"50-year commemoration: Marine artillery in Korea"

["Mike Yared" <mikeyared@hotmail.com>]

50-year commemoration: Marine artillery in Korea
Field Artillery;
Kenneth W Condit;
Nov/Dec 2000; Issue:6; Page:9+

Abstract:
During the Korean War, artillerymen of the 11th Marines did their share to 
stop the mass attacks of the Communists. The fire of their howitzers proved 
invaluable in blasting enemy caves and bunkers. Operating under a great 
variety of conditions, the Marine Artillerymen carried out an extremely 
difficult amphibious operation at Inchon; they operated in the mountains of 
northeast Korea in the dead of winter; and they participated in large-scale 
land warfare as part of the Eighth Army.

Headnote
Ed: This article is a reprint of one by the same name that appeared in the 
Marine Corps Gazette, November 1952. The author was a Writer/Researcher of 
the Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters, USMar-ine Corps, Washington, DC. 
The article features the 11 th Marine Regiment of Camp Pendleton, 
California, and covers most of the I I th Marines' contributions in Korea-a 
fitting anniversary tribute to the FA in the Korean War, 1950 to 1953.


The Korean War has proved again the truth of Napoleon's remark that "It is 
by fire... that battles are won....It is with artillery that war is made." 
Confronted by an enemy who relies upon "human sea" assaults, the UN forces 
have had to depend on superior firepower to overcome the enemy's superiority 
in numbers. Artillerymen of the 1I th Marines have done their share to stop 
the mass attacks of the Communists. And the fire of their howitzers has 
proved invaluable in blasting enemy caves and bunkers. Operating under a 
great variety of conditions, the Marine Artillerymen carried out an 
extremely difficult amphibious operation at Inchon; they operated in the 
mountains of northeast Korea in the dead of winter; and they participated in 
large-scale land warfare as part of the Eighth Army.

For the 11th Marines, the Korean War began on 2 July 1950, the date the 1 st 
Provisional Marine Brigade was alerted for Korea.... Arriving in Korea [with 
1/11, organized into four-gun batteries] on 2 August, the brigade was soon 
engaged in the desperate fighting to hold the perimeter around the port of 
Pusan.

While this fighting was still in progress, Gen MacArthur was preparing his 
counteroffensive. As early as 4 July, the UN commander had begun to prepare 
an amphibious operation to seize Inchon and Seoul, and on 22 July, the 1 st 
Marine Division learned it was to spearhead the Inchon landing. D-Day was 
set for 15 September, only 54 days away.

On the 25th [of July], the [rest of the] 11th was far from ready for 
combat....The regimental commander got a good start on the build-up to war 
strength when elements of the 10th Marines were redesignated as units of his 
command. Two 105-mm howitzer battalions, 1/10 and 2/10, became 2/11 and 
3/11; while 3/10, a 155-mm howitzer outfit, became 4/11. These units arrived 
at Camp Pendleton on 5 August...Very little training was accomplished 
because all hands were busy mounting out... None of the units received its 
equipment in time to calibrate guns and radios. In some instances, the gear 
was not issued to the batteries until after they reached Japan.

Lack of training was a serious problem, particularly in the 3d and 4th 
Battalions where the urgency of build-up demanded the assignment of many 
officers and men who were not qualified artillerymen. But all hands were 
eager and quick to learn, and key officers and NCOs quickly whipped their 
outfits into shape once they got in combat. This was done so successfully 
that not a single round fell short on friendly troops.

The 11th Marines, less the 3d Battalion, departed on schedule and landed at 
Kobe, Japan, on 29 August. A few days later, the regimental commander and 
his staff were briefed on the division plan. The landing was to be carried 
out in two stages. At dawn, 3/5 was to land on Wolmi island just offshore 
from the port of Inchon. Then on the afternoon tide, the main force would 
land on the main island. At this time, the artillery was to go ashore on 
Wolmi to support the advance inland. To provide additional general support, 
the Army 96th FA Battalion, a 155-mm howitzer outfit, was to be attached.

On the basis of this information, the artillery plan was drawn up. Only five 
days remained to complete the work before the troops embarked for Inchon. To 
add to the difficulties, suitable maps of the landing area were almost 
impossible to obtain, the regimental and division staffs were too widely 
separated for proper liaison, and the Navy tractor area plan did not arrive 
until the day of departure. Although serial photographs of Wolmi were 
available, it was impossible to tell whether there were sufficient position 
areas for three battalions of artillery on the island.

