea were not 
suitable for large operations. Unfortunately, by the time TF Smith arrived, 
the North Koreans already occupied them. The Pusan airfield deteriorated 
rapidly under the weight of the C54s that delivered TF Smith. The smaller, 
less capable C47s, which could carry only 18 troops, had to be substituted 
until repairs were made.

9.Top Secret message from LTG Walton H. Walker to MG William Dean (Eyes 
Only), dated 30 June 1950, declassified 4 January 1953.

10.Until 8th US Army headquarters arrived in Korea, BG John Church was the 
commander of the advanced elements. On 15 July, 8th US Army headquarters 
took command of all ground units.

11.Robertson, 6. The tasking for 24th ID to send a regimental combat team to 
Korea was based primarily on the proximity of division elements to air and 
sea embarkation ports. The division's initial elements were sent by air; 
large elements followed by sea.

12.In a telephone conversation with Smith on 10 September 1990, he said the 
Osan position was the last in a series of five he reconnoitered on 4 July en 
route north from P'yong'taek toward Suwon. Smith had no illusions about what 
he was up against. Not knowing the enemy's location, his leader's 
reconnaissance was as much contingency planning as anything.

13.John Toland, In Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Morrow, 1991), 
77.

14.Blair, 102.

15.Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong North to the Yalu, JuneNovember 
1950, US Army in the Korean War (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of 
Military History, US Army, 1961), 82.

16.Interview with retired LTC Duane Scott, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Smith 
was the commander of A Battery, 52d FA, TF Smith, on 5 July 1950.

17.Appleman, 84.

18.VFW Magazine (June-July 2000), 13-14.

19.Robert Jackson, Air War Over Korea: Sixteen Stories of Heroism in the Air 
(New York; St. Martin's Press, 1973), 19.

20.James Stewart, Airpower: The Decisive Force in Korea (Princeton, NJ: Van 
Nostrand, 1957), 19.

21.Stewart, 9. While I believe Stewart's title is exaggerated, he provides 
an interesting alternative perspective of air operations. In a letter to me, 
Wyrick claims that USAF kills tended to be overrated. They "spent a lot of 
time shooting up dead tanks" in the middle of his company's positions. This 
occurred after the battle at Osan since ADCOM had asked GEN George E. 
Stratemeyer, commander, Far East Air Forces, to temporarily suspend 
operations south of the Han River after 3 July because of fratricide and 
civilian casualties caused by uncoordinated fighter bomber attacks. An 
ammunition train alongside TF Smith was mistakenly strafed as it arrived in 
P'yong'taek on 3 July. These factors, plus the lack of good weather were the 
prime reasons air power was not used at Osan. And, even if air power had 
been available, TF Smith had no forward air controllers.

22.The cost computes to about 111 men a day, roughly an understrength 1950 
rifle company. Another way to express the cost is about 20 men a kilometer 
from Osan to Taegu.

23.Stewart, 9.

LTC Edwin L. Kennedy Jr., US Army, Retired, is the Senior Army Instructor, 
Leavenworth High School JROTC, Kansas. He received a B.S. from the US 
Military Academy, an M.A. from Webster University and an M.M.A.S. from the 
US Army Command and General Staff College. He is also a graduate of the 
Israeli Army Armored Corps Commanders Course. He served in various command 
and staff positions in the Continental United States, Korea and Germany.



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