Re: Air Bases, air fields and airstrips - Steel Ridge 1953

["Les Hanson" <hanson@totalnetnh.net>]

give these a try.
www.bob-west.com/KWBOOKS.html

use google  search for this-----type in
bloody ridge  korean war
look for 2nd infantry division (2id)      when this comes up scroll  3/4
down   and on right side click on
U.S.army  center military history

http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/

Les               A LongAgo Airman
----- Original Message -----
From: "John R. Carpenter" <jrcrin001@cox.net>
To: <KOREAN-WAR-L@raven.cc.ku.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, August 13, 2002 7:47 PM
Subject: Re: Air Bases, air fields and airstrips - Steel Ridge 1953


> Les,
>
> Thanks for the heads up on the web page.  It gave me a few books to look
> for.
>
> With all of this talk of airfields, who has data on airstrips?
>
> Specificlly one on Steel Ridge in the Heartbreak Ridge area being placed
in
> June of 1953.  It was abandoned because it fell in the southern part of
the
> DMZ after 27 July 1953.  This was in the ROK IX Corp area of operations.
>
> It was next to a mine.  I am not sure what they mined but it helped make a
> deep bunker.
>
> I included a brief below on the general material I am looking for.
>
> Thanks for the help!
>
> John R. Carpenter
> La Mesa, CA
>
> Subj: Korean War 1953 Bloody Ridge & Heartbreak Ridge area
>
> Hello,
>
> I am researching combat action between the dates of 20 June 1953 to about
27
> July 1953 by an American "Provisional AA Battery" testing the then Top
> Secret Battlefield Radar on Steel Ridge (in the Bloody Ridge or Heartbreak
> ridge area) while attached to the Republic of Korea's Army.
>
> The area called Steel Ridge was then controlled by the ROK 26th Infantry
> Regiment of the ROK Capital (Tiger) Division on the left flank of the
> Kumsong salient in the IX Corp area of control during the last Chinese
> military offensive.  The Chinese Communist Forces (also known as the
Chinese
> People's Volunteer Army) called this the Golden City Campaign which was
> primarily directed at the ROK Army after July 13, 1953.
>
> PLEASE NOTE: This 28 man American unit was under the direct control of 8th
> Army Command.  They may have been documented under the Korean Military
> Assistance Group (KMAG). There was a two man FAC (Forward Air Controller)
> team (a NCO and assistant - where the third man was is unknown) present
also
> that was KMAG. The two American groups were separate.
>
> This "Provisional Anti-Aircraft (AA) Battery" of Americans were in support
> of the ROK Capitol (Tiger) Division just behind the main line of
resistance
> in a bunker complex near the east end of a small airstrip then being
> constructed just below the ridge line. The Americans were testing
> battlefield radar in conjunction with AA weapons for groundfire against
> expected enemy action. Provisions to keep the equipment and operators out
of
> enemy hands if over run had been made.
>
> This group had come from Germany (most voluntered from the American 1st
> Battlion of the 26th Infantry Regiment [Blue Spaders!] of the 1st Infantry
> Division. They were at Erlangen before they came to South Korea to combat
> test the battlefield radar.  They entered the combat zone at Steel Ridge
on
> 15 May 1953. During the ChinCom offensive, and for about 11 days they were
> surrounded by enemy forces. This group of 28 (plus 2 FAC) American and
some
> 180-190 ROK troops held off or interdicted several enemy Divisions. Only
14
> (plus 2) Americans and less than 100 ROK survived this bloody battle in
the
> bunker complex.
>
> Cpl. (acting Sgt.) Richard L. Carpenter was given a battlefield promotion
by
> radio to 2nd Lt. (and as a ROK Major) shortly after the group was isolated
> and cutoff.  This on the third day after all above him were killed or
> seriously wounded. He rejected twice the enemy's offer of surrender and
> provided a forward communications to interdict enemy movement and
resupply.
>
> Second Lt. Carpenter repeatedly help rebuilt the automatic weapons knocked
> out of action from parts, maintained radio contact with 8th Army Command,
> provided interdiction information and helped keep most of the battlefield
> radar units operational for most of the battle.
>
> Even though wounded, he managed to maintain his position against several
> strong enemy attacks severely crippling enemy action and movement in the
> area along Steel Ridge and the valley it overlooked. Only 14 of the 28
> Americans of the Provisional AA group survived after being reinforced by
> elements of the ROK 6th Infantry Division on the right flank then from
> elements of the 17th Regiment of the 7th Infantry Division from the left
> flank in the late afternoon of 20 July 1953. The American survivors were
> evacuated in the evening of the 21 July 1953.  The two FACs were relieved
> earlier in the day. This area was not reported completely secure until 24
> June 1953.
>
> The ROK commander, Lt. Col. Kim, was a battalion (1st or 2nd Batt.?)
