Re: "A Study of North Korean and Chinese Soldiers' Attitudes Toward the KoreanWar"

["Mike Yared" <mikeyared@hotmail.com>]

Ed, Joe, and el al, here are 20 reports done by ORO. I have 17 of the 
reports on files. The last three titles below are not full text and I am 
trying to get which libraries had it for ILL. My ony requests is that 
DTIC/others references on the maincover pages are removed.
Want me to send the file to Ed or YSF for posting for the public?
Mike

JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV CHEVY CHASE MD OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE

*
The Utilization of KATUSA.
01 Mar 1954
Abstract:
The purpose of this report is to determine the advisability of the continued 
utilization of KATUSAs in Korea and by implication, the utilization of 
foreign augmentation troops in other parts of the world, if such utilization 
should appear to be called for in the future. Specifically, four areas were 
investigated: (1) The opinions of American combat personnel in Korea about 
the quality of the military performance of KATUSAs. (2) The major problems 
experienced by American personnel in the utilization of KATUSAs. (3) The 
overall attitudes of American personnel toward KATUSAs. (4) Attitudes of 
KATUSAs toward their treatment in the U. S. Army and toward their rotation 
from the U. S. Army to the ROK Army.


*
Psychological Warfare Operations at Lower Echelons in Eighth Army, July 
1952-July 1953.
Ponturo, John
25 Jan 1954
Abstract:
This memorandum attempts an assessment of psychological warfare operations 
at lower echelons in the Eighth United States Army during the third year of 
the Korean conflict. The main premise of the study is found in current US 
Army psychological warfare doctrine that psychological warfare may be 
expected to pay significant military dividends when used as a close support 
weapon and is tactically oriented. Some of the conclusions and 
recommendations are: (1) Psychological warfare in Korea was large scale and 
well developed; however the main effort was at higher echelons. (2) 
Intensified psychological warfare effort at lower echelons should be 
considered in the future. (3) Lower echelon psychological warfare by leaflet 
and voice media was not usually conducted in close conjunction with 
conventional military operations. (4) The division TO&E should be amended to 
include a full time psychological warfare officer.


*
Vulnerability of Army Supply to Air Interdiction.
April 01, 1953.
By its estimates of numbers of additional personnel and equipment required 
to reduce appreciably the vulnerability of Korean supply lines, ORO-T-46 
(FEC) implies the practical limitations of this approach to the problem. It 
is logical to consider ths other basic factors determining supply 
vulnerability: volume of supply, and restrictions imposed by terrain. A 
characteristic of the Korean War was the high per capita rate of supply for 
UN troops, which is an outgrowth of national preoccupation with protection 
of human life as the ultimate economy.


*
Study of North Korean and Chinese Soldiers' Attitudes Toward the Korean War.
Kahn, Lessing A. Jackson, Joanne E. Vallance, Theodore R. Nierman, Florence 
K. Segal, Julius.
This report is an analysis which seeks the psychological vulnerabilities of 
the enemy soldier delving into his background for future psychological 
warfare.


*
Pretesting Procedures for Psychological Warfare Printed Media - Phase II: 
Ranking and Other Methods.
Birch, Jack W. Konigsburg, David Flanagan, John C. Khan, Lessing A. Nierman, 
Florence K.
December 16, 1952.
>From the outset of the Korean campaign, psychological warfare operating 
units recognized the need for procedures by which the effectiveness of new 
psychological warfare leaflets could be predicted prior to dissemination. To 
develop such procedures, a standard list of leaflets of known degrees of 
effectiveness was developed and various methods applicable to pretesting 
were tried out. Two methods were found to be practical for field 
administration. One enabled the field operator to estimate the probable 
effectiveness of new leaflets; the second isolated elements of strength and 
weakness in the leaflets being evaluated. The methods developed should be 
(1) put into use in the field, (2) applied to psychological warfare printed 
media other than leaflets, and (3) tested with both enemy and friendly 
civilian populations so that psychological warfare aimed at such targets may 
be adequately pretested.


