Re: Korea - 50 years ago this week, Dec. 13-19

["DONALD KILMER" <donskil@msn.com>]

Young and John2,

You two have strange and irrational ways of putting things.  You say
that the "proofs have holes in them," when in fact there are no
proofs whatsoever of US GW in KW.  You find the "counter-proofs
flimsy," when no American not under torture ever has claimed or admitted to 
having participated in GW in KW. You claim that Americans who had been 
tortured only recanted under the "duress" of a threatened court martial.  So 
what is your explanation for why none of them, when out of the service, did 
not admit the "truth" you so desperately desire?

You won't believe U.S. records and research on the subject, and you won't 
believe those who saw the Soviet official records of the hoax.
So why not make an effort yourselves to review the old Soviet records?
And why not submit the FOIAs for the flight records you hope say,
"Cargo: 3 cannisters of plague, 2 of anthrax...?"  I think the reason is 
that if you did not find what you wanted, you would claim it must have been 
destroyed by some sinister hand.  And when you learn that there was no 
logistics tail, again you presume that the records do not exist because they 
have been destroyed.  Do you wonder how it would be possible for so many 
Americans to keep such an awful secret for so long, when Americans have 
never succeeded at a similar conspiracy before?

If you really are serious, inquiring minds, I would hope that you would make 
an effort to review the archives in Pyongyang and Beijing.  That is, the 
real archives, not the propaganda ones.  Have you tried that?

