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07 December 2001
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* N. Korea's Old Tactics May Backfire Post-Sept. 11
http://www.stratfor.com/asia/commentary/0112072100.htm
* Fast-Track Authority Would Boost U.S. Security Agenda
http://www.stratfor.com/northamerica/commentary/0112072230.htm
* Indonesia: Rais' Futile Bid for Power
http://www.stratfor.com/asia/commentary/0112072350.htm
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N. Korea's Old Tactics May Backfire Post-Sept. 11
Summary
North Korea is again raising its level of anti-U.S. rhetoric and
has warned that it will continue to develop and build new and
better missiles. With relations with South Korea bogged down due
to both internal politics in Seoul and a policy shift in
Washington, Pyongyang is returning to its tried-and-true
diplomatic strategy of threat and conciliation. North Korea's
leaders, however, may be miscalculating the changes in
Washington's priorities post-Sept. 11.
Analysis
While reports circulate of potential action against North Korea,
as part of the U.S. anti-terrorism campaign, Pyongyang has warned
Washington not to give it the same treatment it gave Afghanistan.
A commentary in the official Rodong Sinmun Dec. 5 said, "If the
U.S. imperialists try to test their logic of strength on the
DPRK, as they are using it against some countries, they will be
annihilated to the last man." The warning comes amid a renewed
flood of anti-U.S. rhetoric coming out of North Korea, where the
government is suggesting it will continue to develop and deploy
new and better missiles.
Faced with a sustained slowdown in inter-Korean reconciliation,
Pyongyang is returning to its usual diplomatic tactics:
alternately slinging threats and dropping hints about renewed
talks with the United States. But Pyongyang may be miscalculating
Washington's priorities and tolerances in the post-Sept. 11
world, and this could only further complicate its international
relations.
North Korea's nuclear and biological weapons programs have been
under increased scrutiny since Sept. 11. Pyongyang is actually
hoping to benefit from this renewed attention by using it to
restart talks with the United States and South Korea and gain the
upper hand at the bargaining table.
However, for South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, already
weakened by party politics and term limits, Pyongyang's
belligerent tone does little to spur his flagging Sunshine Policy
of strategic engagement with the North. It may also embolden
elements in Washington already predisposed against further aid or
concessions to the North Korean regime.
External Pressure
Washington and its close allies have accused North Korea over the
past few weeks of selling long-range missiles to Egypt,
possessing nuclear weapons and producing large stockpiles of
biological weapons. U.S. President George W. Bush bluntly told
Pyongyang to allow international inspection of its nuclear
facilities and to stop selling missiles. Bush linked ending
missile proliferation and programs to build weapons of mass
destruction to the war on terror, raising speculation that North
Korea was on his short list of targets after Afghanistan.
At the same time, pressure is also building against the regime
from other quarters. Japanese officials Nov. 28 raided the
offices of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan
(Chongryun), a pro-Pyongyang group that funnels money from credit
unions and other sources to North Korea. In South Korea the
highly touted Mount Kumkang tourism project, the first to
schedule regular trips for South Koreans to the North, is near
collapse despite government intervention.
Furthermore, the delay in inter-Korean reconciliation since the
beginning of the year has left many of South Korea's biggest
businesses reconsidering their planned investments in the North,
according to the online NK Chosun. South Korean firms were owed
nearly $14.3 million by North Korea as of the end of November,
according to the South Korean Unification Ministry.
Belligerence or Reconciliation
Pyongyang has made several provocative moves in recent weeks.
North Korean border guards on Nov. 27 fired three shots across
the DMZ, the highly militarized border that separates North and
South Korea. The shooting incident, the first in more than three
years along the border, triggered a brief return of fire by South
Korean troops. A preliminary investigation determined the North
Korean shots were fired from a 7.62 mm machine gun, banned from
use in the area by the armistice agreement that ended the Korean
War, according to a release by South Korea's Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
South Korean officials Nov. 27 also revealed that Pyongyang
requested that the members of the U.N. Military Armistice
Commission withdraw from the body, which is tasked with resolving
violations of the armistice agreement. Pyongyang has tried
several times to dissolve the commission but stopped such
attempts during the period of inter-Korean contact in 2000.
Pyongyang's new demand is an attempt to spur direct peace
negotiations with Washington. If there is no committee to oversee
the armistice agreement, the United States will have little
choice but to resume talks with North Korea.