On 9 September, the 11 th Marines departed for Inchon in nine LSTs [landing 
ship tanks] and the AKA [ammunition assault craft] USS Washburn. Six LSTs 
and the AKA lifted the main body of the regiment from Japan, while the three 
remaining LSTs carried the Ist Battalion from Pusan. Arriving on Inchon on 
15 September, the ships moved to the designated tractor area and prepared to 
launch DUKWs [open, amphibious, wheeled vehicles] loaded with troops and 
equipment. Meanwhile, a reconnaissance party landed on Wolmi with assault 
troops of 3/5...

By 1845, the firing batteries of the 1 st and 2d Battalions began crossing 
the beach, and by 2145, they were in position ready to fire. Lack of space 
prevented the 4th Battalion from landing until the next day when it went 
ashore on the mainland. Heavy smoke over the city and lack of targets 
limited fires to a few rounds during the first night.

[Map]
Caption:

Very little opposition was offered by the enemy to the landing, and infantry 
troops moved rapidly inland. By the 21 st, the regiment had advanced about 
15 miles and were on the outskirts of Seoul. To support the advance, 1/11 
fired in direct support of the 5th Marines, and 2/11 in direct support of 
the 1st Marines. General support for the 5th Marines was provided by 4/11, 
while the 96th FA Battalion performed the same mission for the Ist Marines. 
Artillery units had to displace frequently to keep within range to deliver 
supporting fires. During these five days, 1/11 displaced six times. The 
battalions moved forward a battery at a time so there would be no 
interruption of fire support.

The frequent displacements were not the only problems confronting the 11 th 
Marines. The infantry scheme of maneuver created a wide dispersal of units 
by calling for a two-pronged advance on Seoul. The 5th Marines advancing 
north and then swinging around to approach the city from the northwest, was 
separated from the 1st Marines, pushing directly toward the city on the 
Inchon-Seoul highway, by as much as eight miles. To assure proper control 
during this movement, 1/11 was attached to the 5th Marines.

Complicating control problems, communications difficulties plagued the 
artillery regiment throughout the operation. Untrained communicators and 
worn out or improperly tuned equipment were largely responsible. For the 
first five days, control of operations was actually in the hands of the 
battalion commanders. By the 19th, communications problems had been licked 
sufficiently so that the regiment could exercise effective control. At this 
time, 1/11 was detached from the 5th Marines.

During the advance on Seoul, the enemy had offered relatively little 
opposition. But all this changed when the Marines attacked the capital city 
and its industrial suburb of Yondong-po. The North Koreans put up fanatic 
resistance to the 5th Marines on the hills to the northwest and in the city 
itself, where houses had been turned into fortresses and innumerable 
blockades had been thrown across the streets. The 5th Marines received 
excellent support from 1/11 and 4/11 in the attack on the hills west of the 
city. But when the infantry entered the city streets, artillery was of 
limited value. There were relatively few good artillery targets. To destroy 
a house merely made it a better defensive position because the enemy could 
hide in the rubble; and tanks, with their pinpoint fire, were more effective 
for destroying road blocks.

Artillery came into its own in delivering defensive fires and, on two 
occasions, played a major role in breaking up North Korean counterattacks. 
The first attack struck 2/1 on the night of 20 September and was immediately 
taken under fire by 2/11. The accuracy of the maps of Seoul and the 
information on the location of the enemy made it possible for 4/11 to fire 
unobserved missions with excellent effect.

This performance was repeated on the 26th when 3/1 was counterattacked. 
Again, 2/11 poured fire into the attacking North Koreans. This time, both 
medium battalions, 411 and the 96th FA, delivered highly accurate unobserved 
fire.

On the same day, elements of the Eighth Army, which had broken out of the 
Pusan perimeter, linked up with X Corps troops at Suwon. Seoul fell on the 
27th, and by 7 October, the Eighth Army took over from X Corps. But there 
was to be no respite for the 11 th Marines. Plans were already being made 
for further operations.

To pursue the advantage over a disorganized enemy, Gen MacArthur ordered the 
Eighth Army to attack directly north toward Pyongyang, the enemy capital, 
while X Corps made an amphibious landing at Wonsan on the east coast. Before 
this assault landing could be carried out, rapidly advancing ROK [Republic 
of Korea] troops occupied the city. On 26 October, the 1 st Marine Division 
landed unopposed at Wonsan and prepared to push onto the Manchurian border.