*
Beliefs of Enemy Soldiers About the Korean War.
Kendall, Willmoore.
May 24, 1952.
To determine the most effective approach to the enemy soldier through 
psychological warfare, the Army needs to know to what extent he has been 
influenced by his own propaganda and background. Accordingly, ORO has 
examined what North Korean and Chinese Communist troops in Korea know of 
political affairs, and to what extent they have been Communist 
indoctrinated. To get this information ORO, through International Public 
Opinion Research, Inc., interviewed 768 North Korean POWs and 238 Chinese 
Communist POWs in Korea from 26 January to 5 March 1951. Prisoners were 
asked what they thought and knew about the causes of the war; about their 
countries' allies, and about various world figures, as well as what their 
leaders had told them about the US, Russia, the UN, and South Korea. Here 
are a few of the conclusions: (1) Most POWs had heard about the US and 
Russia, while a larger proportion of North Korean than of Chinese prisoners 
had heard of the UN and South Korea. Of the two groups, the North Koreans 
showed more hostility to the UN's purposes. (2) A majority of North Koreans 
blamed South Korea for the start of the war. In contrast, most Chinese 
prisoners had no opinion on this question and believed that their government 
was fighting a defensive war to prevent US invasion of China. (3) Russia was 
named most frequently as ally to both North Korea and China. North Koreans 
named Red China as their ally as often as they did Russia, but a smaller 
proportion of Chinese named North Korea than named Russia.


*
FEC Psychological Warfare Operations: Intelligence.
Ponturo, John Kendall, Willmoore.
April 28, 1952.
How efficient are the intelligence operations of psychological warfare in 
FEC? How valuable, in relation to its time and personnel costs, is the 
contribution of intelligence output to the current psywar campaign in Korea? 
In this memorandum, ORO has described and analyzed the theater-level psywar 
intelligence operations - from the processing of many sources of information 
to the issuance of various types of reports to psywar operators. To meet the 
operator's working needs for information, psywar intelligence should 
progressively reach beyond the selection and surveying of items of 
information and provide more interpretation and evaluation. Such efforts 
would increase the psywar yield of each source and increase the practical 
usefulness of intelligence reports. In general, operational efficiency would 
benefit from increasingly intensive internal communications within the 
psywar organization, with increased access by operators to intelligence 
files for reference purposes and with increased contact between intelligence 
producers and intelligence users, the writers of leaflets and scripts.


*
Study of Battle Casualties among Equivalent Opposing Forces.
Best, Robert J..
April 14, 1952.
This study was made to develop as much quantitative information as possible 
about battle casualties during a narrowly defined phase of Korean 
hostilities. The document shows the possibilities deriving considerable 
information on certain types of operations by constructing them from 
available records, the large number of charts and graphs permit the reader 
to study the casualty situation from a great many angles, and the narrative 
which accompanies the charts and graphs is easy to read, considering the 
technical aspect of the subject. The study successfully accomplishes its 
mission and points to the fact that studies of casualty rates are needed 
periodically in order to confirm or modify previous findings, to detect 
trends, to evaluate weapons and defenses, and to furnish planners with 
current data.


*
Proposed Program of Investigation of Signal Communications in Korea,
Clarke, Eric T.
February 26, 1952.
The ideal military signal communications system is one which affords 
communication between any persons or groups requiring contact; it is not 
only instantaneous and certain, no matter where the users are and how they 
move about, but also is undetectable by anyone other than those for whom it 
is intended. The system should require a minimum of equipment and operating 
personnel since, in the last analysis, each man used for signal work 
represents one less man available for direct combat.


*
Eighth Army Psychological Warfare in the Korean War.
Kendall, W. O'Donnell, L. F. Ponturo, J..
December 15, 1951.
The problem is to describe and analyze the organization of Eighth Army 
psychological warfare in the Korean war. The purpose which is intended to be 
served by the psychological warfare activities in the Eighth Army has an 
inseparable connection with the organization of those activities, the 
adequacy of the organization being subject to judgment, in the first 
instance, only in terms of how well it fulfills the purpose it is intended 
to serve. Along with this, however, there is another consideration, namely 
whether or not the nature of the organization evolved has tended to shape 
and limit the purpose or task which is or can be assigned to it. In sum, 
operations research must move back and forth between the purpose and the 
organizational measures taken to forward it, and must raise questions as to 
the rationality of the relation between them.


*
Preliminary Report on Utilization of Negro Manpower. Volume II.
The overall problem to which this report addresses itself is that of how 
best Negro troops can be utilized in the United States Army. The Korean 
experience furnishes the occasion for an examination of the following 
aspects of this overall problem: How have Negro troops been used in the 
Korean war? What problems have arisen in regard to their use? What are the 
prevailing attitudes of Negro and white officers and enlisted men on the 
subject? What lessons can be drawn from the Korean experience?


