Re: South Koreans in the 7th Div.

[Ed Evanhoe <evanhoe@arbuckleonline.com>]

> Bob et al,
>
> >>This was a helluva price to pay for seven hours, but the men in Task 
> Force Smith paid it. I have the greatest respect for those men, Carl, but 
> the ROKS that were assigned to us were completely unreliable.<<
What needs mentioning here is the vast majority of the KATUSA troops during 
the early part of the war were draftees with only 4 to 6 weeks (and in some 
cases less) training before being sent to American units, thus were far 
from being trained soldiers.   Adding to the problem the KATUSA's (in 
general) did not speak or understand English and the Americans did not 
speak or understand Korean although a few Americans could communicate in 
limited Japanese.  Thus there was the major problem of making the KATUSA 
understand what he was supposed/expected to do and frustration on the part 
of the Americans because the KATUSA did not understand and did not have the 
training/experience to perform as a trained soldier so could not fulfill 
the expected role.  The result was the KATUSA's developed a bad reputation 
with the average American soldier, whose main desire was to have someone he 
could depend on at his side in a firefight.  And, because he couldn't 
communicate with the KATUSA(S) in his squad/platoon, he didn't feel he 
could depend on the KATUSA(S.)

As Carl pointed out, in some US units, they consolidated the KATUSA's into 
a single unit and assigned NCO's who did have enough basic language 
communications skills (generally Japanese) to train and lead the 
KATUSA's.  In these units the KATUSA's did their job.

All this is similar to the bad rep ROKA combat units received during the 
early fighting.  When the war began, large percentage of the trained ROK 
Army died in the first few days holding their positions or fighting 
delaying actions.  These units were quickly filled with untrained, very 
poorly equipped recruits and lacked experienced Officers and NCO's.  The 
result was poor combat performance.  As time went on and Officers, NCO's 
and men gained experience, and training of recruits improved, plus improved 
supplies & equipment, this turned around.

Ed

Ed Evanhoe, PO Box 916, Antlers, OK, 74523-0916
Author: DARKMOON: Eighth Army Special Operations in the Korean War
Life member: Special Forces & Special Operations Associations
Web site:  http://www.korean-war.com