[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
Re: Intelligence Evaluation and the Yalu
Marc,
>>Blair certainly dissents from your analysis. Prior to CHROMITE, FEC had
been ordered to base operational and strategic planning on intelligence
analyses prepared in Washington, and this was the procedure followed for
the remainder of the conflict. <<
I disagree with Blair on many points. <LOL>
>>In other words, intelligence was gathered by units in Korea and was
sent to Washington with or without a preliminary field analysis. But, in
the end, it was Washington's evaluation which was the "official" one and
was the only one allowed to be used by FEC in its own planning.<<
That may be the "official" line but in reality, MacArthur generally made
his operational decisions on what his staff told him was happening, not on
what Washington told him was happening.
>>Yes, Willoughby did send a field analysis that the CHICOM's captured were
advisors or the like, but, under the procedures in use at the time, this
only counted as a helpful suggestion. The official take was that made in
Washington and was based not just on tactical intelligence but also on a
much broader scope of information. Thus, the CIA, State, and DoD received
FEC's report and discounted it in its entirety -- at one point, the CIA
denied that ANY CHICOM's had been encountered and it was only an offer by
Willoughby to send some of the captured Chinese to Washington which forced
the point.<<
As always, egos and agendas at play. <G>
Ed
Ed Evanhoe, PO Box 916, Antlers, OK, 74523-0916
Author: DARKMOON: Eighth Army Special Operations in the Korean War
Co-author: KOREAN WAR ORDER OF BATTLE 1950-1953 (Dec, 2002)
Life Member: Special Forces & Special Operations Associations
Web site: http://www.korean-war.com Co-list owner KOREAN-WAR-L