*
Observations on Close Air Support in Korea.
Archer, W. L.
June 01, 1951.




*
CCF in the Attack. Part II.
Marshall, S. L..
January 27, 1951.
Detailed study of the operations of 1st Mar Div against CCF in the Koto-ri, 
Hagaru-ri, Yudam-ni area 20 Nov to 10 Dec 1950 substantiates in nearly all 
major particulars the conclusions drain in the paper, 'CCF in the Attack,' 
published on 5 Jan 1951, ORO-S-26 (EUSAK), wherein CCF tactical methods and 
weapons employment were evaluated on the basis of the experience of 2nd Inf 
Div in the Battle of Kunu-ri, 24 Nov to 1 Dec 1950.


*
US Psywar Operations in the Korean War.
Pettee, George S.
January 23, 1951.
The report is to assess the actual past operations and effectiveness of US 
military psychological warfare in the Korean War, and the possible means of 
gaining increased effect


*
Recommendations for Psychological Warfare in Korea,
Kilchoon, Kim.
October 08, 1950.
This study was made to develop as much quantitative information as possible 
about battle casualties during a narrowly defined phase of Korean 
hostilities. The document shows the possibilities deriving considerable 
information on certain types of operations by constructing them from 
available records, the large number of charts and graphs permit the reader 
to study the casualty situation from a great many angles, and the narrative 
which accompanies the charts and graphs is easy to read, considering the 
technical aspect of the subject. The study successfully accomplishes its 
mission and points to the fact that studies of casualty rates are needed 
periodically in order to confirm or modify previous findings, to detect 
trends, to evaluate weapons and defenses, and to furnish planners with 
current data.


*
Report on Communist Radio Propaganda on the Korean War, August 8 - 31, 1950.
Ogloblin, Peter.
September 12, 1950.
This is an attempted evaluation of the propaganda issued by Communist radio 
broadcasts on the Korean War between the dates August 8 and August 31. The 
source material was the monitoring service of FBIS.

no full text:
*Analysis of Battle Casualties for the Stable Period of the Korean War.
Cleaver, Frederick W.
12 Apr 1957
Abstract:
Concomitances of the "Cease-fire" negotiations in the Korean War were the 
establishment of a stable MLR and a condition of limited objective warfare. 
Although consideration of this type of warfare is of secondary importance in 
conjunction with major anticipated conflicts, the fact that continued 
instances of attritional wars with satellite countries are within the realm 
of possibility causes the casualty structures of the various phases of such 
wars to be of interest. In this paper, an analysis is made of the battle 
casualties sustained by the US Army in Korea for the period September 1952 
through July 1953. It is believed that the results of this analysis will be 
of interest, even though generalization may not be appropriate with the 
possible exception of some of the KIA to WIA ratios obtained.

*
US Combat Soldier and the Korean War: A Profile.
July 01, 1951.

*
Operation Punch and the Capture of Hill 440 Suwon, Korea, February, 1951.
Marshall, S. L..
February 01, 1951.
Operation Punch is one of the brightest entries in the record of 8th Army 
operations in Korea. Of it came the first solid American victory during the 
fighting of the 1950-51 winter. Once the left flank of the Army became 
firmly based on the south bank on the Han River, presaging the aborting of 
the enemy force defending Seoul, the way was open to the series of maneuvers 
by which the Communist armies were driven from their main holdings in South 
Korea. Strategically, therefore, this relatively small action was of major 
significance. It decisively influenced action at the very highest level. But 
what commends the operation to particular attention is that the importance 
of the event is in perfect equipoise with the excellence of its tactical 
concepts and the high standard of performance by troops. Here is a study 
highlighting decision at all levels of command combined with a close-in view 
of the American fighter at his best. The stresses in Operation Punch were 
about average for the Korean fighting. The weather was neither mild nor 
rigorously immoderate. The supply situation was favorable. Morale was at a 
mean as the Army was just beginning to upgrade after a period of grave 
reverses. More than half of the troops here engaged were replacements 
without prior experience in battle. The prevailing conditions therefore 
strike a reasonably normal balance favorable to an evaluation of the 
American character under fire. (KAR)



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