"Tanks and the Korean War: A case study of unpreparedness"

["Mike Yared" <mikeyared@hotmail.com>]

Tanks and the Korean War: A case study of unpreparedness
Armor; Sep/Oct 2000; George F Hofmann;
Volume:  109
Issue:  5
Start Page:  7-12
ISSN:  00042420
Abstract:
When the US Army went to war with Korea, it found itself unprepared to fight 
and win the first and succeeding battles. Hofmann argues that the 
unpreparedness was due to massive underfunding and poorly managed 
demobilization after World War II.

"I believe we need to read the lessons closely lest we repeat, at 
inestimable cost, the mistakes for which we paid so dear a price."

General Matthew B. Ridgway The Korean War (1967)

As the U.S. Army went to war in Korea in June 1950, it once again found 
itself unprepared to fight and win the first and succeeding battles.1 In 
order to understand why the Army was unprepared, we must examine the postwar 
development of doctrine regarding mechanized warfare with tanks as the main 
maneuver element.

On the eve of the Korean War, the nation's defense establishment had set 
aside much of what had been learned about the conventional combined arms 
armor doctrine so successfully demonstrated in Western Europe in World War 
II, and instead had begun to depend on nuclear weapons delivered by air 
power. As this was happening, the Army was digesting the war's lessons, 
attempting significant changes in organizations, weapons systems 
development, and doctrine, based on the success of the combined arms 
approach developed during the war.

It was quite evident that the tank had revolutionized battlefield dynamics. 
The armored force that swept across Europe had learned some important 
lessons, chiefly that it was essential for ground forces and tactical air to 
fight in combination, and that tanks could not operate independently in 
battle. Another lesson was that it was important to have tank units organic 
to infantry divisions, and consequently, a tank battalion was made organic 
to each infantry division to assist in the assault.2 Armor was expected to 
exploit the breakthrough, then strike out to pursue the enemy. In short, the 
Army believed that the combined arms team, built around the tank, could make 
operational level exploitation possible.

One doctrinal milestone emerged in January 1946, with the "Report of the War 
Department Equipment Board," the Stilwell Board, which was named after its 
president, the respected General Joseph W. Stilwell. Based on immediate 
postwar reports from Europe on tactical employment of armored and infantry 
divisions, one of its many recommendations called for establishment of a 
combined arms force to conduct extended service tests of new weapons and 
equipment. The board suggested that this proposed combined arms force 
formulate a doctrine for its employment, specifically aimed at providing a 
ready force quickly available for any military contingency.

The report proposed three types of tanks: a light tank for reconnaissance 
and security; a medium tank capable of assault action, exploitation, and 
pursuit; and a heavy tank capable of assault action and breakthrough. The 
board also recognized the importance of developing components specifically 
for tanks rather than relying, as in the past, on standard automotive 
components. It was now accepted that the tank was a special vehicle. 
Finally, the board based its recommendations on the idea that the next war 
would again be total, with the use of air power and atomic weapons, and that 
victory could only be achieved by occupying the enemy's territory.3

Based on another recommendation of the Stilwell Board, the commander of the 
Army Ground Forces, General Jacob L. Devers, disbanded the tank destroyer 
branch. Tank destroyer doctrine was no more than an early World War II 
defensive response to the threat of mechanized warfare and its main ground 
maneuver element, the tank. But as the war progressed, tanks improved and 
accounted for most of the tank-on-tank combat. By the end of the war, the 
M26 Pershing tank offered better armor protection than the openturreted tank 
destroyers and mounted a 90mm gun as good or better than the guns on the 
TDs.4

As the Army was steeply down-sizing, it would be difficult, if not 
impossible, to implement the Stilwell Board's recommendations. The cuts were 
so drastic that during his tour as Army Chief of Staff, between November 
1945 and February 1948, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower remarked 
that implementing the rapid demobilization of the wartime army was more 
unpleasant than being head of the occupation forces in Germany. His tenure 
as Chief of Staff, Eisenhower noted, was full of frustrations. The wartime 
Army was falling apart, rather than demobilizing, while he was struggling 
with Congress over budgetary problems and the public outcry to "bring the 
boys home." Adding to this dilemma, troop discontent over inequities in 
demobilization almost turned into a mutiny. Eisenhower struggled with the 
need to redeploy the Army for occupation duties in Germany, Austria, Japan, 
and Korea, and there was an ongoing debate over the unification of the 
military services.5

Although the U.S. had developed more modern tanks, the WWII-era Sherman 
M4A3E8s carried the burden of much of the fighting early in the Korean War.

