"How armor was employed in the urban battle of Seoul"

["Mike Yared" <mikeyared@hotmail.com>]

How armor was employed in the urban battle of Seoul
Armor; Fort Knox; Sep/Oct 2001; Matthew H Fath;

Volume:  110
Issue:  5
Start Page:  25-29+
ISSN:  00042420

Abstract:
The Battle of Seoul during the Korean War demonstrated that armor, with its 
ability to survive on the battlefield and produce large, concentrated 
amounts of firepower, was an integral component of the combined arms team.

BUSTING THE BARRICADES:


As noted in a recent Army Times article entitled "Urban Crisis," few armor 
or mechanized infantry units - and not one active duty armor or mechanized 
infantry unit - has yet trained or was scheduled to train at the Zussman 
Village Mounted Urban Combat Training Site at Fort Knox, Kentucky.

This is a startling fact, considering that the facility cost over 15 million 
dollars to build and is touted as the premier urban warfare training center 
for armor units.1 This apparent lack of interest by the heavy force 
community, coupled with the light infantry's increasing reliance on 
"precision" urban warfare, is a disturbing trend. By disregarding the 
likelihood of future battles in urban terrain, many heavy units, with their 
emphasis on desert or rural warfare, allow the special operations and elite 
light infantry units to write the Army's future urban warfare doctrine. For 
example, a cursory reading of doctrinal proposals or combat training center 
articles demonstrates that the correct training emphasis of conventional 
U.S. Army units should be on proper roomclearing techniques and well-aimed 
rifle fire.2 Moreover, the focal point for "precision" MOUT adherents seems 
to be on aggressive light infantry forces, to the neglect of the combined 
arms team. Disregarding both the very nature of urban warfare and history's 
past urban battles, "precision" MOUT supporters have wrongly implied that 
future urban fights will require less firepower.

General Douglas MacArthur once stated that it is the study of military 
history that brings to light "those fundamental principles, and their 
combinations and applications, which, in the past, have been productive of 
success."3 An examination of the Battle of Seoul during September 25-28, 
1950, refutes the "precision" MOUT theory and demands that armor and 
mechanized leaders claim their rightful place at the table of doctrinal 
discussions. Specifically, the Battle of Seoul demonstrates that armor, with 
its ability to survive on the battlefield and produce large, concentrated 
amounts of firepower, was an integral component of the combined arms team. 
During X Corps's "Battle of the Barricades," Marine and Army tactics 
stressed the punching power of tanks as a decisive and necessary complement 
to the rifleman. Tanks, in the role of mobile assault guns, reinforced the 
rifle companies with destructive and suppressive fires to overcome the North 
Korean People's Army's (NKPA) strongpoint defenses.Additionally, they 
provided commanders flexibility by shifting tanks to decisive points on the 
battlefield. As a veteran of the fighting in Seoul, Private First Class Lee 
Berger of E Company, 2d Battalion, Ist Marine Regiment, stated, "Thank God 
we had tanks with us. Without them, we'd still be fighting there."4

Given the military, psychological, and political importance of Seoul to both 
the UN (United Nations) and NKPA forces, it is hardly surprising that the 
city would become a battleground. Seoul, the capital of South Korea, was 
also an important logistics node. General MacArthur believed that the 
recapture of Seoul was an important part of Operation Chromite (The 
Inchon-Seoul Campaign) and stated:

"By seizing Seoul, I would completely paralyze the enemy's supply system 
coming and going. This in turn will paralyze the fighting power of the 
troops that now face Walker. Without munitions and food they will soon be 
helpless and disorganized, and can be easily overpowered by our smaller but 
well supplied forces."5

MacArthur also believed that the recapture of Seoul would undermine the 
morale of the NKPA and boost the morale of the ROK forces. Author Clay Blair 
in The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953, noted that MacArthur 
placed great emphasis on the psychological benefits of capturing Seoul. 
MacArthur professed that Seoul's capture would shock and demoralize the 
North Korean government and armed forces.6

For the North Koreans, Seoul was the logistical hub for its forces south of 
the Imjin River, a lifeline of sorts. As author James Stokesbury, in his 
work A Short History of the Korean War, stated, "The vast majority of the 
support for the Communist offensive, therefore, funneled through the fairly 
narrow corridor in and around the capital city."7