The large area assigned to the division, with the resulting dispersal of 
forces, compelled the division commander-to attach artillery battalions to 
infantry RCTs [regimental combat teams]. The 1st Battalion was attached to 
RCT-5, the 2d to RCT-1, and the 3d to RCT-7. As a result, it was never 
possible for the regiment to exercise effective centralized control of the 
artillery fired in support of the division.

The Marines had hardly landed at Wonsan when the intervention of the Chinese 
Communists produced a brand new war. Only seven days after landing, 3/11 
with RCT-7 went into action against the new enemy. Ordered forward to 
relieve an ROK regiment on the road to Chosin reservoir, the RCT-7 was 
attacked by a Chinese division in the Sudong gorge. For four days, the RCT 
was heavily engaged. Throughout the engagement, 3/11 delivered excellent 
offensive and defensive supporting fires. The most spectacular mission came 
on the night of 6 November when the Chinese reserve regiment was caught 
moving into frontline positions and mauled so badly it had to withdraw.

Problems encountered in this engagement were typical of those confronting 
artillerymen throughout the operation. In the mountainous terrain, good 
position areas were few and far between, and even though artillery was 
granted priority, it was often hard to find enough level ground to emplace a 
battery, much less a battalion.

Artillery operations were restricted even more by the necessity to operate 
within the infantry perimeter. Operating with regiment- sized or smaller 
combat teams in enemy-infested territory, this was the only way to provide 
security for the artillery units. But from within the perimeter of an 
infantry regiment, many targets were at very short ranges. To provide 
360-degree coverage, it was necessary to lay the batteries on different 
azimuths. In some cases, the howitzers could not be brought to bear without 
shifting trails. Under these conditions, it was very difficult to mass 
fires. Short ranges and high hills combined to require a great deal of 
highangle fire. Gen Almond, the X Corps commander, who visited 3/11 in 
position for high-angle fire at Sudong, thought the battalion looked more 
like an AAA [antiaircraft artillery] outfit.

Following the defeat of the Chinese division at Sudong, the Marines pushed 
on toward the Chosin reservoir. Enemy opposition was negligible, although 
there were signs of the presence of hostile forces. By the middle of the 
month, the Marines were confronted by a new enemy, the cold. Temperatures 
went down below the zero mark, presenting a whole new set of problems. Truck 
and bulldozer engines had to be turned over every half hour during the night 
to prevent them from freezing. The ground was frozen so hard that it was 
impossible to dig in the trails, and it took several minutes for the 
howitzer tubes to return to battery after firing.

In spite of the cold, the advance continued, and by 27 November, RCTs-5 and 
-7 had reached Yudam-ni on the western side of the reservoir. With the 
exception of H Battery still in Hagaru, the attached artillery elements were 
emplaced at Yudam-ni to support their RCTs. Under new orders from Gen 
MacArthur calling for participation in an envelopment movement with Eighth 
Army, both RCT-5 and RCT-7 were ready to attack west. To give general 
support to the attack, 4/11 was moved up to Yudam-ni.

RCT-1, relieved by Army units of its security mission to the south, was now 
deployed at selected strongpoints along the MSR [main supply route] to the 
coast. Its artillery elements were distributed over a wide area...

But the great "end of the war" offensive never got rolling. On the 25th, the 
Chinese struck Eighth Army, and two days later, the Chinese attacked X 
Corps. The 1st Marine Division bore the brunt of the attack, and by the 
morning of 28 November, all the Marine perimeters were isolated. The two 
most advanced, Yudam-ni and Hagaru, were under heavy attack by eight enemy 
divisions.

Typical of these fights was the defense of Yudam-ni. Here the three 
artillery battalions-1/11, 3/11 and 4/11were in position to support the 
attack to the west when the enemy struck. It was obvious that the howitzers 
should be redeployed to provide the best coverage all around the perimeter. 
But before this could be done, it was necessary to establish some form of 
centralized control. Regimental headquarters was to have moved forward to 
Yudam-ni. To remedy the deficiency, an artillery group was formed under the 
command of the senior battalion commander, LtCol Harvey Feehan of 1/11. 
Under his direction, the batteries were spotted around on different azimuths 
to cover all avenues of approach.

Artillery made every effort to meet all requests for fire missions but was 
handicapped by ammunition shortages. With the MSR cut, airdrop was the only 
means of resupply. But only about 1,200 rounds of 105-mm ammunition were 
dropped, and of these, only about 600 were usable. No effort was made to 
drop 155-mm ammunition, as an equivalent weight of 105-mm was more valuable 
in the minimum range missions against enemy attacking infantry frontlines. 
To conserve the limited amount of heavier caliber ammunition, 4/11 limited 
its fires to counterbattery and heavy troop concentrations. This restriction 
was justified by the enemy's limited use of artillery.