Speaking on national security at the Nebraska Fair in Lincoln on August 31, 
1947, General Devers observed that during the two years after the end of 
hostilities in Europe and the Pacific, the United States demobilized the 
Army and Navy, "until it became evident that, with every reduction in the 
power at our disposal, there was a corresponding deterioration in the 
international situation."6 Even before the war had ended in Europe, the 
Secretary of State advised the War Department of serious deterioration of 
relations with the Soviet Union. A year later, Secretary of State James 
Byrnes had painted a very pessimistic picture regarding Soviet aggressive 
tendencies in Eastern Europe.7 These developments made the international 
situation more unstable, yet the President was implementing a defense policy 
based on deep cuts in conventional military expenditures in favor of 
reliance on nuclear power delivered by air.

General Devers reacted with criticism of the nation's policy makers. He 
claimed they had missed opportunities to educate the public about world 
problems. Regarding the future Army, he said he was disappointed that 
Congress was resisting the President's and War Department's plan for 
universal military training, which was necessary to fill the ranks of the 
National Guard and Organized Reserves. Devers argued that since the bulk of 
the Regular Army was on occupation duty and garrisoning United States 
territories, there would be a major manpower problem if a war occurred.8 Two 
years later, the Army would be stretched even further by the need to assign 
ground troops to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which - along with 
the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan - were part of the nation's new policy 
of containing Soviet expansionism.

When the economy-minded Republicans gained control of both houses in 
Congress in the 1946 elections, the Army's future became even more vague. 
Senator Robert A. Taft, an influential Republican isolationist, challenged 
the country's postwar role in internationalism, and was a proponent of 
limited government. The Ohio senator was not enthusiastic about committing 
U.S. ground forces in Europe. Instead he supported the Navy and a policy of 
reliance on air power and nuclear weapons for national defense.9

Adding to the Army's predicament was the influence of atomic bomb scientist 
and author Vannevar Bush, who was head of the Office of Scientific Research 
and Development during World War II, and beginning in September 1947, the 
director of the Joint Research and Development Board, created to resolve 
technological differences between the several departments and agencies in 
the military establishment. Earlier he had suggested to Congress that the 
military limit its work to improvements in existing equipment rather than 
perusing technological development. Shortly before the war started in Korea, 
Bush wrote the Army Chief of Staff, General Omar N. Bradley, that the day of 
the tank's dominance was fading. He argued that for the cost of one tank, 
100 antitank guns could be built, using new ammunition to fight and hold 
defensive lines in Europe against a preponderance of Soviet tanks.10

Throughout this period Congress tenaciously held to its illusion of insular 
security despite growing Soviet intransigence and aggressiveness. By 
controlling the purse, Congress was able to influence a national strategic 
policy, limiting military force levels and weapon systems development 
programs. The Army suffered the most under the fiscal restraints of the 
legislative branch, having its appropriations, especially for research and 
development, cut each year until the war broke out in Korea. Before he left 
office in February 1948, General Eisenhower warned that the unbalanced 
budget situation had rendered the Army increasingly unable to mobilize in a 
national emergency. The outgoing Army Chief of Staff stated that the Army 
had in essence purchased no new equipment, including tanks, since World War 
II. Therefore the Army, he warned, was in no situation to train and arm its 
troops adequately to meet demands of emerging international threats. 
Consequently, the ground forces reported state of readiness to deal with 
contingencies and defensive plans were nothing but "mere scraps of paper," 
Eisenhower concluded.11

Military manpower continued to decline, not for a lack of volunteers, but 
due to Army budget cuts. Despite an increasingly turbulent new world order, 
the home front was more preoccupied with its move to suburbia, concern over 
rising prices and inflation, labor unrest, a crisis in education, housing 
shortages, and tax disputes. Meanwhile, the National Defense Act of 1947 had 
separated the Air Force from the Army, giving it equal status with the Army 
and Navy. The new Defense Department establishment, under a civilian head 
with cabinet status, was intended to improve wartime operations of the 
services, but instead politicized the process, making it difficult to 
establish centralized planning due to multiservice bickering and squabbling 
amongst the service chiefs. This increased the competition for military 
technology funding during a period of budget constraints.

