Re: MacArthur [Was: Slow period for list]

[Marc James Small <msmall@infi.net>]

At 03:55 AM 12/20/02 EST, SDonell73@aol.com wrote:
>I agree with what you say, but I'd say that his greatest failure was to sit
>on his hands for days after the invasion of the Philippines, paralyzed with
>doubt and inaction. That happened a few times in his life. One observation
>of this was in his early months in Australia. Hap Arnold happened to be on
>a tour of the Pacific when he dropped in on Mac. When he reported his
>observation about Mac's paralysis in SWPAC, he recommended that Mac be
>replaced. Marshall ordered his planners work with Arnold's planners to
>resolve the issue. Not one member of the joint-planning staff recommended
>keeping him in his position. (One suggestion was made to make him the
>ambassador to the Soviet Union.) Marshall received their report and decided
>against their recommendation. 
> 
>MacArthur treated his Australian Army like second class soldiers, when they
>in fact were the only ones who had been in combat for over a year, when he
>took command of SWPAC. The Aussies had been fighting the Germans in N.
>Africa and securing the peace in the Middle East.  
> 
>He totally went around his ground force commander, General Blamey, an
>Australian general who had been fighting the Germans in N. Africa, and
>created the Alamo Force, aka the 6th Army, composed entirely of American
>soldiers. The Australian Army was given the privilege of marching through
>the jungles of New Guinea, while the Alamo Force was busy "hitting them
>where they ain't" in the amphibious operations along the New Guinea coast.
>Upon leaving SWPAC the Australians were refused permission to move forward
>with the Americans. They were left with cleaning up the passed over
>Japanese garrisons and bases, which were left to die on the vine, unable to
>affect Allied movements in SWPAC. 
> 
>MacArthur was given the power to determine the Australian government's
>actions after he arrived. There were times of great expectations. By the
>time he left, the Australians were sorry that he had set foot on their soil. 
> 
>He was quick to chastise any subordinate who dared speak out for the 6th
>Army or American operations in his area of command. One example of this was
>the removal of General Eichelberger from command of combat troops, when
>"Ike" dared to speak to the press about the victory at Buna. 
> 
>He surrounded himself with a gaggle of sycophants, known as the "Bataan
>Gang," who continued with him into the occupation of Japan. Some of them
>were still working for him in the Korean War. One of these was Mac's G-2,
>Charles Willoughby, with him since the Philippines often erred in his
>predictions of events to come. But it made little difference to Mac, as he
>chose what he wanted to believe, ignoring Willoughby when he thought
>differently. Willoughby, who had many detractors, as the head of Mac's G-2,
>claimed that he had predicted the entry of the Chinese into the Korean War,
>but when that contradicted with MacArthur's "Home by Christmas" program, he
>did a lot of side stepping and shuffling explaining just what was the
truth.  
> 
>Mac had no concept of joint operational command, i.e., using the personnel
>of the Navy or Marines on his staff. And it was most fortunate that General
>Kenney was his air commander, during WW II, as the latter's ability to work
>around problems of attack and logistical support, provided MacArthur with
>capabilities that he couldn't have addressed.  
> 
>The Air Force commanders weren't up to that caliber in the Korean War, and
>so there was the multiple year program of interdiction. It was a failure,
>and ended up costing many aircraft and lives in that strategy.  
> 
>As for his love of the Marines, he didn't think enough of the 4th Marines,
>captured with the other troops in the Philippines. Mac ordered medals for
>all of the ground units fighting there, but omitted them entirely. When
>Wainwright questioned this, Mac said that the regiment already had too many
>medals. Wainwright corrected this unmerited omission before he went into
>captivity.  
> 
>MacArthur respected no one. If he had his way there would have been no
>Europe First national policy, and he would be given the overall command of
>the Pacific theater of operations. He bemoaned any effort to support the
>European theater, and most certainly Nimitz' theater in the North, Central,
>South, and Eastern Pacific.  
> 
>As his attack on the Bonus Army showed, he had little respect for the
>wishes of the president. Herbert Hoover had wanted to use less harsh
>tactics in removing the Bonus marchers. Mac disagreed despite the
>suggestions of his aide, Dwight Eisenhower to show a less forceful
approach.  
> 
>He did the same thing to FDR when the President visited Pearl Harbor and
>Mac was summoned to the confab. He cowed FDR into invading the Philippines,
>which was against the general concept of the Joint Chiefs. He threatened
>FDR with exposing him as a racist, not even caring for the Asian citizens
>of the Philippines. Mac had the PR folk and press contacts, as well as the
>conservative Republicans, to back him up in his threat. FDR obviously
>didn't feel strong enough in his position to forgo the invasion of the
>Philippines, especially as he was planning to run for his fourth term
>presidency, so he caved to Mac on this issue.  
> 
>During the Korean War, Mac tried the same thing with Truman, once too
>often, and the rest, as they say, is history. 