Two important factors in understanding the need for armor support during the 
Battle of Seoul center on the nature of the city's urban terrain and the 
NKPA defenses. In 1950, Seoul had a population of nearly two million people. 
The city proper was surrounded by hill masses, mostly rural villages of 
huts. However, its core contained modem office buildings, residential 
structures, and ancient palaces. Many of the buildings were solidly 
constructed and structurally sound. Wide arterial boulevards crisscrossed 
the city, and it was these avenues of approach that would become the focal 
point for NKPA strongpoints.8 One such major road was Ma Po Boulevard. 
General Edwin H. Simmons, then a weapons company commander in the 3rd 
Battalion, Ist Marine Regiment, described Ma Po Boulevard as a "solidly 
built-up street, mostly two- and three-story structures of stucco and 
masonry construction, and occasional more impressive buildings - churches, 
hospitals, and so on - often enclosed with a walled compound."9

In charge of the NKPA defense of Seoul was Major General Wol Ki Chan. Chan's 
initial plan was to concentrate his forces on the hills surrounding Seoul 
and in the city itself. However, after the 32d Infantry Regiment of 7th 
Infantry Division seized South Mountain on the 25th of September, Chan 
believed that the city was lost and withdrew many of his units. 
Nevertheless, he left a sizeable force to defend Seoul's city core, in an 
effort to delay and attrit X Corps forces. Chan hoped that this delaying 
action would also allow NKPA units south of Seoul to withdraw north and 
avoid being smashed between X Corps and Eighth Army.10

Opposing UN forces were an amalgamation of various NKPA units under the 
newly formed 31st Rifle Division or Seoul City Regiment, numbering 
approximately 8,000 to 10,000 men. The 31st Rifle Division consisted of 
units from the 25th NKPA Separate Infantry Brigade, 18th NKPA Rifle 
Division, 42d NKPA Tank Regiment, 19th NKPA Anti Tank Regiment, 513th NKPA 
Artillery Regiment, 10th NKPA Railroad Regiment, and the 36th Battalion, 111 
th NKPA Security Regiment.11 The NKPA defenders also employed a large 
majority of Seoul's inhabitants as forced labor to construct their 
barricades. 12

To defend the nucleus of Seoul, the NKPA developed a potentially deadly 
defensive scheme. On the outer edges of the city core, the NKPA employed 
ambushes and sniper teams in order to attrit and disrupt Marine or Army 
attacks. Photojournalist David Douglas Duncan, with A Company, Ist 
Battalion, lst Marine Regiment, testified to the frustrating effects of 
these ambushes in his book This Is War: A Photo-Narrative of the Korean War. 
He stated, "Other Reds, armed with rapid fire burp guns and hiding behind 
the gutter walls along the way, squirted quick bursts at the steadily 
pushing Marines - then melted away."13

After the ambushes had taken some toll on the attackers, the NKPA hoped that 
their series of successive strongpoint defenses or barricades would destroy 
them. Barricades were established every 400 to 600 yards. If the attacker 
could not be halted, the NKPA's defensive depth would allow their defenders 
to break contact, withdraw, and then occupy a supplemental or alternate 
barricade.14 The major weakness of the NKPA's defense was that many 
strongpoints were isolated and lacked mutual support. As author Bevin 
Alexander explained in his book Korea: The First War We Lost, "Thus the 
Americans were able to reduce each barricade independently with no fear that 
the enemy could develop a coordinated counterattack or pose any threat to 
possession of the city."15

Despite the NKPA's lack of an overall coherent defensive plan, at the small 
unit level each barricade was individually formidable and deadly to the 
potential attacker. These barricades were essentially fortified islands. As 
author Robert Tallent, who was with D Company, 2d Battalion, 1st Marine 
Regiment, stated:

"In actions of this type there can be no flanking of a position - only so 
many men can get into the fight. The width of the street, available cover 
and strength of the enemy fire dictate the number of troops that can be 
brought to bear on any one position... The barricade is a separate battle 
all to itself."16