With the technologically driven air power proponents striving to achieve a 
greater nuclear delivery capability and the Navy, traditionally the most 
expensive of the military services, fighting for its share, there were 
virtually no funds for armor research and development. This weakened the 
Army's political situation, depriving the ground forces of the means to 
develop a proper relationship between the doctrine and technology required 
for mechanized warfighting as envisioned by the Stilwell Board.

The Truman Administration, continually driven by domestic policies that 
focused more on the postwar economy and social programs, remained adamant 
about defense cuts. In 1948, the Army had to impose an 80 percent reduction 
in equipment requirements, thus deferring any equipment modernization. In 
1948, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted a $30 billion defense budget 
based on their perceptions of national security needs, Truman capped their 
budget at the $14.4 billion set in 1947 and progressively reduced in 
succeeding fiscal years until January 1950, when it was reduced again to 
$13.5 billion. Congress also reduced the authorized Army end-strength from 
677,000 to 630,000. When North Korea invaded South Korea, the U.S. Army's 
actual strength was only about 591,000 men. And only 6,000 serviceable tanks 
remained in 1950 of the more than 28,000 tanks the country had at the end of 
World War II.12

Although President Truman blamed rapid post-World War II demobilization of 
America's mighty military force on the people, the press, and Congress, he 
also went to great lengths to hold down defense spending.13 Truman's 
ambitious Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, whose economy drive on the 
eve of the Korean War again fell heavily on the Army, best illustrated this. 
Johnson believed that the best national defense policy rested on nuclear air 
power. Unlike Johnson, Secretary of State Dean Acheson favored a more 
flexible policy based on deployable military power that would enhance 
American diplomacy. This policy found support in a recommendation made 
shortly before the invasion of South Korea in a secret National Security 
Council study (NSC-68), which called for a stronger ground force to deal 
with increasing challenges caused by the spread of communism worldwide.14

Secretary Acheson, however, defined the country's strategic defensive 
perimeter along a line that included Japan and Taiwan but did not include 
Korea, a country where the Joint Chiefs of Staff had earlier advised the 
President that the United States had little strategic interest. They argued 
that military retrenchment and budget cuts forced them to take U.S. military 
forces out of Korea.15 At the same time, there was disagreement between the 
Central Intelligence Agency and Army Intelligence over the possible outcome. 
The CIA advised that withdrawal of U.S. ground troops from South Korea in 
the spring of 1949 would in time be followed by an invasion from the North. 
The Army's Intelligence Division disagreed, claiming troop withdrawal would 
not encourage a North Korean move.16

Meanwhile, early in 1949, an advisory panel on armor reported that the U.S. 
Army had no tank on production or in development capable of defeating the 
types possessed by the country's potential enemies. The panel considered 
this situation critical. Unless the Army's tank development situation was 
improved, the panel reported, the United States would not have enough tanks 
to support a major ground war for a least two and a half years after the 
beginning of hostilities. One solution suggested was to take advantage of 
America's great industrial capabilities and the mechanical aptitudes of its 
people.17

A 1949 field manual emphasized the importance of the offensive role of 
armor, noting that the faster armor moves and the quicker it accomplishes 
its offensive mission of penetration and envelopment, the fewer the losses 
and more effective the gains. Exploitation was considered a continuation of 
penetration and envelopment. Tankers were expected to plan boldly and 
execute their missions with aggressiveness and violence, employing 
firepower, mobility, and speed.18

In March 1950, the Hodge Report named after Lieutenant General John R. 
Hodge, the post-World War II Army corps commander in Korea - stated that 
armor was more effective when employed as part of the combined arms team of 
tank, infantry, artillery, combat engineers, and tactical air power. Armor's 
mission with the combined arms team was destruction of enemy forces with 
firepower, mobility, and shock action. The report added that attacking 
towards deep objectives in pursuit and exploitation over considerable 
distances was the role for armor at the operational level. In the design of 
tanks, the report stated, firepower, maneuverability, and mobility were more 
important than armor protection, although armor remained important. Like the 
Stilwell Board, it recommended tanks be organic to infantry regiments and 
divisions, and that three types of functional tanks be developed. 
Disheartened, the Hodge Report noted that Army research and development had 
been curtailed and would likely be further reduced.19

