Almond was also one of MacArturs perfumed princes whose stupidity caused
many unnecessary casualties. The strategy during the advance North, splitting
the forces with the Taeboc Mountains dividing the forces, was military idiocy,
and it was only the consummate Generalship of General Smith, commanding the
First Marine Division, that kept the rear secured, allowing the classic fighting
retrograde that secured the Division and permitted the orderly re-positioning of
the Marines. SDonell73@aol.com wrote:
I believe this is mostly true. Most of y'all loaded up in 6 by 6s, backed
your ears, and headed north. I heard some units were advancing 30 to 40 miles a
day. The enemy just pulled back to the other hill and watched as you passed on
the road below. We walked. And sometimes the enemy didn't pull back on the other
side of the hill when we approached.
Bob Dove.
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Friday, December 20, 2002 9:58
AM
Subject: Re: MacArthur [Was: Slow period
for list]
Almond was also one of MacArturs perfumed princes whos
stupidity caused many unecessary casualties. The strategy during the advance
North, spliting the forces with the Taeboc Mountains dividing the forces, was
military idiocy, and it was only the consumate Generalship of General Smith,
commanding the First Marine Division, that kept the rear secured, alowing the
classic fighting retrograde that secured the Division and permited the orderly
re-positioning of the Marines.
SDonell73@aol.com wrote:
In a message dated 12/19/02 10:43:12 PM
Pacific Standard Time, ChosinMead@aol.com writes:
Chosin was his greatest failure, his refusal to accept the
intelligence given him was responsible for the lives of thousands of men.
Lee,
I agree with what you say, but I'd say
that his greatest failure was to sit on his hands for days after the
invasion of the Philippines, paralyzed with doubt and inaction. That
happened a few times in his life. One observation of this was in his early
months in Australia. Hap Arnold happened to be on a tour of the Pacific when
he dropped in on Mac. When he reported his observation about Mac's paralysis
in SWPAC, he recommended that Mac be replaced. Marshall ordered his planners
work with Arnold's planners to resolve the issue. Not one member of the
joint-planning staff recommended keeping him in his position. (One
suggestion was made to make him the ambassador to the Soviet Union.)
Marshall received their report and decided against their recommendation.
MacArthur treated his Australian Army like second class soldiers,
when they in fact were the only ones who had been in combat for over a year,
when he took command of SWPAC. The Aussies had been fighting the Germans in
N. Africa and securing the peace in the Middle East.
He totally went
around his ground force commander, General Blamey, an Australian general who
had been fighting the Germans in N. Africa, and created the Alamo Force, aka
the 6th Army, composed entirely of American soldiers. The Australian Army
was given the privilege of marching through the jungles of New Guinea, while
the Alamo Force was busy "hitting them where they ain't" in the amphibious
operations along the New Guinea coast. Upon leaving SWPAC the Australians
were refused permission to move forward with the Americans. They were left
with cleaning up the passed over Japanese garrisons and bases, which were
left to die on the vine, unable to affect Allied movements in SWPAC.
MacArthur was given the power to determine the Australian
government's actions after he arrived. There were times of great
expectations. By the time he left, the Australians were sorry that he had
set foot on their soil.
He was quick to chastise any subordinate who
dared speak out for the 6th Army or American operations in his area of
command. One example of this was the removal of General Eichelberger from
command of combat troops, when "Ike" dared to speak to the press about the
victory at Buna.
He surrounded himself with a gaggle of sycophants,
known as the "Bataan Gang," who continued with him into the occupation of
Japan. Some of them were still working for him in the Korean War. One of
these was Mac's G-2, Charles Willoughby, with him since the Philippines
often erred in his predictions of events to come. But it made little
difference to Mac, as he chose what he wanted to believe, ignoring
Willoughby when he thought differently. Willoughby, who had many detractors,
as the head of Mac's G-2, claimed that he had predicted the entry of the
Chinese into the Korean War, but when that contradicted with MacArthur's
"Home by Christmas" program, he did a lot of side stepping and shuffling
explaining just what was the truth.
Mac had no concept of joint
operational command, i.e., using the personnel of the Navy or Marines on his
staff. And it was most fortunate that General Kenney was his air commander,
during WW II, as the latter's ability to work around problems of attack and
logistical support, provided MacArthur with capabilities that he couldn't
have addressed.
The Air Force commanders weren't up to that caliber
in the Korean War, and so there was the multiple year program of
interdiction. It was a failure, and ended up costing many aircraft and lives
in that strategy.
As for his love of the Marines, he didn't think
enough of the 4th Marines, captured with the other troops in the
Philippines. Mac ordered medals for all of the ground units fighting there,
but omitted them entirely. When Wainwright questioned this, Mac said that
the regiment already had too many medals. Wainwright corrected this
unmerited omission before he went into captivity.
MacArthur
respected no one. If he had his way there would have been no Europe First
national policy, and he would be given the overall command of the Pacific
theater of operations. He bemoaned any effort to support the European
theater, and most certainly Nimitz' theater in the North, Central, South,
and Eastern Pacific.
As his attack on the Bonus Army showed, he had
little respect for the wishes of the president. Herbert Hoover had wanted to
use less harsh tactics in removing the Bonus marchers. Mac disagreed despite
the suggestions of his aide, Dwight Eisenhower to show a less forceful
approach.
He did the same thing to FDR when the President visited
Pearl Harbor and Mac was summoned to the confab. He cowed FDR into invading
the Philippines, which was against the general concept of the Joint Chiefs.
He threatened FDR with exposing him as a racist, not even caring for the
Asian citizens of the Philippines. Mac had the PR folk and press contacts,
as well as the conservative Republicans, to back him up in his threat. FDR
obviously didn't feel strong enough in his position to forgo the invasion of
the Philippines, especially as he was planning to run for his fourth term
presidency, so he caved to Mac on this issue.
During the Korean War,
Mac tried the same thing with Truman, once too often, and the rest, as they
say, is history.
Sandy
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