North Korea has also renewed a rhetorical battle against the
United States and South Korea. Through official media outlets,
Pyongyang has accused Washington of taking advantage of Sept. 11
to try to threaten the regime. The government also responded to
these so-called U.S. threats by saying it will rely on its strong
leader, step up military readiness, and prepare and develop
missiles to "smash the imperialists' moves to stifle the DPRK."
Yet amid the rhetoric and provocative actions, Pyongyang has
still taken several steps to encourage a resumption of dialogue
with the United States. North Korea's foreign minister told a
visiting Western diplomat in October that Pyongyang had expelled
members of the Japanese Red Army, who for decades took refuge in
North Korea.
Pyongyang also recently signed two U.N. treaties against
terrorism: the 1999 convention to control financing for
terrorists and the 1979 international convention against the
taking of hostages. Both moves were made to get North Korea
removed from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism. Being
on this list has seriously hindered Pyongyang's economic and
political relations.
Other less-visible steps have also revealed Pyongyang's interest
in restarting talks with Washington or even Seoul. North Korea
has relaxed its strong objection to being called the "No. 1
enemy" in South Korea's defense white papers, a label that has
been a point of contention cited for the delay of past talks.
North Korea last month asked that the label simply be changed, a
step back from previous demands that it be abolished.
The government also has offered to open the Isotope Production
Laboratory in Yeongbyeon to inspectors from the International
Atomic Energy Agency, according to the JoongAng Ilbo. And
Pyongyang signed an accord with the Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization (KEDO) that establishes warranties and
quality assurances on light water reactors the organization is
constructing in North Korea. The KEDO projects, which are years
behind schedule, were the result of the 1994 agreement under
which North Korea abandoned its nuclear programs in exchange for
internationally built nuclear energy plants that do not produce
weapons-grade plutonium.
On the diplomatic front, Pyongyang has continued to engage
European nations for political and economic support. North Korea
also replaced its ambassador to the United Nations with Pak Gil
Yon, the former vice foreign minister. Pak is known to be one of
Pyongyang's key U.S. experts and served as North Korea's first
U.N. ambassador from 1991 to 1996. In addition, North Korean
leader Kim Jong Il recently held an unusual personal meeting with
the new Russian ambassador to Pyongyang, a move that suggests
Pyongyang is seeking Moscow's advice on dealing with Washington
after Sept. 11.
Strategic Miscalculation
This answer to the question of how to deal with Washington in the
new geopolitical environment is one that is apparently eluding
North Korean officials. Pyongyang was already having enough
trouble deciphering the Bush administration's policies after the
remarkably conciliatory administration of former U.S. President
Bill Clinton. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon left North Korea further guessing about Washington's
intentions.
The North Korean regime has little chance to reinvigorate direct
North-South relations due to Seoul's internal political bickering
and economic problems. Pyongyang is instead using its old tactic
of combining belligerence, hints of social instability and
implications that there is a small opening for talks.
In the past this has worked well. When it felt ignored, North
Korea would threaten drastic action and even demonstrate some of
its capabilities. For instance, on one occasion, Pyongyang made
no attempt to hide some suspected nuclear reprocessing facilities
from satellites, and on another, it boldly launched a multi-stage
rocket over Japan.
However, each of these incidents -- which could have brought
direct military reprisal from the United States -- was matched
with a show of weakness inside North Korea. For example, the
ongoing famine gave the appearance that North Korea was near
collapse anyway and that there was little reason to accelerate
its demise.
What helped preserve the regime was the ever-present fear that
North Korea's leaders, if pushed to the wall, would resort to
drastic actions. North Korea's gambit of projecting weakness
along with political instability managed not only to perpetuate
the North Korean government but also to get other states to send
food aid and make conciliatory gestures.
The difference now, however, is that Washington has little
patience for such games. The attacks on U.S. soil brought home a
real and pressing threat and gave the U.S. government tremendous
leeway in international affairs. The Bush administration barely
tolerates concerns from even its own allies now, let alone
belligerency from an old foe.
If Pyongyang presses too hard, it may find itself completely
isolated once again. As a lame-duck president, Kim Dae Jung is in
no position to pressure Washington to be more conciliatory toward
Pyongyang. Seoul's opposition Grand National Party, looking
forward to increasing its power in the 2002 elections, will
itself further goad Washington into taking stricter actions
against Pyongyang.
Japan also appears ready to address the North Korean issue more
forcefully. Even Russia and China, looking respectively at
potential integration with Europe and the international economic
community, may be reluctant to step out and defend North Korea.
This situation means that while Pyongyang's strategy has worked
in the past at winning recognition and concessions, it may
backfire this time around.
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