------------------------

Wow!  Again, on-topic and off-topic

Off-Topic

There is no doubt that MacArthur froze when the Philippines was attacked,
as the War Department had been advising him that the Japanese could not
possibly attack him before the following April.  He then based all of his
plans on this, sent the plans to Washington for review, and had them
approved.  

There is also no doubt that MacArthur froze when he reached Australia.  He
had been told, for five months, that huge convoys of troops and supplies
were being sent to Australia to mount the relief expedition to the
Philippines.  When he got to Australia, he found that the US had sent
almost no troops to Australia and, his mind bent to the relief of the
troops trapped in the Philippines, he did sink into depression.  (It must
be hard for any senior officer to learn that your own government has been
filling you with falsehoods for a half-year!)  But, he soon bounced back
and went forward to do his duty. Arnold did NOT recommend his replacement:
he suggested that his replacement be considered -- but, then, recall that
Major Arnold had almost had his career terminated after he challenged the
MacArthur-Pratt Pact on the division of air responsibilities.  (Arnold, at
all times in his life, most strongly opposed ANY Marine aviation,
incidentally, and felt that Navy Aviation should be limited to maritime
missions only.)

MacArthurn NEVER relieved Eichelberger.  Eichelberger was his second-string
combat commander almost from the beginning in Australia, right after
Kruger.  That Kruger was more capable of dealing with MacArthur's ego-trips
than was Eichelberger merely speaks poorly of Eichelberger's mental
stability.  (One of his party once pointed out to MacArthur how much
Eichelberger physically resembled Smedley D Butler, a noted Marine general
whom MacArthur deeply admired and with whom he was on warm personal terms.
MacArthur simply laughed and replied, "hell, NO!  Butler was a REAL
officer", which pretty much sums up the feelings so many had about
Eichelberger, that he was a perfectly adequate Army commander when held on
a tight leash but was not a first-rank soldier.

MacArthur treated the Australian Army with great respect at all times.  He
did attempt to work around Blamey but that was pretty much because Blamey
was far too outspoken in his opposition to the Australian Labour Party
government of Curtin, and MacArthur was on close terms with that
government.  Hence, MacArthur used the Australian Army to its best
advantage but avoided being perceived as being too closely connected with
the unpopular Blamey.  In the end, MacArthur did as the Combined Chiefs of
Staff directed, concentrating the US troops on the recovery of the
Philippines and dedicating the Australian troops to the recovery of the
NEI, which became a British Imperial concern upon the realignment of
Theater boundaries on the workup to DOWNFALL.  And the Australian Army
MacArthur had at his disposal in the spring of 1942 were not the veterans
of North Africa -- the troops sent into Buna and the like were freshly
raised troops, who fought most capably.

MacArthur never was given any sort of power to determine the actions of the
Australian government, and Australian members of this List are probably
going to be calling for your head for saying so.  Don't be a fool.

Eichelberger was never "Ike".  His World War II nickname was "Miss Em",
after his radio call-sign.

The "Bataan Gang" were a very limited number of folks, consisting of the
guys who came out with MacArthur on the PT Boats from Fort Mills.  This did
include some really capable souls, such as Richard Marshall and Pat Casey,
along with some questionable folks such as Dick Sutherland, and one primary
puzzler, "Sir Charles" Willoughby.  I have no clue what bond connected
these two folks, but MacArthur did keep Willoughby with him to the end.
And there is no doubt at all that Willoughby, while a really capable
intelligence officer in many ways, was simply incapable of forming a decent
assessment of the opposing forces.  MacArthur does not seem to have
regarded Willoughby's assessments of such with any credibility after the
middle of 1943.  But, again, Willoughby had many other qualities as an
intelligence officer which might dictate his retention -- Willoughby's
capabilities, unfortunately, have been ignored by MacArthur's supporters
and Willoughby's penchant for underestimating enemy troop strength has been
made much of by MacArthur's detractors, but, in the end, no neutral soul
has ever conducted a really valid assessment of "Sir Charles'" abilities as
an intelligence officer in the broad meaning of the term.

