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Re: Intelligence Evaluation and the Yalu
I suppose we are still in Korea for the same reason we are still in Japan
and Germany. To keep the peace we worked so hard to win, my friend.
Bob Dove
----- Original Message -----
From: "Les Hanson" <hanson@totalnetnh.net>
To: <KOREAN-WAR-L@raven.cc.ku.edu>
Sent: Saturday, December 21, 2002 12:38 PM
Subject: Re: Intelligence Evaluation and the Yalu
> MacArthurs farewell speach to Congress
> A reading of the day from a day in the past,and if read,Why are
> we still in Korea ?
>
> http://www.unclesam.net/warriors/farewell.htm
>
> Les
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Ed Evanhoe" <evanhoe@arbuckleonline.com>
> To: <KOREAN-WAR-L@raven.cc.ku.edu>
> Sent: Saturday, December 21, 2002 12:06 PM
> Subject: Re: Intelligence Evaluation and the Yalu
>
>
> >
> > >Marc,
> > >
> > > >>Blair certainly dissents from your analysis. Prior to CHROMITE, FEC
> had
> > >been ordered to base operational and strategic planning on intelligence
> > >analyses prepared in Washington, and this was the procedure followed
for
> > >the remainder of the conflict. <<
> >
> > I disagree with Blair on many points. <LOL>
> >
> > > >>In other words, intelligence was gathered by units in Korea and was
> > > sent to Washington with or without a preliminary field analysis. But,
> in
> > > the end, it was Washington's evaluation which was the "official" one
and
> > > was the only one allowed to be used by FEC in its own planning.<<
> >
> > That may be the "official" line but in reality, MacArthur generally made
> > his operational decisions on what his staff told him was happening, not
on
> > what Washington told him was happening.
> >
> > > >>Yes, Willoughby did send a field analysis that the CHICOM's captured
> were
> > >advisors or the like, but, under the procedures in use at the time,
this
> > >only counted as a helpful suggestion. The official take was that made
in
> > >Washington and was based not just on tactical intelligence but also on
a
> > >much broader scope of information. Thus, the CIA, State, and DoD
> received
> > >FEC's report and discounted it in its entirety -- at one point, the CIA
> > >denied that ANY CHICOM's had been encountered and it was only an offer
by
> > >Willoughby to send some of the captured Chinese to Washington which
> forced
> > >the point.<<
> >
> > As always, egos and agendas at play. <G>
> >
> > Ed
> > Ed Evanhoe, PO Box 916, Antlers, OK, 74523-0916
> > Author: DARKMOON: Eighth Army Special Operations in the Korean War
> > Co-author: KOREAN WAR ORDER OF BATTLE 1950-1953 (Dec, 2002)
> > Life Member: Special Forces & Special Operations Associations
> > Web site: http://www.korean-war.com Co-list owner KOREAN-WAR-L
> >
>