Each barricade was centered on a street intersection. The entire width of 
the street was blocked with a wall constructed of rice bags filled with 
earth. The barricade was generally eight feet high and approximately six 
feet deep, making it impervious to machine gun or small arms fire. Many 
barricades were reinforced with various materials such as overturned trolley 
cars, automobiles, barrels, streetcar rails, or other debris. In front of 
each barricade were rows of antitank mines. Covering this kill zone were 
interlocking fires from towed 45mm antitank guns, individual T-34 tanks or 
SU 76 self-propelled guns, antitank rifles, and Maxim heavy machine guns. 17

Each barricade was also tied into adjacent buildings. NKPA soldiers occupied 
defensive fighting positions inside the buildings and fired from doors and 
windows.8 These positions offered excellent cover and concealment and 
degraded the attacker's target acquisition. Snipers also fired from 
rooftops. Staff Sergeant Lee Bergee of E Company, 2d Battalion, Ist Marine 
Regiment, stated that, "It seemed that every building in Seoul housed an 
enemy sniper."19 Each barricade was also supported with mortars and 
artillery fires, which were often registered in front of the enemy 
barricades. For extra defense against tanks, the NKPA also resorted to 
suicide detachments armed with satchel charges.20

Against these defenses, the X Corps commander, Major General Edward Almond, 
ordered General Oliver P. Smith's Ist Marine Division to seize Seoul. Smith 
planned a multi-pronged advance that was centered on major roads in Seoul, 
in an effort to capture the city quickly.21 Based on the limited 
intelligence of NKPA defenses in Seoul, the operation was essentially an 
urban movement to contact. On September 25, the 1st Marine Division began 
its attack on Seoul. In order to support the 1st Marine Division's attack 
and isolate the city from the south, the 32d Infantry Regiment of the 7th 
Infantry Division seized South Mountain and cleared the surrounding urban 
area.22

Marine Regimental Combat Team One, consisting of the lst Marine Regiment and 
the 2d Korean Marine Corps Battalion, attacked in zone (its "zone of action" 
approximately one mile to one and half miles wide with a final objective of 
six miles in depth the high ground near the northeastern outskirts of Seoul) 
oriented on the Ma Po Boulevard. In RCT-1's zone were Seoul's main business 
and hotel section; the main Seoul railroad station; the French, American, 
and Russian consulates; City Hall; the Duk Soo Palace; and the Museum of 
Art.23 To give the reader a flavor of the scope of RCT1's mission, General 
Edwin Simmons stated that their attack was analogous to "moving up 
Pennsylvania Avenue to capture the Capitol, taking Union Station along the 
way."24

Regimental Combat Team Five, consisting of the 5th Marine Regiment and the 
Ist Korean Marine Corps Battalion, attacked in zone (its "zone of action" 
also approximately one to one and a half miles wide, with a final objective 
of six miles in depth - the high ground overlooking the Seoul-Uijongbu Road) 
oriented towards the northwestern part of the city, which included the 
Government House, Sodaemun Prison, Changdok Palace, and the Royal Gardens. 
Regimental Combat Team Seven, consisting of the 7th Marine Regiment, the Ist 
Marine Recon Company, and the 5th Korean Marine Corps Battalion, was 
originally ordered to protect the division's left flank and seize the high 
ground astride the Seoul-Kaesong Road to the northwest of Seoul in order to 
block enemy escape routes.25 However, after Smith realized the intensity of 
the fighting in Seoul, he reoriented RCT-7s axis to the south down the 
KaesongSeoul highway and ordered them to attack abreast of RCT-1.26

Despite MacArthur's premature pronouncement of the city's liberation on 
September 26, the seizure of Seoul did not come quickly. After defeating a 
NKPA armored counterattack during the night of September 25, the Marine 
forces soon became bogged down in a street-by-street war. As Colonel Lewis 
"Chesty" Puller, the commander of the 1st Marine Regiment stated, "Progress 
was agonizingly slow."27 Sometimes, the Marine regiments averaged a total of 
1,200 to 2,000 yards a day.28 This was due to the fact that the lethal NKPA 
traps produced murderous amounts of fire and posed significant challenges 
for the Marine or Army attackers. They also had the propensity to inflict 
large numbers of casualties. Private First Class Jack Wright of G Company, 
3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, remarked that his company nicknamed one 
intersection "Blood and Bones Corner."29 Army Signal Corps Lieutenant Robert 
Strickland, who was with the Marines in Seoul, stated:

"The air was whipping with everything from flying stones to big antitank 
shells... Right after this, we got so much fire of all kinds that I lost 
count. There was more mortar shells, more antitank stuff, and more 
small-arms fire, and then it started all over again. I have seen a lot of 
men get hit in this war and in World War II, but I think I have never seen 
so many men get hit so fast in such a small area."30

Given the nature of the intense fighting described above, it becomes 
abundantly clear that the "sugar-coated version" of precision MOUT could not 
have possibly overcome these defenses.31

Instead, in order to breach these barricades and destroy the NKPA defenders, 
the Marine and Army forces developed a highly effective combined arms team, 
in which tanks played an indispensable role. Most UN forces quickly 
discovered that rifle or machine guns lacked the penetrating power and punch 
to overcome the hardened NKPA barricade defenses. Moreover, only the tank 
proved to be effective at physically breaching the barricade. It simply 
blasted it to shreds with its main gun or plowed through it.32

The typical tactical pattern for the Marines or Army units began with a 
bombing or strafing of NKPA positions by Marine Corsairs. Next, mortars and 
artillery suppressed the enemy while a team of infantry and armor moved into 
support-by-fire positions. Tanks destroyed NKPA machine guns, tanks, and 
antitank guns, while engineers breached the minefields.

After a breach lane was created, tanks rolled forward and demolished the 
barricade. Then infantry, following behind the tanks to take advantage of 
their armor protection, entered buildings and completed the destruction of 
the enemy. On the average, this whole process took about an hour per 
barricade.33 Staff Sergeant Chester Bair of the Heavy Tank Company, 32d 
Infantry Regiment, which was often attached to Marine units, praised these 
tactics. He stated:

"The Marines used tanks very well. They would use the telephone located on 
the rear of each tank which talked to the commander inside. In this way the 
Marines acted as our eyes. Buttoned up inside, depending on a periscope, our 
vision was limited. Working outside in the streets, the Marines tremendously 
increased our ability to close with the enemy and to direct our 
firepower."34

The two tanks that were used by UN forces during the Battle of Seoul were 
the M-26 Pershing and the M4A3 Sherman. The M-26 Pershing was used by the 
Marine Corps. Its armament was a 90mm main gun and two .30 caliber machine 
guns. The Army used the M4A3 Sherman. Also, some Marine units received 
support from the Sherman tank companies of the 7th Infantry Division. The 
Sherman's armament consisted of a 76mm main gun and three .30 caliber 
machine guns. In addition to the Pershing and Sherman tanks, other variants, 
such as flame-thrower tanks and bulldozer tanks, were also used.35

Tanks were often rotated in order for the attacking units to sustain the 
momentum of the attack and prevent many withdrawing NKPA soldiers from 
bolstering the defense of the next barricade. Chester Bair stated, "As soon 
as one had been eliminated, there would be another. After a tank overran 
three or four of them, another one would replace it.

In this manner each tank could refuel, clean its guns, receive ammo, and 
allow the crew to work and do maintenance."36 If a tank "rotation" policy 
was not possible, attackers waited for tanks to rearm and refuel before 
continuing on to the next barricade fight.37

One hallmark of the tank's effectiveness was its ability to generate large 
amounts of accurate and deadly firepower in a very short time. During the 
destruction of one barricade by D Company, 2d Battalion, 1st Marine 
Regiment, Tallent stated that it appeared that the "tank guns went into a 
rampage."38 Tanks assisting companies from the 1st Battalion, 1st Marine 
Regiment were also instrumental in destroying NKPA defenses around the 
railroad station and government compound.39 Often, tanks proved to be the 
decisive arm when the momentum of attacks began to stall and fire 
superiority needed to be regained. Duncan observed:

"From behind their barricades they (the NKPA) started spraying endless 
rounds into the station and its plaza out in front. The Marines burrowed 
into the shell holes and dared not raise their heads, for the crack of 
bullets overhead was close and constant and meant for them. Back along the 
street, other Marines heard the fire, leaned dangerously far out from their 
own barricades to see how they might relieve their buddies, and had found no 
answer - when deep, ground-shivering roars took the problem from their 
shoulders... tanks, those long-overdue tanks, growled up across the railroad 
tracks, into the plaza - and met the enemy fire head on. The tanks traded 
round for round with the heavily-armed, barricaded enemy and chunks of armor 
and bits of barricade were blown high into the air."40

Tanks were also very effective at quickly destroying NKPA heavy weapons and 
armored vehicles which, left alone, would have cut advancing infantrymen to 
pieces. During a fight near Duksoo Palace, Lieutenant Bryan J. Cummings's 
M-26 Pershing destroyed two NKPA SU-76s and allowed the Marines to seize the 
enemy barricade.41 Blair's Sherman crew also destroyed a NKPA T-34 in a 
battle in the street, "ripping their turret completely off" with one 
round.42

Attacks that were launched without tank support often ended in failure. In 
fact, many of these units had to be rescued by tanks; the presence of a few 
tanks often favorably shifted the tide of the battle towards the UN side. 
For example, on September 26, a platoon from C Company, 32d Infantry 
Regiment encountered a NKPA defense in vicinity of the Seoul City Racetrack. 
Suffering heavy casualties within seconds and lacking any tank support, the 
platoon established a hasty defense and began fighting for their lives. The 
platoon just simply did not have enough firepower to overcome the NKPA 
defenses. The platoon leader, Lieutenant James Mortrude, wisely requested 
assistance from some tanks that he saw in an adjacent sector. As author 
Shelby Stanton described in his book, Ten Corps in Korea, 1950:

"He (Lieutenant Mortrude) spotted a trio of three tanks clanking forward to 
their assistance, and dashed 25 yards through withering enemy fire to reach 
them before more casualties were inflicted on his platoon. Grabbing the 
external interphone system phone on the rear of the "buttoned-up" lead tank, 
he yelled directions to commence firing immediately into the enemy-held 
roadway. The tanks smothered the road berm in geysers of blackened earth as 
the uninjured and walking wounded retreated to safety."43

The initial advance by D Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment is 
another vignette that demonstrates the vital need for tank support during 
the urban fight at Seoul. Moving to conduct link-up with elements of the 5th 
Marine Regiment, D Company was punished by NKPA defenses near the Arch of 
Independence, suffering heavy casualties within minutes. D Company was soon 
surrounded by NKPA counterattacks and had to establish a perimeter defense 
and wait for support. The next morning, tanks smashed through the enemy's 
defenses and liberated the lost company.44

The liberation of Seoul actually occurred on September 28, when fittingly, a 
flame-thrower tank destroyed that last real NKPA defense near Kwang Who Moon 
Circle.45 Seoul was ripped from the hands of the NKPA at a high cost. For 
example, the lst Marine Division lost 121 killed in action and 589 wounded. 
NKPA casualties were estimated at 4,284 dead or wounded.46 U.S. tanks proved 
to be quite resilient. Not one tank was destroyed by an NKPA tank but 
several were destroyed by suicide detachments or mines.41

The use of armor during the Battle of Seoul provides the modem military 
leader with key insights on the possibilities of future urban warfare and 
the need to train units to meet this challenge. The Marine and Army 
experience in Seoul demonstrates that armor plays a critical role in 
destroying a resolute enemy in urban battles. Armor has the ability to 
rapidly destroy enemy strongpoints and create breach holes for the infantry 
assault, while using its armor protection to survive on the battlefield.

Like the Marines and the Army at Seoul, successful future MOUT operations 
should be conducted with combined arms teams, with armor or infantry 
fighting vehicles playing a requisite role. The current fad of believing 
that infantry alone, employing "discriminatory" rifle fire and hostage 
rescue tactics, can overcome an urban defense may well be a recipe for 
disaster. Precision MOUT techniques, while admirable and alluring in its 
concept of minimizing noncombatant casualties and collateral damage, does 
not pass the test of history.

