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Re: Why Didn't the US Win In Korea?



I do not see that it was a war for us to Win..
However Singamon Rhee is was..
IMHO The US just wanted to keep things abated
until there was a concensus to get out. Which happened.

DF

Joe Brennan wrote:

> Given the whole history of air effort in Korea I think the burden of proof
> is on someone who makes a remarkable suggestion like we could have kept the
> PVA *out* of Korea with air. I don't think that's plausible at all (again
> non-nuclear/radiological as was supposedly considered).
>
> But in general whether one imagines it happening in Oct 1950, or more
> realistically in say fall 1951 when the Chinese had been beaten up further
> down the peninsula,  there are too big issues in assuming we could have
> driven back and kept the Chinese at the Yalu:
>
> 1. the Yalu border with China is 500 miles long vs. 120 air miles at the DMZ
> and 90 miles across the "neck" of NK north of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line. And
> the impassable central mountain spine in northern NK allows a force willing
> to operate a little farther up in the mountains to flank forces on eithe
> side from inland, as happened in the early PVA offensives.
>
> 2. we can't assume the Chinese would have committed the same size force, the
> size we'd been able to handle at the DMZ. Their inital commitment pushed us
> back from the Yalu, fine for them. An ultimately larger force was chewed up
> further south in their later offensives: bad for them but it was far away
> from their border so not critical. But what if they'd been willing to commit
> a force several times that size to push us back from their critical border?
> They certainly could have put that many men under arms.
>
> Military minds must have considered these factors, quite aside from
> politicians. The perfectly rational *military* solution would have been to
> pull back and defend the neck of NK after the PVA broke off its first
> offensive in Oct 1950: possibly permanently defensible quite possibly
> politically acceptable to the Chinese, but leaving a rump NK and so not
> "winning".
>
> Joe
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Marc James Small" <msmall@infi.net>
> To: <KOREAN-WAR-L@raven.cc.ku.edu>; <KOREAN-WAR-L@raven.cc.ku.edu>
> Sent: Monday, September 23, 2002 7:58 PM
> Subject: Why Didn't the US Win In Korea?
>
> > At 06:30 PM 9/23/02 -0400, Joe Brennan wrote:
> > >It was said it was a "political" decision to settle for a half loaf in
> > >Korea. True but also an unavoidable decision w/o nuclear war IMO.
> >
> > The settlement of any and all wars is always political, by definition, and
> > not military.
> >
> > Had the UN determined prior to CHROMITE to push to the Yalu and had so
> told
> > the Soviets and firmly, and had then been prepared to invest a LOT of
> > airpower in dumping napalm on the river to fry the incoming, yes, the war
> > certainly could have had a different outcome, and one without the use of
> > nuclear ironmongery.
> >
> > But, then, no one in Washington listened to what FEC and X Corps and 8th
> > Army was saying.  They turned this over to the politicals for resolution
> > and, in the end, after weeks of worry, they gave what are arguably the
> most
> > elastic of orders ever given a military force.
> >
> > Blame the SecDef, Marshall, as he is, arguably, the most marked with this
> > shame.  Blame Truman, the President, as he backed every call Marshall
> made.
> >  Blame Bradley, the Chairman of the JCS, as he never had an original
> > thought in his life and certainly did not begin to think during this time.
> > Blame the Chief of Staff of the Army, "Lightning Joe" Collins, for trying
> > to live up to his reputation by reversing himself every twelve or eighteen
> > hours.
> >
> > In the end, the Korean War could have been "won", had the US had the
> > determination to do so.  But Truman, Marshall, Bradley, Collins, et al.,
> > did not have that determination.  Cf Kerensky and the Duma and the Russian
> > Revolution.  Those who want intelligently and ably, get.  We had the
> > capacity, but Washington chose not to use it.
> >
> > Now, had the US and UN forces accomplished a firm northern line at the
> Yalu
> > and enforced it, would that have been a "win"?
> >
> > Marc
> >
> > msmall@roanoke.infi.net  FAX:  +540/343-7315
> > Cha robh bas fir gun ghras fir!
> >