Further to handicap the artillery units in their delivery of fires, they 
were required to provide infantry replacements. On the 28th, artillery units 
furnished seven officers and 314 men. The next day, they were called upon to 
supply an additional four officers and 164 men. As a result, it was not 
always possible to man all the howitzers. In 411, for instance, one platoon 
(two howitzers) in each battery had to be put out of action, but all the 
weapons were laid, and the crews shifted from one piece to another, 
depending upon the direction of targets.

After two days of heavy fighting, the Marines at Yudam-ni were ordered to 
withdraw to Hagaru. This was to be the first step in a general withdrawal of 
the whole division to the coast. As a preliminary step, the two RCTs 
redeployed into a valley running south of the two and astride the road to 
Hagaru. Artillery and service units were displaced first, followed by the 
infantry. Then, on 1 December the withdrawal began.

Artillery tactics during the withdrawal called for leapfrogging units. As 
the main column moved out, it was covered by a unit emplaced at the point of 
departure. Near the head of the column were other units which would advance 
about 5,000 to 6,000 yards and emplace to fire both forward and back. At 
this point, the units at the point of departure would displace forward to 
repeat the process...

Using these tactics, the 1I th Marines continued to support the withdrawal 
of the I st Marine Division from Koto-ri to the sea. By 15 December, the 
Marines had completed outloading and had sailed for South Korea. Following a 
period of reorganizing and training and a brief anti-guerrilla campaign, the 
1 st Marine Division was committed to the Eighth Army front.

The Marines were.to participate in Operation Killer, a limited objective 
offensive designed to keep the pressure on the enemy, inflicting maximum 
casualties and preventing him from mounting a counteroffensive. Jumping off 
on 21 Feb, mary, the Marines moved methodically ahead and had achieved their 
objectives by 4 March. Operation Killer was so successful that it was 
continued at once under the name of Operation Ripper.

For artillerymen, these operations were war "by the book." The 1I th Marines 
headquarters was able to control the artillery supporting the division, to 
mass fires, and to deliver TOT (time-on-target) missions. The 105-mm 
battalions were assigned to direct support of the same regiments they had 
supported in previous operations. To supplement the general support fires of 
4/11, the Army 92d Armored Field Artillery [AFA] Battalion was attached to 
the 1I th Marines until 20 March...For short periods, the 11th Marines also 
had batteries of 8-inch howitzers of the Army 17th FA Battalion attached. 
These heavy artillery pieces were powerful and extremely accurate and were 
used for precision fire against enemy bunkers and artillery positions.

[Photograph]
Caption: M/4/11 in action. To conserve its 155-mm ammunition that was in 
short supply, 4/11 limited its fires to counterbattery and heavy troop 
concentrations. (Photo by SSgt Robert H. Mosier)


As the Marines moved slowly forward, the enemy conducted delaying actions 
from successive hill positions. For artillery as well as for infantry, one 
attack was much like another. Typical of these actions was the attack of the 
1 st Marines on Hill 166 south of Hoengsong. During the night before the 
attack, howitzers of 2/11 kept up harassing and interdiction fires to keep 
the enemy awake and to soften him up. At 0800, an air strike came in and hit 
the target hill, while the infantry moved up to jump-off positions. When the 
planes retired, artillery and 4.2-inch mortars fired their concentrations. 
Infantry and tanks attacked under cover of the artillery and mortar fires. 
As each howitzer had been individually registered, it was possible to keep 
the fire on the objective until friendly troops were within 100 yards of the 
enemy positions. At this point, the artillery lifted to fire on the next 
ridge, and 81-mm mortars began hitting the reverse sloop of the objective. 
Under the cover of these supporting fires, the assault troops had no 
difficulty in seizing the hill.

This pattern was repeated time and again as the Marines moved methodically 
ahead. After a month of this sort of fighting, the artillery was confronted 
with an additional problem by the attachment of the Korean Marine Corps 
(KMC) regiment to the division. With four infantry regiments and only four 
battalions of artillery, the balance of arms was upset. The ordinary 
procedure of providing a 105-mm battalion for direct support of each 
infantry regiment and a 155-mm battalion for general support of the whole 
division could no longer be used. As an expedient, the division shifted the 
direct support battalion along with forward observers and liaison officers 
from the reserve regiment to the KMC's regiment when it was on the line. But 
there was a very real danger of getting caught short if it were ever 
necessary to commit all four infantry regiments.