By 1950, Army doctrine had been revised in many ways; however, it was 
basically a refinement of World War II experience. It was Eurocentric, 
designed to fight a total war, rather than contingency operations in present 
and future less-than-total war situations around the world.20 Congressional 
and White House actions had reduced nine of 10 Army divisions into 
ineffective skeletons, impacting training. This was especially true of the 
four occupation divisions stationed in Japan. That congested country and its 
road conditions did not permit extensive training exercises, especially for 
medium and heavy tanks. Moreover, because of the military austerity program, 
these divisions were deficient in authorized tank strength. Rather than 
having a standard complement of one heavy tank battalion of M26s and three 
regimental medium tank companies of M4s, each division had only one company 
of M24 Chaffee light tanks, no match for the Soviet-built T34/85 tanks that 
the North Koreans Peoples' Army used to spearhead their invasion of South 
Korea.

On the eve of the Korean War, the Army had approximately 3,400 M24 light 
tanks in the inventory, most of them unserviceable. In addition, there were 
available approximately 3,200 M4A3E8 Sherman medium tanks of World War II 
vintage, of which only a few more than half were serviceable.21 The M4 
mediums were the workhorse of U.S. ground troops during World War II. They 
were not tactically capable of head-to-head engagement with German tanks. 
Their battlefield success was due more to superior numbers and the ability 
of U.S. tankers to maneuver to a position where a penetrating round could 
find a weak spot.22 To engage superior German tanks, the Army introduced, 
late in the war, the heavier armed and armored M26 Pershing. However, the 
first three M26s that were rushed to Korea from the Tokyo Ordnance Depot had 
chronic problems, especially overheating engines and defective fan belts.23

Also introduced to Korea was the M46 Patton. Fielded in 1949, the M46 was an 
M26 upgraded in engine reliability and cooling. Accordingly, tankers went to 
war in Korea with equipment mostly left over from World War 11. In addition, 
many tankers were illtrained and ill-prepared, receiving equipment just days 
before engaging the T34/85S.24

In the beginning, the Korean War was a war of movement. U.S. tank units were 
assigned to various infantry divisions, regimental combat teams, and task 
forces for mobile fire support and antitank capabilities. No large armor 
units - regiments, brigades or divisions - saw service in Korea. After the 
counter-invasion by the Chinese Communist forces and what was left of the 
North Korean People's Army, the conflict became a defensive war of attrition 
and increased firepower to support infantry forces. Despite mountainous 
terrain and restricted trafficability, tanks proved to be potent adjuncts in 
support of infantry. Often they were used for indirect fire missions or 
deployed in fixed defensive positions. Though most armor action was 
infantry- and artillery-driven, Korea demonstrated the value of tanks as 
infantryaccompanying weapons, and on occasion, achieved spectacular results 
in executing fairly deep mechanized task force operations despite 
mountainous terrain and trafficability restrictions.25

A 1954 Johns Hopkins study, "Tankvs-Tank Combat in Korea," recorded that 
U.S. tanks were approximately three times as effective as enemy tanks. It 
noted that American tanks destroyed about 25 percent of the enemy tank 
force, largely due to higher first-round engagements and hits.26 As a result 
of early experiences in Korea, a 1951 policy conference on armor revived the 
Stilwell Board's recommendations for three types of functional tanks: a 
light gun tank distinguished by its mobility; a medium tank characterized by 
its ability to sustain itself in all types of combat action; and a heavy 
tank to defeat any enemy on the battlefield.27 Conversely, the British, who 
considered the Patton tank "all too pansy," had indicated that, unlike the 
U.S. Army, one all-purpose tank, like their Centurion, was more suitable for 
armor operations.28

In spite of various armor policy recommendations following the Stilwell 
Board Report, battlefield dynamics in a limited war changed the relationship 
between maneuver and firepower, emphasizing increased use of air power and 
artillery.

