Re: Air Bases, air fields and airstrips - Steel Ridge 1953

["John R. Carpenter" <jrcrin001@cox.net>]

Les,

Thanks for the heads up on the web page.  It gave me a few books to look
for.

With all of this talk of airfields, who has data on airstrips?

Specificlly one on Steel Ridge in the Heartbreak Ridge area being placed in
June of 1953.  It was abandoned because it fell in the southern part of the
DMZ after 27 July 1953.  This was in the ROK IX Corp area of operations.

It was next to a mine.  I am not sure what they mined but it helped make a
deep bunker.

I included a brief below on the general material I am looking for.

Thanks for the help!

John R. Carpenter
La Mesa, CA

Subj: Korean War 1953 Bloody Ridge & Heartbreak Ridge area

Hello,

I am researching combat action between the dates of 20 June 1953 to about 27
July 1953 by an American "Provisional AA Battery" testing the then Top
Secret Battlefield Radar on Steel Ridge (in the Bloody Ridge or Heartbreak
ridge area) while attached to the Republic of Korea's Army.

The area called Steel Ridge was then controlled by the ROK 26th Infantry
Regiment of the ROK Capital (Tiger) Division on the left flank of the
Kumsong salient in the IX Corp area of control during the last Chinese
military offensive.  The Chinese Communist Forces (also known as the Chinese
People's Volunteer Army) called this the Golden City Campaign which was
primarily directed at the ROK Army after July 13, 1953.

PLEASE NOTE: This 28 man American unit was under the direct control of 8th
Army Command.  They may have been documented under the Korean Military
Assistance Group (KMAG). There was a two man FAC (Forward Air Controller)
team (a NCO and assistant - where the third man was is unknown) present also
that was KMAG. The two American groups were separate.

This "Provisional Anti-Aircraft (AA) Battery" of Americans were in support
of the ROK Capitol (Tiger) Division just behind the main line of resistance
in a bunker complex near the east end of a small airstrip then being
constructed just below the ridge line. The Americans were testing
battlefield radar in conjunction with AA weapons for groundfire against
expected enemy action. Provisions to keep the equipment and operators out of
enemy hands if over run had been made.

This group had come from Germany (most voluntered from the American 1st
Battlion of the 26th Infantry Regiment [Blue Spaders!] of the 1st Infantry
Division. They were at Erlangen before they came to South Korea to combat
test the battlefield radar.  They entered the combat zone at Steel Ridge on
15 May 1953. During the ChinCom offensive, and for about 11 days they were
surrounded by enemy forces. This group of 28 (plus 2 FAC) American and some
180-190 ROK troops held off or interdicted several enemy Divisions. Only 14
(plus 2) Americans and less than 100 ROK survived this bloody battle in the
bunker complex.

Cpl. (acting Sgt.) Richard L. Carpenter was given a battlefield promotion by
radio to 2nd Lt. (and as a ROK Major) shortly after the group was isolated
and cutoff.  This on the third day after all above him were killed or
seriously wounded. He rejected twice the enemy's offer of surrender and
provided a forward communications to interdict enemy movement and resupply.

Second Lt. Carpenter repeatedly help rebuilt the automatic weapons knocked
out of action from parts, maintained radio contact with 8th Army Command,
provided interdiction information and helped keep most of the battlefield
radar units operational for most of the battle.

Even though wounded, he managed to maintain his position against several
strong enemy attacks severely crippling enemy action and movement in the
area along Steel Ridge and the valley it overlooked. Only 14 of the 28
Americans of the Provisional AA group survived after being reinforced by
elements of the ROK 6th Infantry Division on the right flank then from
elements of the 17th Regiment of the 7th Infantry Division from the left
flank in the late afternoon of 20 July 1953. The American survivors were
evacuated in the evening of the 21 July 1953.  The two FACs were relieved
earlier in the day. This area was not reported completely secure until 24
June 1953.

The ROK commander, Lt. Col. Kim, was a battalion (1st or 2nd Batt.?)
commander of the 26th ROK Regiment. This unit was falling back to prepared
positions when the enemy disrupted them by attacking.  This caused many
units to fall back farther than desired.  Lt. Col. Kim rallied many ROK
soldiers into the bunker complex to make a stand. He saved Sgt. (later 2nd
Lt.) Carpenter's life by helping dig him out of a collapsed trench during a
heavy artillery attack.

Because the battlefield radar was rated "Top Secret" and the end of the
hostilities not much has been documented on this specific action. The radar
units in combination with quad .50 calibre (12.7 mm) machine guns (later
dismounted) and 40 mm anti aircraft guns (knocked out early in the battle)
disrupted many of the enemy attacks while they were forming up and attacking
at night. Radio contact and observation of the valley roads at night by
radar allowed friendly artillery (FAC)  to concentrate on the enemy supply
and logestic units. This severely hindered the major enemy push. Heavy
Artillery (8 inch) and air support helped maintain this position until the
UN (United Nation) counter attack brought more support forward..

