Re: Communist G-2 re air raids

["Joseph S. Bermudez Jr." <jbermudez@qwest.net>]

Title: Re: Communist G-2 re air raids

Sandy,

> ...I have read some articles that allude to the Communists having something similar regarding air raids by UN forces.  ...In studying the rail interdictions carried out by VMA-121...any time this squadron's planes took off with heavy bomb loads, the "tom toms would start beating warning Ambyon and vicinity... 

Hmmm, although it might not directly relate to the VMA-121 situation here are some points which may be of help,

1. Prior to the beginning of the war the DPRK Ministry of Internal Affairs, as one of its functions, established a civil defense network in the major cities around the country. Included within this were a small number of air defense warning posts (i.e., ground observers). To date there is no evidence that these were linked nationally in a meaningful way. 

2. This system was disrupted with the UNC counterattack north of the 38th Parallel, although its was reestablished after the PRC intervention. As the frontlines became more static and UNC strategic bombing increased the air defense observation network was expanded and its capabilities were enhanced.

3. The introduction of Soviet Air Force units brought about the introduction of an radar early warning network (and later searchlight/gun-laying radars). There is some preliminary evidence (which needs to be verified) that there were a few ex-Japanese radars working in the north prior to the war). This network initially covered the Soviet border area and the bases in China (in both cases extending into the DPRK). Subsequently, it was extended south to P’yongyang and to major cities on the east coast. By the end of the war it cover all major cities in the north. BTW, it consisted of a mix of Russian, U.S. Lend-lease, British and ex-Japanese radars.

4. The Reconnaissance Department/Bureau of the General Staff and agents/guerrillas of the Korean Worker’s Party conducted reconnaissance missions of UNC air bases in the south during the war (both before the war and after the front stabilized). Some of these units were equipped with radios. It is unknown, however, if there was any direct connection with any reports generated by these units to an air defense network in the north. Such a connection would have been an impressive accomplishment given the state of the Communist command & control network at the time.

I hope that all of this is of some use.

Best regards,
Joe B.

Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.