At the 1954 Armor Conference, the question of armor mobility was positioned 
within the national strategy of nuclear air power. It rationalized that 
mobility and flexibility would become more decisive on a nuclear 
battlefield. The conference concluded that armor was more capable of 
attaining relatively superior mobility that could provide a decisive 
advantage in a European-style battle. The conference accepted the concept of 
firepower and attrition but suggested it be integrated with the freedom of 
action that armor provided.29 Naturally, mobility depended upon equipment 
characteristics, which required a trade-off between mobility and 
survivability. Summarizing, the conference noted that firepower was the 
decisive factor, and that armor doctrine be based on the fundamental concept 
that power coupled with an unexcelled ability to maneuver firepower at the 
decisive time to the decisive place. Yet for the decades following the 
Korean War, firepower systems and attrition warfare doctrine dominated. This 
doctrine finally gave way to the visionary AirLand Battle doctrine for 
warfighting at the operational level that characterized Allied operations 
during the Gulf War.30

Concluding, there are a number of historical observations to consider. First 
are the country's political objectives. Until the war in Korea, Congress and 
the President were more prone to political and economic containment of the 
Soviet Union and collective security through the United Nations rather than 
promoting a combat-ready ground force to deal with contingencies, as 
suggested by the Stilwell board.

This situation again demonstrated that the country's leadership failed to 
adopt a national defense policy that took advantage of technological changes 
brought about as a result of World War IL Congress and the President also 
lacked the vision to fully understand the importance of the conventional 
component of a national military policy. The outcome was that traditional 
military heritage once again came in conflict with postwar domestic and 
political demands, causing a serious gap between foreign policy and a 
suitable military policy.

The second observation deals with the issue of military strategy, which is 
how to win the next war. The post-World War II military austerity invoked by 
the White House and Congress had a ripple effect, stifling Army research and 
development necessary for innovation with a mobile strike force trained and 
equipped to fight and win the first and succeeding battles.

At top of page, M46 tanks of the 64th Tank Battalion undergo final 
inspection before an operation supporting the 3rd ID in July, 1951. At left, 
an M46 rolls down one of country's few high-speed roads. The M-46 at lower 
right slowly moves into a village. The knocked-out North Korean vehicle at 
center, above, is a 76mm self-propelled field gun.

The Army's post-war doctrine on how to organize and fight its next war was 
not in agreement with required modern equipment assets necessary to execute 
its mission. Consequently, the strategic, operational, and tactical links 
for winning the first battle never materialized. This was due to a national 
strategy that did not take into consideration the relationship between 
threats and the need for technological advances. As a result, the Army had a 
force structure and equipment that did not fit its future warfighting 
doctrine that became outmoded in spite of the Stilwell Board's 
recommendations. Instead the national defense strategy of the country relied 
on nuclear weapons and intercontinental airpower capabilities and the 
exercise of coercion called deterrence, America's Maginot Line.

Third, when the U.S. Army entered the Korean War, an innovative tank program 
and a visionary mobile combined arms doctrine - suggested by the Stilwell 
Board and endorsed by the Hodge Report - were all but forgotten.

As revolutionary as the tank was in World War II, its future full potential 
was not to be realized with a ground force whose mission began to change as 
a result of America's expanding international commitments to contain 
communism. As a result of the Army's lack of preparedness, North Korean 
forces, led by their T-34/85s, pushed the allies back to the Pusan 
Perimeter, a tiny sliver of the peninsula, before it could accumulate 
sufficient strength to stop the North Koreans and launch a counteroffensive.

The neglect of armor research and development and a makeshift organization 
led to many frustrations for tankers in Korea, who fought and died there 
while employing, in most cases, wornout, World War II equipment. This 
experience was a clear example of the importance of readiness and the need 
to modernize organization, training, and equipment to deal with the 
ever-changing threats and technical advances of warfighting.

Unfortunately, funds that did trickle down for armor research and 
development degraded the health of the armor force, a legacy that continued 
long after the "Forgotten War" in spite of the changes in warfighting from a 
World War II concept of total war to the dynamics of a limited war.

