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Island hopping only works on
islands.
Gene
Almond was also one of MacArturs perfumed princes whose stupidity caused
many unnecessary casualties. The strategy during the advance North, splitting
the forces with the Taeboc Mountains dividing the forces, was military idiocy,
and it was only the consummate Generalship of General Smith, commanding the
First Marine Division, that kept the rear secured, allowing the classic
fighting retrograde that secured the Division and permitted the orderly
re-positioning of the Marines. SDonell73@aol.com wrote:
I believe this is mostly true. Most of y'all loaded up in 6 by 6s, backed
your ears, and headed north. I heard some units were advancing 30 to 40 miles
a day. The enemy just pulled back to the other hill and watched as you passed
on the road below. We walked. And sometimes the enemy didn't pull back on the
other side of the hill when we approached.
Bob Dove.
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Friday, December 20, 2002 9:58
AM
Subject: Re: MacArthur [Was: Slow
period for list]
Almond was also one of MacArturs perfumed princes whos
stupidity caused many unecessary casualties. The strategy during the advance
North, spliting the forces with the Taeboc Mountains dividing the forces,
was military idiocy, and it was only the consumate Generalship of General
Smith, commanding the First Marine Division, that kept the rear secured,
alowing the classic fighting retrograde that secured the Division and
permited the orderly re-positioning of the Marines.
SDonell73@aol.com wrote:
In a message dated 12/19/02 10:43:12 PM
Pacific Standard Time, ChosinMead@aol.com writes:
Chosin was his greatest failure, his refusal to accept the
intelligence given him was responsible for the lives of thousands of
men.
Lee,
I agree with what you say, but I'd
say that his greatest failure was to sit on his hands for days after the
invasion of the Philippines, paralyzed with doubt and inaction. That
happened a few times in his life. One observation of this was in his early
months in Australia. Hap Arnold happened to be on a tour of the Pacific
when he dropped in on Mac. When he reported his observation about Mac's
paralysis in SWPAC, he recommended that Mac be replaced. Marshall ordered
his planners work with Arnold's planners to resolve the issue. Not one
member of the joint-planning staff recommended keeping him in his
position. (One suggestion was made to make him the ambassador to the
Soviet Union.) Marshall received their report and decided against their
recommendation.
MacArthur treated his Australian Army like second
class soldiers, when they in fact were the only ones who had been in
combat for over a year, when he took command of SWPAC. The Aussies had
been fighting the Germans in N. Africa and securing the peace in the
Middle East.
He totally went around his ground force commander,
General Blamey, an Australian general who had been fighting the Germans in
N. Africa, and created the Alamo Force, aka the 6th Army, composed
entirely of American soldiers. The Australian Army was given the privilege
of marching through the jungles of New Guinea, while the Alamo Force was
busy "hitting them where they ain't" in the amphibious operations along
the New Guinea coast. Upon leaving SWPAC the Australians were refused
permission to move forward with the Americans. They were left with
cleaning up the passed over Japanese garrisons and bases, which were left
to die on the vine, unable to affect Allied movements in SWPAC.
MacArthur was given the power to determine the Australian
government's actions after he arrived. There were times of great
expectations. By the time he left, the Australians were sorry that he had
set foot on their soil.
He was quick to chastise any subordinate
who dared speak out for the 6th Army or American operations in his area of
command. One example of this was the removal of General Eichelberger from
command of combat troops, when "Ike" dared to speak to the press about the
victory at Buna.
He surrounded himself with a gaggle of
sycophants, known as the "Bataan Gang," who continued with him into the
occupation of Japan. Some of them were still working for him in the Korean
War. One of these was Mac's G-2, Charles Willoughby, with him since the
Philippines often erred in his predictions of events to come. But it made
little difference to Mac, as he chose what he wanted to believe, ignoring
Willoughby when he thought differently. Willoughby, who had many
detractors, as the head of Mac's G-2, claimed that he had predicted the
entry of the Chinese into the Korean War, but when that contradicted with
MacArthur's "Home by Christmas" program, he did a lot of side stepping and
shuffling explaining just what was the truth.
Mac had no concept
of joint operational command, i.e., using the personnel of the Navy or
Marines on his staff. And it was most fortunate that General Kenney was
his air commander, during WW II, as the latter's ability to work around
problems of attack and logistical support, provided MacArthur with
capabilities that he couldn't have addressed.
The Air Force
commanders weren't up to that caliber in the Korean War, and so there was
the multiple year program of interdiction. It was a failure, and ended up
costing many aircraft and lives in that strategy.
As for his love
of the Marines, he didn't think enough of the 4th Marines, captured with
the other troops in the Philippines. Mac ordered medals for all of the
ground units fighting there, but omitted them entirely. When Wainwright
questioned this, Mac said that the regiment already had too many medals.
Wainwright corrected this unmerited omission before he went into
captivity.
MacArthur respected no one. If he had his way there
would have been no Europe First national policy, and he would be given the
overall command of the Pacific theater of operations. He bemoaned any
effort to support the European theater, and most certainly Nimitz' theater
in the North, Central, South, and Eastern Pacific.
As his attack
on the Bonus Army showed, he had little respect for the wishes of the
president. Herbert Hoover had wanted to use less harsh tactics in removing
the Bonus marchers. Mac disagreed despite the suggestions of his aide,
Dwight Eisenhower to show a less forceful approach.
He did the
same thing to FDR when the President visited Pearl Harbor and Mac was
summoned to the confab. He cowed FDR into invading the Philippines, which
was against the general concept of the Joint Chiefs. He threatened FDR
with exposing him as a racist, not even caring for the Asian citizens of
the Philippines. Mac had the PR folk and press contacts, as well as the
conservative Republicans, to back him up in his threat. FDR obviously
didn't feel strong enough in his position to forgo the invasion of the
Philippines, especially as he was planning to run for his fourth term
presidency, so he caved to Mac on this issue.
During the Korean
War, Mac tried the same thing with Truman, once too often, and the rest,
as they say, is history.
Sandy
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