> commander of the 26th ROK Regiment. This unit was falling back to prepared
> positions when the enemy disrupted them by attacking.  This caused many
> units to fall back farther than desired.  Lt. Col. Kim rallied many ROK
> soldiers into the bunker complex to make a stand. He saved Sgt. (later 2nd
> Lt.) Carpenter's life by helping dig him out of a collapsed trench during
a
> heavy artillery attack.
>
> Because the battlefield radar was rated "Top Secret" and the end of the
> hostilities not much has been documented on this specific action. The
radar
> units in combination with quad .50 calibre (12.7 mm) machine guns (later
> dismounted) and 40 mm anti aircraft guns (knocked out early in the battle)
> disrupted many of the enemy attacks while they were forming up and
attacking
> at night. Radio contact and observation of the valley roads at night by
> radar allowed friendly artillery (FAC)  to concentrate on the enemy supply
> and logestic units. This severely hindered the major enemy push. Heavy
> Artillery (8 inch) and air support helped maintain this position until the
> UN (United Nation) counter attack brought more support forward..
>
> The ChinCom apparently wanted this position and the equipment it
contained.
> It was the last of 21 strong points in this sector that was not taken.
They
> were attacked by Chinese field artillery and heavy artillery, possibly
> bombed and straffed by at least one Mig.  They were assaulted or heavily
> probed by enemy ground troops almost repeatedly. Three offers of surrender
> were offered to the defenders while they were surrounded. At least three
> major human wave attacks got close enough to engage in grenade and hand to
> hand combat. Artillery and automatic weapon fire aided by radar broke up
> most of the enemy attacks before they could close.
>
> Richard Carpenter is my father and I am slowly documenting the actions of
> his unit by historical records.
>
> As a side note, my father participated in long range sniping. This sniping
> took out several Chinese officers including at least one high ranking
> officer (at about 1700 meters) who had six body guards. My father did this
> with a 32x power rifle scope which he drilled and tapped into a .50
calibre
> (12.7 mm) machine gun that was fired single shot.
>
> Any help you can provide will be greatly appreciated.
>
> Sincerely,
>
> John R. Carpenter
> 5850 Yorkshire Ave.
> La Mesa, CA 91942-2821
> (619) 466-5735
> jrcrin001@cox.net
>
> **********************************************************
>
> Each of these radar units were in two pieces:
>
> A) This first piece is similar to a TV set in shape, except it had no
> screen.
> Looking at the front of the radar unit you would see a 15 by 30 inch box
> with the front slightly concave (about 4 inches) with a 4 to 6 inch
circular
> enter piece made out of some type of ceramic. The front pointed at the
> target. It was about 20 to 22 inches deep with a rounded back, except
where
> there was two connections for cables.
>
> It had a small tripod stand which was useless except in testing. Actual
use
> had a soldier aim or point the device along a defined circle. This was
done
> small arc by small arc by hand as directed by the operator observing the
> screen (see B).
> B) The second piece was used by the operator. It had an oblong green
screen
> similar to an old ocilliscope (spelling?) with three major knobs. It was
> operated by a battery pack (24 volt).
>
> The screen had a 2 to 3 second scan rate from left to right. The up and
down
> lines were black until a white flash (blip) occurred. How high on the
screen
> from the bottom helped identify the range. Objects moving were compared to
> fixed and known distances. This was done by metal stakes pounded in the
> ground and provided measured distance (marked out to 700 yards). Most of
> these stakes survived the artillery attacks. The unit could "see" items
over
> a 1,000 yards.
>
> My father thinks there were "XPS" with a serial number on the back of the
> second unit (B) where the cable connected. Both pieces connected to a
> battery pack. When I first started looking into this one old vet said it
may
> have been a MP-3 or MPS-3 radar unit. Regardless, it was brand new in 1952
> and used in Korea in 1953 and was considered Top Secret.
>
> Gunnery was conducted by shooting predeteremined azimuths and elevations.
> Azimuths were done by compass headings and later each fifty calibre
machine
> gun was given gunnery stakes made out of various items that were laying
> around. Thirty calibre machine guns were placed on either side of the
> fifties and fired in support.
>
> Two twin 40mm AA guns and the two quad fifty machine guns were mounted in
> halftracks and semi-buried slightly nose down behind the bunker berm.
> Artillery knocked out the twin 40s rather quickly. The quad fifties were
> dismounted and placed on tripods with in the bunker. Each halftrack crew
had