This paper was presented as part of a panel session entitled, "The Korean 
War `Tank Crisis' of 1950, " chaired by BG Jack Mountcastle, USA (Ret.) at 
the Society for Military History annual meeting at the Marine Corps 
University. The commentator at the session was GEN Donn A. Starry. The 
author would like to express thanks to GEN Starry and Charles Lemons, 
Curator of the Patton Museum, for their assistance while he was researching 
the article.
The Sherman "Easy-8" was outclassed in tank-to-tank combat by the early 
'50s, but was still formidable in its main Korean War role, supporting 
infantry. This scene shows an M4 accompanying U.S. and Korean infantrymen 
through a nibbled street.

Notes
1Eric C. Ludvigsen, "The Failed Bluff of Task Force Smith: An `Arrogant 
Display of Strength'," ARMY, February 1992, pp. 36-45, and William G. 
Robertson, "Economy of Force: Repulsing the North Koreans Along the Naktong, 
1950," in Roger J. Spiller, gen. ed., Combined Arms in Battle Since 1939 
(Fort Leavenworth, Kan: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 
1992), pp. 97-103.
2Christopher R. Gabel, "World War II Armor Operations in Europe," in George 
F. Hofmann and Donn A. Starry, eds., Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The History 
of U.S. Armored Forces (Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 1999), 
pp. 179-80.
3Report of War Department Equipment Board, 19 January 1946, Falkovich 
Collection, Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor, Fort Knox, Ky., pp. 8-9, 
42-4. Hereinafter cited as Falkovich Collection, Patton Museum. Also see 
Jonathan M. House, Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th Century 
Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization, Research Survey No. 2 (Fort 
Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff 
College, August 1984), pp. 146-9, and Philip L. Bolte, "Post-World War II 
and Korea: Paying for Unpreparedness," in Camp Colt to Desert Storm, pp. 
218-20.
4Report of War Department Equipment Board, Falkovich Collection, Patton 
Museum, p. 42. For an excellent study on the too-specialized TD doctrine, 
see Christopher R. Gabel, Seek, Strike, and Destroy: LLS. Army Tank 
Destroyer Doctrine in World War II (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies 
Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, September 1985).
5Dwight D. Eisenhower, At Ease: Stories 1 Tell to Friends (New York: 
Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1967), pp. 316-20, and R. Alton Lee, "The Army 
`Mutiny' of 1946," Journal of American History, December 1966, pp. 555-71. 
For a provocative account of mobilization and military unpreparedness, see 
Michael Kendall, "An Inflexible Response: United States Army Manpower 
Mobilization Polices, 1945-1950" (Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 
1982).
6Address by General Jacob L. Devers at Veterans' Day Observance, Lieutenant 
General George W. Read, Jr. Files in possession of author, p. 2.
7Samuel P. Huntington, "The Interim Years: World War II to January, 1950," 
in Raymond G. O'Connor, ed., American Defense Policy in Perspective: From 
Colonial Times to the Present (London: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965), p. 
298, and James F. Byrnes, Speaking Friendly (New York: Harper & Brothers 
Publishers, 1947), pp. 277-97.
8Address by General Jacob L. Devers, pp. 2, 4.
9Thomas D. Boettcher, First Call: The Making of the Modern U. S. Military, 
1945-1953 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1992), pp. 116-7.
10S. Everett Gleason and Fredrick Aandahl, gen. eds., Foreign Relations of 
the United States
1950: National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Vol. I 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 231-33. Also see 
Nathan Reingold, "Vannevar Bush," in John A. Garraty and Mark C. Carnes, 
eds., American National Biography, Vol. 4 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1999), p. 80.
11Louis Galambos, ed., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The Chief of 
Staff, Vol. IX (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), pp. 
2254-6. For an excellent study on Congress and its ability to influence the 
military through power of the purse, see Edward A. Kolodzeij, The Uncommon 
Defense and Congress, 1945-1963 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 
1966).
12William W. Epley, America's First Cold War Army 1945-1950 (Arlington, Va.: 
The Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the United States Army, 1999), 
pp. 6, 11.
13Memoirs by Harry A. Truman: Years of Trial and Hope 1946-1952 (Garden 
City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1956), p. 345.
14Steven L. Rearden, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense: The 
Formative Years 19471950 (Washington: Historical Office, Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, 1984), pp. 406-10. For brief discussions of NSC-68, 
see Maurice A. Mallin, Tanks, Fighters, & Ships: U.S. Conventional Force 
Planning Since WWII (Washington: Brassey's, Inc., 1990), pp. 41-62, and John 
Edward Wilz, "Korea and the United States, 19451950," in Stanley Sandler, 
ed., The Korean War: An Encyclopedia (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 
1995), pp. 176-7.
15Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1969), pp. 349-53, and Eisenhower, At Ease, 
pp. 319-20.
16"Consequences of a U.S. Troop Withdrawal from Korea in Spring, 1949," and 
"Appendix," 28 February 1949, in Michael Warner, el., The CIA under Harry 
Truman (Washington: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central 
Intelligence Agency, 1994), ORE 3-49.
17Report of Army Field Forces Advisory Panel on Armor, Vol. 1, 18 February 
1949, Falkovich Collection, Patton Museum, pp. 5-7.
18Department of the Army, FM 17-100 Armored Division and Combat Command, 
December 1949, Patton Museum, pp. 85-7.
19Report of the Army Equipment Board 1950, Fort Monroe, Va., 8 March 1950, 
Falkovich Collection, Patton Museum, pp. 27-9.
20Robert A. Doughty, The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76, 
Leavenworth Papers (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army 
Command and General Staff College, August 1979), p.1.
21Bolte, "Post-World War II and Korea: Paying for Unpreparedness," p. 204.
22S. R. Hinds, "Comparison of United States Equipment with Similar German 
Equipment," in Major General I. D. White, Commanding General
2d Armored Division, A Report on United States vs. German Armor to General 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Headquarters 2d Armored Division, 20 March 1945, 
Patton Museum, p. 1.
23R, p, Hunnicutt, Pershing: A History of the Medium Tank 720 Series 
(Berkeley, Calif.: Feist Publications, 1971), pp. 178-9.
24For two superb studies on armor's calamity and the excellent adjustments 
made by tankers during the war, see Bolte, "Post-World War II and Korea: 
Paying for Unpreparedness," pp. 21758, and Arthur W. Connor, Jr., "The Armor 
Debacle in Korea, 1950: Implications for Today," Parameters, Spring 1992, 
pp. 66-76.
25eadership Branch, Armor in Battle, (Fort Knox: Leadership and Training 
Division, Command and Staff Department, U.S. Army Armor School, March 1986), 
pp. 3-I to 3-27. For additional details, see John F. Antal, "Tanks at 
Chipyong-Ni," ARMY, March 1998, pp. 24-32, Scott D. Aiken, "The 72d Tank 
Battalion in Operation TOUCHDOWN," ARMOR SeptemberOctober 1992, pp. 44-8, 
and Sam Friedman, "Tankers at Heartbreak," ARMOR, SeptemberOctober 1952, pp. 
24-7.
26Vincent V. McRae and Alvin D. Coox, "Tank-vs-Tank Combat in Korea," 
Operations Research Office (Chevy Chase, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University, 
8 September 1954), Falkovich Collection, Patton Museum, pp. 2-3.
27Report of U.S. Army Policy Conference on Armor, Fort Monroe, 16-20 October 
1951, Falkovich Collection, Patton Museum, pp. 1-2.
28"Tanks: How Do They Rate?" 24 March 1952, Newsweek, pp. 30-1.
29"Effect of Atomic Weapons on the Employment of Armor," in Final Report of 
United States Army Policy Conference, 15-19 November 1954, Fort Knox, 
Falkovich Collection, Patton Museum, 1-3.
30On This issue, see Robert H. Scales, "From Korea to Kosovo: America's Army 
Learns to Fight Limited Wars in the Age of Precision Strikes," Armed Forces 
Journal International, December 1999, pp. 36-41.

[Author note]
Dr. George F. Hofmann is a history professor at the University of 
Cincinnati, who served in the U.S. Army (Armor). He is the author of The 
Super Sixth: A History of the Sixth Armored Division, Cold War Casualty: The 
Court Martial of Major General Robert W. Grow, and edited with Donn A. 
Starry Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The History of U.S. Armored Forces. He is 
a contributor to History in Dispute, World War N, and a frequent contributor 
to ARMOR and The Journal of Military History.


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