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Diegos and Cookies data are strikingly similar
coming from two different POV...
In a way the Migs were cherry picking our
aircraft.
Anything slower then the F86 was a good
target....
They already saw what happened to the NK airforce
and
knew better not to employ a lesser aircraft. Then again
the Russian, Chinese and NK pilots gave a good
accounting.
Though ultimately I think we did eeek by a 2:1
air to air kill ratio.
Ironically this was the same or similar air loss
ratio the Russians
had in WW2 against the allies.
However, the Russians developed excellent
tactics in WW2 and employed them in Korea.
This was implemented with the US Made P39's in WW2
in the Cucaus area
The Russians would stack several layers of
planes.
I think the term used was Book Shelving...or Book
Stacking..I forgot the exact term.
Our Sabers stumbled in a climb about 7000ft/min ...
The Migs 11,000ft/min..
The Migs could not sustain a long dive, high
mach, but could climb.
The opposite for the Saber as it could manage a
sustained dive but not climb.
Thus setting the fighting tactics for each
plane.
Mig handled better at very high altitude the Saber
lower. Mig was a lot lighter ..
The Migs tactic was to Rake Down or Up.. but
through their targets and leave.
Their approach speed was at a moderate speed.
It was easier to hit a target this way.
Then hit the Throttle in the dive and pull up.
Thereby Avoiding a
Dogfight...Climbing back to altitude...(Roost...) Repeat the
maneuver..
You see so much better from above and can force
your opponenet away from the fight.
A fighter escorting a bomber at 300 knots would get
waxed if not in high SA mode.
Most of these were the F84's and could not climb or
outrun the Mig.
Unless the Mig turned back in the flow of UN
fighters where the F84 could close the gap.
Even our own data states we lost a lot of planes in
Air ro Air combat.
Also I feel that many of the planes lost to
non-related combat accidents
were actually a result of combat damage.
Just the way they reported the
data..then.
DF
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Thursday, December 26, 2002 11:58
AM
Subject: Re: Almighty?
My own 2 cents: the Communist air effort had only
one significant impact, preventing B-29's operating in daylight with
acceptable losses, "acceptable" under the circumstances of availability
of B-29's and what they were accomplishing. Then as Sandy says there was a
see-sawing of advantage in B-29 night raids which ended with the Commuist side
basically unable to inflict further losses after the crisis of turn of yr
52-53. *But* one big factor in that refusal of Russians to commit radar
equipped MiG's of which they had a few already.
Otherwise losses inflicted by MiG's just not that
significant. That's partly based on my respectful disagreement with Cookie, I
think air-air losses were much closer to the 150 or so reported by the UN
than 400. Even at the latter figure it's a small % of overall losses. As
far as fighter-bomber ops I doubt there would have been much difference with
no Communist air opposition. Indeed as noted, there was hardly any as it was
over the great majority of the geographic area of NK.
Joe
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Thursday, December 26, 2002 5:35
AM
Subject: Re: Almighty?
In a message dated
12/25/02 8:43:10 PM Pacific Standard Time, wanaki@infi.net writes:
FEAF had air superiority behind the MLR but only temporarily
on the other side of it, based on who was flying that day. The significant
indicators that they did not have air supremacy are the gradual changeover
of B-29 mission tasks to night operations and in favorable conditions
(e.g. weather favoring blind bombing with radar as the searchlights were
ineffective under such conditions.)
Cookie,
This is true. And the B-29 raids got more costly as time went on.
After sustained losses in June 1952, escorts were authorized. In July,
Marine F7F's from VMF(N) 513 were used as escorts, but they didn't prove
effective against the Communist jet night fighters. In November 1952, the
Marine squadron received F3D Skyknights. These proved to be so
effective that they were the preferred aircraft for this mission.
The
USAF had F-94B's as interceptors in South Korea, but because of their
advanced technical capabilities, the USAF didn't want to risk them in North
Korea. In November 1952 this was changed by the Air Force Chief of Staff
ordered them to be assigned to join the escorts.
However, the
Communists continued to shoot down B-29's and USAF planners figured that
there were two Communist night fighter forces. One to decoy the escorts
away, while a second force hovered overhead waiting to pounce on the
bombers. So, Bomber Command requested that Skyknights fly 2,000 to 3,000
feet above the bombers, while flights of F-94's flew ahead of the B-29's.
This arrangement proved to be the key to protection of the B-29's.
Sandy
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