The ChinCom apparently wanted this position and the equipment it contained.
It was the last of 21 strong points in this sector that was not taken. They
were attacked by Chinese field artillery and heavy artillery, possibly
bombed and straffed by at least one Mig.  They were assaulted or heavily
probed by enemy ground troops almost repeatedly. Three offers of surrender
were offered to the defenders while they were surrounded. At least three
major human wave attacks got close enough to engage in grenade and hand to
hand combat. Artillery and automatic weapon fire aided by radar broke up
most of the enemy attacks before they could close.

Richard Carpenter is my father and I am slowly documenting the actions of
his unit by historical records.

As a side note, my father participated in long range sniping. This sniping
took out several Chinese officers including at least one high ranking
officer (at about 1700 meters) who had six body guards. My father did this
with a 32x power rifle scope which he drilled and tapped into a .50 calibre
(12.7 mm) machine gun that was fired single shot.

Any help you can provide will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

John R. Carpenter
5850 Yorkshire Ave.
La Mesa, CA 91942-2821
(619) 466-5735
jrcrin001@cox.net

**********************************************************

Each of these radar units were in two pieces:

A) This first piece is similar to a TV set in shape, except it had no
screen.
Looking at the front of the radar unit you would see a 15 by 30 inch box
with the front slightly concave (about 4 inches) with a 4 to 6 inch circular
enter piece made out of some type of ceramic. The front pointed at the
target. It was about 20 to 22 inches deep with a rounded back, except where
there was two connections for cables.

It had a small tripod stand which was useless except in testing. Actual use
had a soldier aim or point the device along a defined circle. This was done
small arc by small arc by hand as directed by the operator observing the
screen (see B).
B) The second piece was used by the operator. It had an oblong green screen
similar to an old ocilliscope (spelling?) with three major knobs. It was
operated by a battery pack (24 volt).

The screen had a 2 to 3 second scan rate from left to right. The up and down
lines were black until a white flash (blip) occurred. How high on the screen
from the bottom helped identify the range. Objects moving were compared to
fixed and known distances. This was done by metal stakes pounded in the
ground and provided measured distance (marked out to 700 yards). Most of
these stakes survived the artillery attacks. The unit could "see" items over
a 1,000 yards.

My father thinks there were "XPS" with a serial number on the back of the
second unit (B) where the cable connected. Both pieces connected to a
battery pack. When I first started looking into this one old vet said it may
have been a MP-3 or MPS-3 radar unit. Regardless, it was brand new in 1952
and used in Korea in 1953 and was considered Top Secret.

Gunnery was conducted by shooting predeteremined azimuths and elevations.
Azimuths were done by compass headings and later each fifty calibre machine
gun was given gunnery stakes made out of various items that were laying
around. Thirty calibre machine guns were placed on either side of the
fifties and fired in support.

Two twin 40mm AA guns and the two quad fifty machine guns were mounted in
halftracks and semi-buried slightly nose down behind the bunker berm.
Artillery knocked out the twin 40s rather quickly. The quad fifties were
dismounted and placed on tripods with in the bunker. Each halftrack crew had
a radar operator. Two units were damaged and by repairs and swapping
electronics and pieces one was made useable but it did not have the same
efficiency.

The radar was most valuable at night and when smoke or mist hide things from
view. The bunker complex my father was in survived because of the radar. The
Chinese by that time were very good sneaking up on forward outposts. The
radar replaced the outposts for the bunker complex.

I hope this provides more detail.

JRC


**********************************************************

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http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/highlights/koreanwar/history/chronology/chronol
ogy.html

1953
January Li Zhimin is appointed commissioner of the Political Department of
the Chinese People's Volunteer Army by the Central Military Commission.

February 22 UN Force General Clarke writes to Marshal Kim Il-song and
General Peng Dehuai, asking to exchange POWs who are ill or injured.

March 30 Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai issues a statement on truce
talks.

April 10 Representatives of the truce talk liaison group reach agreement on
the exchange of the ill and injured POWS
April 26 Representatives for truce talks from both sides resume their
meeting and negotiations.
April 30 The Chinese People's Volunteer Army decides to launch the Summer
Counterattack Campaign.

May 13 The Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteer Army
launch the first and second battle of the Summer Counterattack Campaign.

June 8 The truce talks reach the agreement on the settlement of POWs.
June 17 Syngman Rhee group violates the POW agreement, detaining some POWs
of the Korean People's Army.

June 19
Kim Il-song and Peng Dehuai write to "UN forces" General Clarke, demand the
US side to release POWS detained by the Syngman Rhee group.
July 13
The Chinese People's Volunteer Army launches the third battle in the summer
campaign. (The Golden City Campaign)
July 19, the Chinese negotiating delegation issued a statement, making
public the promises of the Allied Forces for enforcing the armistice pact.
July 26, armistice negotiation came to an end.
July 27, armistice pact was signed by the Chinese People's Volunteer Army
and the Allied Forces in Panmunjom.
July 27,Clarke, the commander-in-chief of the "UN Forces", formally signed
the armistice pact in Munsan.
July 27, Kim Il-song, the marshal of the Korean People's Army, formally
signed the armistice pact in Pyongyang.
July 28, Peng Dehuai, the commander-in-chief of the Chinese People's
Volunteer Army, formally signed the armistice pact in Kaesong.