thanks,

don



>From: "ysk" <ysk@kimsoft.com>
>Reply-To: KOREAN-WAR-L@raven.cc.ku.edu
>To: <KOREAN-WAR-L@raven.cc.ku.edu>
>Subject: Re: Korea - 50 years ago this week, Dec. 13-19
>Date: Fri, 14 Dec 2001 06:17:45 -0800
>
>THANKS!
>
>One of the best statements on the subject I have seen todate.
>
>I agree that the GW "proofs" have holes but the "counter-proofs" are flimsy 
>as well.
>
>BTW, a Chinese video documentary on the Korean War includes shots of 
>'happy' American POWs, GW sites, Chinese MIGs, etc.
>
>
>
>Young
>
>   ----- Original Message -----
>   From: LTC John N. Duquette
>   To: KOREAN-WAR-L@raven.cc.ku.edu
>   Sent: Friday, December 14, 2001 6:05 AM
>   Subject: Re: Korea - 50 years ago this week, Dec. 13-19
>
>
>   ysk,
>
>   The short answer to all your questions is yes.  The details...
>
>   Q.  Any gov documents on what these folks stated while in captivity?
>
>   A.  Yes.  The CIA recorded all radio broadcasts coming from Radio Peking 
>and Radio Pyongyang during and after the war.  Approximately 200-250 
>dictabelt recordings of anti-war statements/germ warfare confessions by UNC 
>personnel were declassified and are available at NARA.  You can hear what 
>they say in their own words.
>
>   Q.  After captivity?
>
>   A.  Yes.  Debriefs were conducted of all U.S. POWs returned during 
>Operations Little and Big Switch--initially under the auspices of the 
>Army's ACofS, G2 and Counterintelligence Corps, and then upon return to the 
>states by the service member's owning service. (see Eugene Kinkead, In 
>Every War But One, [New York: W.W. Norton,1959] for a description of the 
>debrief process).  I have seen about a dozen depositions from one debrief 
>file of a former POW Marine Lieutenant that were made available through the 
>FOIA.  This individual was not involved in GW; my point is that the debrief 
>files still exist and are accessible through FOIA.  Secondary sources state 
>that all 38 GW confessors recanted their statements upon return to UNC 
>control.
>
>   Q.  Any academic studies on why/how they confessed other than those of 
>the two Canadian profs?
>
>   A.  To a small degree--Yes.  See William Lindsay White's, The Captives 
>of Korea: An Unofficial White Paper on the Treatment of Prisoners of War 
>[New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957].  According to White, the 
>"why/how" of the 38 GW confessions were combinations of the following 
>interrogation methods:
>
>   Methods                                           Non-Confessors    
>Confessors
>
>   Threats of non-repatriation                          33                  
>     21
>   Threats of death                                        33               
>        33
>   Mock execution (digging own  grave)             9                       
>5
>   Convicted of war crimes                             15                   
>    23
>   Isolation for more than a month                     8                    
>  11
>   Physical abuse, third degree                      12                     
>  12
>   Sub-standard living conditions                      8                    
>     8
>   Denied permission to go to the  toilet            0                      
>   1
>   Denied food                                                7             
>            8
>
>   Not mentioned in White's table was sleep deprivation which, if not 
>universal, was used on a high percentage of POWs that were interrogated.
>
>   As far as "academic studies" on the validity of the GW charges, I have 
>read only two books dealing specifically with this 
>topic--Endicott/Hagerman's book and the Report of the International 
>Scientific Commission [ISC] for the Investigation of the Facts Concerning 
>Bacterial Warfare in Korea and China, published in Beijing in September 
>1952.  Needless to say, the full spectrum of possibilities, probabilities 
>and inaccuracies have not been explored/rectified/discarded in these works. 
>  I have seen no comprehensive work refuting/supporting the charges 
>outlined in these two documents or a balanced examination of the 
>"evidence".  Their are many pieces/parts out there dealing with the issue 
>from the tactical-operational-strategic levels but no single source, full 
>spectrum examination.
>
>   See the following at URL (search for author):
>
>   Point (search for author):
>
>   http://cwihp.si.edu/
>
>   SOVIET INTERROGATION OF U.S. POWs IN THE KOREAN WAR by Laurence Jolidon
>   New Russian Evidence on the Korean War Biological Warfare Allegations: 
>Background and Analysis By Milton Leitenberg
>   Deceiving the Deceivers: Moscow, Beijing, Pyongyang, and the Allegations 
>of Bacteriological Weapons Use in Korea By Milton Leitenberg
>
>   Counterpoint (Endicott/Hagerman):
>
>   http://www.yorku.ca/sendicot/ReplytoMiltonLeitenberg.htm
>   http://www.yorku.ca/sendicot/12SovietDocuments.htm
>   http://www.yorku.ca/sendicot/ReplytoNewYorkTimes.htm
>   http://www.yorku.ca/sendicot/ReplytoJohnvanCourtlandMoon.htm
>
>   From my limited research on the subject (a large portion being secondary 
>source material vs primary--yeah, I don't do this for a living but I am 
>interested), preliminary conclusions on my part are that:
>
>   a) The Chinese and North Korean at all levels initially believed the 
>U.S. had used GW and acted accordingly (i.e. it was not "just propaganda"). 
>  Significant actions were taken at the national level to commit 
>substantial resources to combating a perceived biological threat.
>
>   b)  At some point in mid-1952, the Chinese and North Koreans at the 
>highest levels either viewed the charges as false or believed they were 
>true--but had defeated the threat through the extensive countermeasures 
>they had emplaced in Mar-June 52.  For the times, one could argue that the 
>Chinese had planned for and implemented a text-book response to a 
>biological threat at no insignificant cost.
>
>   c)  Following the publication of the ISCs "Facts" in Sep 52, the focus 
>of GW charges and actions taken at the national level were for propaganda 
>value only--the rank and file continued to believe (and were assisted in 
>this belief) that the charges were true.  Some sources sight a significant 
>decrease in GW propaganda after September 52 following the publication of 
>the ISCs findings.  There were two spikes in GW propaganda in February 53 
>with the broadcast of Schwable and Bley's confessions and then again 11-20 
>November 53 with the broadcasting/rebroadcast of 19 GW confessions and 
>simultaneous publication of "19 Confession of U.S. Airmen" in Beijing. (The 
>last of the 78 germ warfare interrogation participants were exchanged at 
>Panmunjom on 6 Sep 53).
>
>   d) The alleged motives, methods and means of GW employment are all over 
>the compass and require a closer examination and explanation.  The 78 
>accused pilots/soldier came from all four services and from airfields all 
>over South Korea, Okinawa and carriers at sea.  They came from many 
>different squadrons & groups and nearly every type of aircraft in the 
>inventory (ADs, F4Us, F-51s, RF-51s, F-80s, an RF-80, F-84s, F-86s, B-26s, 
>B-29s, a C-46 and a Beechcraft).  The selection of who was to be 
>interrogated seemed to boil down to this--if you were shot down between 1 
>Jan - 30 Aug 1952 you were interrogated.  After that, the Chinese became 
>more selective.  The criteria for selection after August 52 is unclear and 
>not necessarily logical as far as aircraft go.  Col Mahurin was an F-86 
>pilot as were several other confessors during this period.  That he was a 
>full colonel seems to be a key factor in his selection.  His confession 
>along with Schwable's form the strongest "acknowledgements" of U.S. GW 
>charges.  Both recanted.  The personnel involved in supporting these 
>alleged operations would have been quite large.  From the logisticians 
>acquiring, shipping, storing and dispersing such weapons, to the plans and 
>operations personnel providing task and purpose for such missions from the 
>highest levels through the JOC and air groups to the numerous squadrons 
>represented by the 38 confessors (let alone the remaining 40 
>non-confessors), to the pilots and ground crews responsible for preparing 
>these weapons and delivering them so they achieved the desired effects 
>without jeopardizing friendly forces, installations and the Cease Fire 
>negotiations at Panmunjom, to the methods and means of battle damage 
>assessment (BDA) of such weapons--all arouses my curiosity as to the 
>doctrine (and supporting tactics, techniques and procedures), 
>organization(s), training, leader development, materiel, and 
>personnel/skills employed in such a monumental undertaking.  I would like 
>to see information about "the tail" from other than confessions given by 
>POWs under duress.  Surely someone from Kadena to Kunsan to Kimpo to the 
>Valley Forge (to name a few locations) have something to say about their 
>part in the whole affair.
>
>   e)  If GW was a "limited experiment" as stated by Endicott/Hagerman, the 
>scientific method of experimentation used in Korea in 1952 was something 
>other than what was taught in my high school science classes in 1969-73 or 
>employed at the Battle Command Battle Lab at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas where 
>I was Chief of Experimentation Division 1998-2000.  If what they claim is 
>true, U.S. "Germ Warfare Experiments" in Korea would provide a textbook 
>example of how not to conduct an experiment.  An experiment seeks to prove 
>or disprove a theory.  Data collection is required at the point of the 
>experiment.  Analysis of that data proves or disproves the theory.  I would 
>like to see this--if in fact it exists.
>
>   f)  It might be an interesting line of study to determine the means of 
>selection and training of Capt Tibbets and crew of The Enola Gay, the 
>supporting infrastructure and activities and the follow-on scientific 
>studies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; perhaps it would shed some light on 
>building a model that would/should have been employed in Korea to ensure 
>successful achievement of the ends for which the alleged GW attacks were 
>undertaken.
>
>   Inquiring minds want to know... :-)
>
>   v/r
>
>   John D.
>
>
>




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