Advance to the Yalu

[Marc James Small <msmall@infi.net>]

At 08:08 AM 12/21/02 -0700, Robert wrote:
>    Of course my being there would be irrelevant to the likes of you.
>That's why witnesses are irrelevant in court. Right! What possible
>relevance could truth have to critical inquiry? 

Robert

Your presence or lack of presence is irrelevant to your understanding of
just what the methodology was in 1950 for the collection and analysis of
intelligence information.  Tactical intelligence, which you mention, was
then a very small piece of the pie and was rejected by the intelligence
community in Washington for the reasons I previously set out.  

The CIA, State, and DoD had convinced themselves that there would be no
Chinese Communist intrusion and ordered FEC to base its plans on this.
This resulted in the confusing set of contradictory instructions issued to
FEC after the great success of CHROMITE -- in the end, FEC was ordered to
advance to the Yalu and alternate plans proposed by X Corps and FEC -- such
as stopping at the narrow waist of Korea or only allowing ROK troops north
of that point -- were summarily rejected by a JCS which simply had
convinced itself that it was safe for US troops to advance to the
"neigborhood" of the Yalu.

OP Smith was an extremely capable commander and his decision to deploy his
troops for maximum protection was exceedingly wise one.  But the folks in
Washington pooh-poohed this deployment as being unnecessily cautious at the
time.

Marc

msmall@infi.net  FAX:  +276/343-7315
Cha robh bąs fir gun ghrąs fir!