Those fears were realized on 23 April when the Chinese launched a major 
offensive and broke through the ROK division on the Marines' left. To refuse 
the exposed flank, the 1 st Marines was ordered to occupy the blocking 
positions with two battalions, while the other battalion reinforced the 7th 
Marines. It was necessary to assign 4/11 to a direct support mission, as no 
other artillery unit was available....Although 155-mm howitzers are not 
ordinarily used in direct support, Marines of 4/11 fired these missions with 
excellent effect. On the night of 23 April, they brought fires within 50 
yards of friendly troops and helped to break up Chinese attacks. One enemy 
column of 500 men, advancing through a valley on which the howitzers were 
registered, suffered an estimated 50 percent casualties.

All along the front, enemy attacks were met by Marine artillery fires. 
Reinforcing fires came from the Army 213th AFA Battalion, which was attached 
to the 1I th Marines, and from the 92d AFA Battalion, now part of corps 
artillery. There were so many targets that it was impossible to take them 
all under fire. But the fires that were delivered were extremely effective. 
According to the testimony of one Chinese prisoner, artillery fire 
frequently broke up troop concentrations, making it very difficult for the 
enemy to mass for an attack. During the period of heavy enemy attacks, 22 to 
24 April, the 11th Marines had fired 527 missions, consisting of 12,844 
105-mm rounds and 4,008 155-mm rounds. Enemy casualties inflicted by 
artillery fire were estimated at 5,000.

Although by 24 April, the Marines had beaten off the enemy attacks, still 
the gap on the left created by the breakthrough remained. In danger of being 
outflanked, the Marines were ordered by Eighth Army to withdraw. During the 
next eight days, the division pulled back to successive defensive positions 
for a distance of about 30 miles before the Eighth Army was able to 
stabilize the front. This withdrawal required four successive artillery 
displacements, carried out by echelon, so that the infantry was never 
without artillery support. By 30 April, the 1st Marine Division was deployed 
along a new defensive line, and the Chinese attack had been stopped all 
along the line.

Following the collapse of the Chinese April offensive, Eighth Army ordered 
defensive positions to be prepared in depth with minefields, wire 
entanglements, and prepared fields of fire. On 16 May, the Chinese returned 
to the attack, striking this time at the US 2d Infantry Division and at ROK 
units on the east. Again, the enemy achieved a breakthrough, but timely 
shifting of reserves slowed down the attack. As the main enemy thrust struck 
the UN forces to the east of the Marine positions, the 11th Marines was free 
to support the hard-pressed 2d Infantry Division. Heavy concentrations were 
fired in harassing and interdiction missions, but as very few specific 
targets had been assigned, the effect was merely to saturate the areas with 
undetermined results.

By the 20th, the enemy attacks had lost their momentum. An immediate 
counteroffensive was ordered, and by 15 June, UN forces had advanced some 30 
miles. At this point, they ran up against the enemy main line of resistance. 
Both sides dug in, and the war settled down to a stalemate, with neither 
side willing to attempt a major attack. Shortly after, truce negotiations 
were started.

As the truce delegates were holding their first meetings to discuss a 
ceasefire agreement, the enemy opened up with his heaviest artillery fire of 
the war. From that point on, counterbattery fire became a vital mission for 
Marine artillerymen. Beginning on a modest scale in July, the enemy 
gradually increased his fires, both in volume and accuracy. At first, he 
followed the Japanese practice of firing single weapons from cave positions, 
but by, the end of the month, he was massing battery fires. The 76-mm guns 
with which-the enemy began his effort were soon supplemented by 122-mm 
howitzers, captured American 105 s, and even a few 152-mm weapons. Infantry 
positions were the first enemy targets, but he soon began firing on the 
artillery emplacements as well. On 1 November, 2/11 was shelled by [120 
rounds of] 76-mm guns and 122mm howitzers...killing one man [and], wounding 
four others...

Counterbattery and other fires against the enemy artillery were primarily 
the responsibility of 4/11. In June, this battalion had devoted a mere two 
percent of its efforts to this type of mission, but the next month, the 
figure jumped to 15 percent... [and] gradually increased until it reached 22 
percent in April 1952.

More than two years has elapsed since the lIth Marines first arrived in 
Korea...The end of the war is still not in sight. In fact, the enemy 
continues to build up his forces. But whatever happens, the 11th Marines 
stands ready to meet the challenge.


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