Intelligence Evaluation and the Yalu

[Marc James Small <msmall@infi.net>]

At 09:31 AM 12/21/02 -0600, Ed Evanhoe wrote:
>Bottom line is the analysis the Chinese POW's were simply "support" troops 
>helping the NKPA escape North Korea came from FEC (Willoughby/MacArthur,) 
>not from Washington to FEC.

Ed

Blair certainly dissents from your analysis.  Prior to CHROMITE, FEC had
been ordered to base operational and strategic planning on intelligence
analyses prepared in Washington, and this was the procedure followed for
the remainder of the conflict.  In other words, intelligence was gathered
by units in Korea and was sent to Washington with or without a preliminary
field analysis.  But, in the end, it was Washington's evaluation which was
the "official" one and was the only one allowed to be used by FEC in its
own planning.

Yes, Willoughby did send a field analysis that the CHICOM's captured were
advisors or the like, but, under the procedures in use at the time, this
only counted as a helpful suggestion.  The official take was that made in
Washington and was based not just on tactical intelligence but also on a
much broader scope of information.  Thus, the CIA, State, and DoD received
FEC's report and discounted it in its entirety -- at one point, the CIA
denied that ANY CHICOM's had been encountered and it was only an offer by
Willoughby to send some of the captured Chinese to Washington which forced
the point.

Marc

msmall@infi.net  FAX:  +276/343-7315
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