1Sean D. Naylor, "Urban Crisis," Army Times, 20 November 2000, [on-line].
2The definition of precision MOUT can be found in the Department of the Army 
Field Manual 90-10-1, An Infantryman's Guide to Combat in Built-Up Areas 
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993).
3John E. Jessup and Robert W. Coakley, A Guide to the Study and Use of 
Military History (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1998), 38.
4Donald Knox, The Korean War, Pusan to Chosin: An Oral History (New York: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985), 293.
5William T. James, "From Siege to Surgical: The Evolution of Urban Combat 
from World War II to the Present and Its Effect on Current Doctrine," 
(M.M.A.S. thesis, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 
1998), 27.
6Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Times 
Books, 1987), 231-232.
7James L. Stokesbury, A Short History of the Korean War (New York: William 
Morrow, 1988), 66.
8Roy E. Appleman, United States Army in the Korean War: South to the 
Naktong, North to the Yalu (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of 
Military History, Department of the Army, 1961), 531; Knox, 288; James, 
27-28.
9Edwin H. Simmons, "The Battle For Seoul," address to the U.S. Marine Corps 
Amphibious Warfare School, 15 March 1985, [on-line], 
http://www.geocities.com/pentagon/6453/seoul.html, accessed 14 September 
2000.
10G.W. Smith, "The Blinding Sand of MacArthur's Hourglass: The Race to 
Seoul," Marine Corps Gazette (September 2000), [on-line], accessed 7 Sep 
2000; Robert E. Everson, "Standing at the Gates of the City: Operational 
Level Actions and Urban Warfare," (M.M.A.S. thesis, School of Advanced 
Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 
1995), available from the Center for Army Lessons Learned Database (Public 
Access), hops://calldbpub.leavenworth.army.mil/call.html, accessed 8 
September 2000; Bevin Alexander, Korea: The First War We Lost (New York: 
Hippocrene Books, 1986), 214; James, 29.
"Lynn Montross and Nicholas A. Canzona, United States Marine Corps 
Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume II: The Inchon-Seoul Operation 
(Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 1955), 325-326.
12Shelby L. Stanton, Ten Corps in Korea, 1950 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio 
Press, 1996), 106. 13David D. Duncan, This Is War! A Photo
Narrative of the Korean War (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1990).
14Robert Tallent, "Street Fight in Seoul," The Leathernecks: An Informal 
History of the U.S. Marine Corps (New York: Franklin Watts, 1963), 240-241.
"Alexander, 218. 16Tallent, 240.
"Robert D. Heinl, Jr., Victory at High Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign (New 
York: J.B. Lippincott, 1968), 229; Andrew C. Geer, The New Breed: The Story 
of the U.S. Marines in Korea (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952), 171; 
Simmons; Tallent, 240-241; Montross and Canzona, 271-272; Knox, 289.
18Alexander, 215-216. 19Knox, 289.
2Montross and Canzona, 272.
21Anthony Harrigan, "Combat in Cities," Military Review 46, No. 2, (May 
1966): 29; Montross and Canzona, 255-256.
22Montross and Canzona, 273-274. 23Ibid., 255-256; Appleman, 531. 24Simmons.
25Montross and Canzona, 255-256; Appleman, 531.
26Montross and Canzona, 264. 271bid., 272.
28Montross and Canzona, 273; Heinl, 242. 29Knox, 292.
10Stanton, 108-109.
31 George Mordica, "Urban Combat: It's A Dirty Business, But Someone Has to 
Do It," Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter - Urban Combat 
Operations: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, November 1999, No. 99-16, 
1-2. Mordica coins the term "sugar-coated," when referring to precision or 
surgical MOUT.
32Tallent, 244; Heinl, 229-230.
"Heinl, 229-230; Alexander, 216; Appleman, 535.
34Knox, 294.
35Birchard L. Kortegaard, "Korean War: Tanks and Fighting Vehicles," 
http://rt66.coml~korteng/ SmallArms/tanks.htm, accessed on 15 November 2000; 
Appleman, 535.
36Knox, 293.
37Heinl, 242.
38Tallent, 243.
39Montross and Canzona, 279.
40Duncan.
41Montross and Canzona, 278; Heinl, 245.
42Knox, 294.
43Stanton, 106-107.
44Appleman, 534-535; James, 32.
45Appleman, 535.
46James, 35.
47Appleman, 540.

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