> a radar operator. Two units were damaged and by repairs and swapping
> electronics and pieces one was made useable but it did not have the same
> efficiency.
>
> The radar was most valuable at night and when smoke or mist hide things
from
> view. The bunker complex my father was in survived because of the radar.
The
> Chinese by that time were very good sneaking up on forward outposts. The
> radar replaced the outposts for the bunker complex.
>
> I hope this provides more detail.
>
> JRC
>
>
> **********************************************************
>
> >From GPO:
> United States Army and the Korean War. CD-ROMS. 2000. Contains the Korean
> War Collection from the Center of Military History's publications catalog,
> including narrative history, historical map posters, and two photograph
> collections. Contains Adobe Acrobat 3.0 Reader software. System
> requirements: Minimum 4M RAM and 6M free space on hard drive. Can run on
> Windows 3.1, 95, 98, or NT; Macintosh System 7.0 or better with 68020
> processor; or Unix (SunOS, Solaris, HP-UX, AIX, or IRIX. 4 CD-ROMs and
> booklet in plastic case. 0-16-061473-2
> S/N 008-029-00365-1 -- $24.00 (Out of Stock)
>
> CD-ROM
>
> THE UNITED STATES ARMY AND THE KOREAN WAR, (2000, updated edition
> forthcoming in 2002) EM 0182, GPO S/N 008-029-00365-1, $24.00.
> A four-disc CD-ROM containing the Center's existing publications on the
> Korean War. See pages 10 and 11 above for detailed descriptions of the
works
> contained.
>
>
> http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/catalog/KW-Pubs.htm
>
> PRF Online Via GPO Access Title: United States Army and the Korean War
> (CD-ROM) Stock Number: 008-029-00365-1 Availability: 0. out of print GPO
> Price: $24.00 Price (non-U.S.): $33.60 Description: United States Army in
> the Korean War Series. Contains the Korean War collection from the Center
of
> Military History's Publications catalog, including narrative history,
> historical map posters, and two photograph collections. Includes Adobe
> Acrobat 3.0 Reader software. LC card 99-046564. Publisher: Defense Dept.,
> Army, Center of Military History Year/pages: 2000: 4 CD-ROMs and booklet
in
> plastic case. Note: System requirements: Minimum 4M RAM and 6M free space
on
> hard drive. Can run on Windows 3.1, 95, 98 or NT; Macintosh System 7.0 or
> better with 68020 processor; or Unix (SunOS, Solaris, HP-UX, AIX, or
IRIX).
> NB1282 Key Phrases: United States Army and the Korean War, Compact Disc
Read
> Only Memory (CD-ROM), Electronic Products, Army History, Military History,
> Korean War ISBN: 0-16-061473-2 Format: multimedia Extra Description:
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> coated Weight: 8 oz Quantity Price: discount Binding: specialty item
> Available date: 01-23-01 Subject Bibliography: 098CP 314SA Status date:
> 05-03-02 Unit: set Unit (non-U.S.): each
>
>
>
>
>
>
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/highlights/koreanwar/history/chronology/chronol
> ogy.html
>
> 1953
> January Li Zhimin is appointed commissioner of the Political Department of
> the Chinese People's Volunteer Army by the Central Military Commission.
>
> February 22 UN Force General Clarke writes to Marshal Kim Il-song and
> General Peng Dehuai, asking to exchange POWs who are ill or injured.
>
> March 30 Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai issues a statement on
truce
> talks.
>
> April 10 Representatives of the truce talk liaison group reach agreement
on
> the exchange of the ill and injured POWS
> April 26 Representatives for truce talks from both sides resume their
> meeting and negotiations.
> April 30 The Chinese People's Volunteer Army decides to launch the Summer
> Counterattack Campaign.
>
> May 13 The Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteer Army
> launch the first and second battle of the Summer Counterattack Campaign.
>
> June 8 The truce talks reach the agreement on the settlement of POWs.
> June 17 Syngman Rhee group violates the POW agreement, detaining some POWs
> of the Korean People's Army.
>
> June 19
> Kim Il-song and Peng Dehuai write to "UN forces" General Clarke, demand
the
> US side to release POWS detained by the Syngman Rhee group.
> July 13
> The Chinese People's Volunteer Army launches the third battle in the
summer
> campaign. (The Golden City Campaign)
> July 19, the Chinese negotiating delegation issued a statement, making
> public the promises of the Allied Forces for enforcing the armistice pact.
> July 26, armistice negotiation came to an end.
> July 27, armistice pact was signed by the Chinese People's Volunteer Army
> and the Allied Forces in Panmunjom.
> July 27,Clarke, the commander-in-chief of the "UN Forces", formally signed
> the armistice pact in Munsan.
> July 27, Kim Il-song, the marshal of the Korean People's Army, formally
> signed the armistice pact in Pyongyang.
> July 28, Peng Dehuai, the commander-in-chief of the Chinese People's
> Volunteer Army, formally signed the armistice pact in Kaesong.
>
>