Re: Korea - 50 years ago this week, Dec. 13-19

[<GRBroman@aol.com>]

In a message dated 12/14/2001 12:09:24 PM EST, ysk@kimsoft.com writes:

> A) Flimsy counter-claims:
Ah, this is indeed an interesting dilemma.  If the US categorically denies, 
at all levels, this claim, then that is "flimsy"?  If you accuse me of using 
biological weapons, the best I can do is deny it. Let me turn the tables on 
you, how would you effectively deny it?  You can't.  It's like being charged 
with a heinous crime, and then being acquitted.  In some minds that guilt 
will always remain.  That, my friend, is the beauty of propaganda.  So we 
must agree to disagree on this point.
  
>  1)  All of the POWs who had confessed recanted their confession.  Did they 
> have any choice but to 'recant'?
An interesting point, I would argue that they certainly did.  See John's 
response for a better summary of this point.  However, I counter your 
statement with this, an even more important fact which you do not raise.  Did 
they have any choice to make the "confession" in the first place?  If you 
found yourself in the same situation, you would have confessed as well.  As a 
graduate (survivor?) of SERE (Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape) 
training, I know that they can eventually break you if they so choose.  
Review your question from that standpoint.

>  2) The Beria  'archives' were 'copies' made by a Japanese reporter.  There 
> are other Soviet "archives" that contradict the Beria reports (even 
assuming 
> their authenticity).
No, this is not correct, they are available for review.  However, the 
research in this field is hardly touched the tip of the iceberg. I think that 
we would both agree that this is an area that would be most interesting to 
study in ever greater depths.  As to your point of contradictory evidence.  
Russia was bureaucracy raised to the level of an art form.  This is to be 
expected, as information was never openly shared between any branch.  
Therefore, Politburo and Presidium documents from the highest level carry 
more weight.  The real trick to document interpretation is understanding the 
organization that produced it.
 
>  3) The 'Polish' reporters claim - if my memory serves me right, they had 
> never visited the GW sites.
Again, incorrect.  These are declassified documents that cover what are 
essentially supply requests from NK and China.  They have nothing to do with 
any site visit but are documents recently found in state archives.  In my 
discussions below I mention footprints and indicators, this information is 
both and is an incredibly strong indicator that the claims by China and NKPA 
are false.

>  4) Gen. Sams Wonsan landing and examination of a Chinese field hospital.  
> According to an eyewitness account by a Korean partisan who was with the 
> general, there was no such event.  The Korean partisans brought a medical 
> student to chat with the general, who incidentally remained on an island 
held 
> by the Korean partisans.  The general used his exploit to counter the GW 
> claim, along the line  - 'Look I've been there and I saw no GW'.

"He said, she said."  I'm not sure that information of this nature has any 
meaning, one way or the other.
  
>  B) Circumstantial Evidence:
 
>  1) The US Army was conducting GW experiments in America in the same time 
> frame  
Young, this reach is too far.  Please familiarize yourself with the purpose 
of these experiments.  The US knowledge of the behavior of bio agents was in 
it's infancy.  The experiments were conducted with simulants.  Live agent 
testing at Detrick was only just beginning.  Even had the US wanted to field 
test, they had little or nothing to test.  Additionally, in order to conduct 
a meaningful test, some analysis had to be made and this leaves what we call 
a logistical footprint.  No such footprint exists for Korea.  Remember, the 
US was a latecomer to BW.  Japan and the USSR started in the 20's and 30's, 
the UK and Canada in the 30's.  The US did not start till the mid 40's, and 
then with UK assistance.  The US also lagged on the chem side.  We were 
barely starting in 1950 -53, the Korean war gave the program impetus, but did 
not start to achieve results until the war was ending.

>  2) Gen. Ishii was in Korea in the same time frame
The information Ishii provided was largely useless, see Ed Regis for a more 
detailed explanation.  If you want, much of this information can be collected 
via FOIA.

>  3) The US was ready to use nukes (why not CBW as well?)
This point is too spurious to seriously consider.  We were ready to use nukes 
everywhere during the cold war, so this is irrelevant.

>  4) Alleged use of CBW against communist partisans in South Korea in the 
same 
> time frame 
Alleged.  There's that darn word again.  Where did they get it?  How did they 
get it?  Lets discuss Anthrax, that powdery substance I believe you described 
in an earlier email.  The UK (and US through information exchange) knew as 
early as 1940-43 that Anthrax was an area denial weapon.  If it was used in 
South Korea, it would STILL be there today.  Gruinard Island and 
Vozrodzhdeniye Island took 50 plus years to decontaminate.  Again, CBW leaves 
a footprint.  No such footprint exists.  I haven't eve touched on the worst 
aspect of the use of bio weapons, the boomerang effect.  This is a medical 
footprint.  Someone mailed a handful of letters to Florida, New York and 
Washington, DC containing anthrax.  Someone in Connecticut died, along with 
some upstream mail handlers.  Where is the evidence of this, especially non - 
endemic diseases in South Korea 1950-53?  This is the type of evidence you 
should be looking for.
  
>  C) Conclusive evidence - either way:
>  
 1) Declassification of all flight logs of the 'confessed' POWs.
 2) Declassification of what Ishii and his men did for the US.
Young, I'm a little disappointed here as this is too easy.  Those logs are 
declassified.  You need to know though that that isn't what you think it is.  
My logs are sterile in the extreme, even though I never flew any such 
missions.  You want what are now called Air Mission Tasking Orders.  They are 
all, if they are still around, available through diligent research with the 
USAF.  But they won't help, because even if they do exist for the flight in 
question, you would view them as doctored or incomplete, in all likelihood 
anyway.  I don't mean to be rude, but I cannot see you accepting something 
that simple as conclusive proof. I wouldn't.  If you really knew what you 
were doing, you would not look at something as benign as logs and AMTO's.  
You would look for something that the Intel guys call "indicators."  The use 
of chem-bio has both precursor and follow on events.  Many are logistical in 
nature and are absolutely, positively the hardest to hide.  Special equipment 
and personnel, unusual activity or equipment at airfields.  Increases in 
shipments with increased security.  A careful study of the departure 
airfields will reveal none of these.  You simply can't keep that secret.  You 
may be able to keep what you are doing secret, but not the fact that 
something secret is going on. Hence, the indicators which the intel folks 
thrive on.  I have personally used this technique, it is amazingly effective. 
 Again, this is the most damning indictment of the claims of US use of CBW by 
the US in Korea.  An increase in CBW indicators could be a smoking pistol in 
terms of evidence, sadly for the conspiracy theorists, no such evidence has 
ever been found.  As an example I request you review the literature 
surrounding the first use of nukes during 1945.  That was the most secret 
project to date, yet review of diaries, letters and oral histories reveal 
that the fact that something secret was going on on Titian and the  type of 
weapon was a matter of open conjecture on the island.  You simply won't find 
that same type of activity anywhere in Korea.  And that fact, as they say in 
the sporting world, is huge.  I know that this won't convince you, but at 
least I hope that I have shown you that your review of the available 
information should be more rigorous and empirical in it's focus.  If you can 
do that, I will be very interested in hearing the results of your findings.  
Because few things in history, as in life, are certain, we cannot rule out, 
with 100% certainty, that CBW was not used.  However, an unbiased approach 
not only fails to produce any positive evidence, it also seems to indicate 
that the claims are fabrications.  Your mileage may vary.
Glen Broman