I am not certain what you meant to suggest with your remarks about Kenney,
but it is important to note that Kenney had given little evidence of his
abilities before the Second World War, and that his command of the
Strategic Air Command after the War was generally regarded as an
embarrassment.  Kenney and MacArthur worked together most closely, and both
of them should be properly regarded as the developers of the concept of
"advancing by air power" -- or, as MacArthur put it, "by the unceasing
application of air power".  That is, the two of them developed the idea of
seizing terrain, putting in an air base in a matter of hours (Pat Casey's
contribution), then using the new air base to dominate the area while the
troops on the ground prepared for their next operation.

I have answered the Bonus Marcher comments in a separate posting.  Again,
both Hoover and Hurley, the fellows who had given MacArthur his orders,
never questioned his conduct of these orders and remained his close friends
until his death.  And Eisenhower's ONLY recorded suggestion was that
MacArthur either not appear or that he appear in civilian clothes -- but
the Chief of Staff had been ordered to be there, to supervise, and to be in
uniform, so Eisenhower's comments were really not terribly relevant, were
they?

I would appreciate a source for your repeated accusation that MacArthur
"refused" awards for the 4th Marines.  The record shows, of course, that
MacArthur ordered Rockwell, their immediate commander, to put them in for
awards as Rockwell deemed appropriate, and that such awards such match
those given to the Army.  I am unaware of any Wainwright "protest" to this
application of the local rules which applied -- MacArthur had only been
given tactical command of the 4th Marines but their admininstrative and
logistical control remained a Navy matter and MacArthur had been ordered to
strictly observe these lines of command.  Whyever would you object to a
senior commander carrying out his orders?  Perhaps, Sandy, your PROPER
gripe should lie with the Navy Department, who had the responsibility for
awarding medals to the 4th Marines.  But, of course, as a Marine, you are
forced to believe that the Navy ALWAYS "does right" by the Corps, aren't
you?  (Read up a bit on Smedley Butler, HM Smith, or Puller if you truly
believe this to be the case -- the Corps is, in the end, "the orphan
lonelies" of the Navy Department -- and don't turn your bile at the Navy
Department towards the Army or MacArthur or the War Department, all of whom
were, in this instance, playing the game by the rules on which the Navy
Department had insisted.)

Certainly, MacArthur opposed the "Europe First" Policy.  So, did, inter
multa alia, Stilwell, Nimitz, King, Halsey, Spruance, Kimmel, Richardson,
and the State Department.  MacArthur offered to serve under Nimitz, but
King declined the offer, knowing that MacArthur's brilliance would soon
outshine the abilities of Nimitz, which King seems to have seen as rather
limited.  (This isn't MY view:  read the biographies of King and Nimitz and
the memoirs of Leahy to understand the complexities in play here.)

I am shocked at your words on the 1944 Pearl Harbor Conference:

>He did the same thing to FDR when the President visited Pearl Harbor and
>Mac was summoned to the confab. He cowed FDR into invading the Philippines,
>which was against the general concept of the Joint Chiefs. He threatened
>FDR with exposing him as a racist, not even caring for the Asian citizens
>of the Philippines. Mac had the PR folk and press contacts, as well as the
>conservative Republicans, to back him up in his threat. FDR obviously
>didn't feel strong enough in his position to forgo the invasion of the
>Philippines, especially as he was planning to run for his fourth term
>presidency, so he caved to Mac on this issue.  

First, the Conference was Roosevelt's idea, and MacArthur, over his
objections, was ordered to attend.  Second, no one ever "cowed" Roosevelt
into anything, though MacArthur DID remind Roosevelt of all of his mighty
words in 1942 committing the US to the recovery of the Commonweath
'immediately' (the word used by Roosevelt in January, 1942).  The Joint
Chiefs of Staff had adopted a plan for a simultaneous recovery of the
Philippines and assault on Formosa;  this plan made both MacArthur and
Nimitz queazy due to the lack of forces to accomplish both at the same time
and, in the end, Nimitz agreed that the US had committed itself to the
recovery of the Philippines and that this was the way to go.  The jaunt to
Pearl was a political ploy by Roosevelt to keep MacArthur from speaking up
against his running for President and, to that end, he promised MacArthur
the command for both the invasion of the Philippines and for DOWNFALL, and
MacArthur bought this.

And what is this bit about MacArthur and "conservative" Republicans?
MacArthur's family were Democrats.  MacArthur switched to the Republicans
under the ęgis of Leonard Wood but always remained what we would now see as
a "Liberal Republican".  He was distrusted by the mainstream Republicans
such as Stimson, Knox, and Dewey, and was quite distasteful to the
Conservative Republicans such as Taft and Dirksen.  Note that, even when
his bid for President was failing, Taft refused to try to work with the
MacArthur delegates to block Eisenhower in 1952.

Wow!  Now, can we get back to the Korean War?

Marc







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