Diegos and Cookies data are strikingly similar
coming from two different POV...
In a way the Migs were cherry picking our
Anything slower then the F86 was a good
They already saw what happened to the NK
knew better not to employ a lesser aircraft. Then again
the Russian, Chinese and NK pilots gave a good
Though ultimately I think we did eeek by a
2:1 air to air kill ratio.
Ironically this was the same or similar air
loss ratio the Russians
had in WW2 against the allies.
However, the Russians developed excellent
tactics in WW2 and employed them in Korea.
This was implemented with the US Made P39's in
WW2 in the Cucaus area
The Russians would stack several layers of
I think the term used was Book Shelving...or
Book Stacking..I forgot the exact term.
Our Sabers stumbled in a climb about 7000ft/min
... The Migs 11,000ft/min..
The Migs could not sustain a long dive, high
mach, but could climb.
The opposite for the Saber as it could manage a
sustained dive but not climb.
Thus setting the fighting tactics for each
Mig handled better at very high altitude the
Saber lower. Mig was a lot lighter
The Migs tactic was to Rake Down or Up.. but
through their targets and leave.
Their approach speed was at a moderate
speed. It was easier to hit a target this way.
Then hit the Throttle in the dive and pull up.
a Dogfight...Climbing back to altitude...(Roost...) Repeat the
You see so much better from above and can force
your opponenet away from the fight.
A fighter escorting a bomber at 300 knots would
get waxed if not in high SA mode.
Most of these were the F84's and could not
climb or outrun the Mig.
Unless the Mig turned back in the flow of UN
fighters where the F84 could close the gap.
Even our own data states we lost a lot of
planes in Air ro Air combat.
Also I feel that many of the planes lost to
non-related combat accidents
were actually a result of combat damage.
Just the way they reported the
Original Message -----
Thursday, December 26, 2002 11:58 AM
My own 2 cents: the Communist air effort had
only one significant impact, preventing B-29's operating in daylight with
acceptable losses, "acceptable" under the circumstances of
availability of B-29's and what they were accomplishing. Then as Sandy
says there was a see-sawing of advantage in B-29 night raids which ended
with the Commuist side basically unable to inflict further losses after
the crisis of turn of yr 52-53. *But* one big factor in that refusal of
Russians to commit radar equipped MiG's of which they had a few
Otherwise losses inflicted by MiG's just not
that significant. That's partly based on my respectful disagreement with
Cookie, I think air-air losses were much closer to the 150 or so reported
by the UN than 400. Even at the latter figure it's a small % of
overall losses. As far as fighter-bomber ops I doubt there would have been
much difference with no Communist air opposition. Indeed as noted, there
was hardly any as it was over the great majority of the geographic area of
Original Message -----
Thursday, December 26, 2002 5:35 AM
In a message
dated 12/25/02 8:43:10 PM Pacific Standard Time, firstname.lastname@example.org writes:
FEAF had air superiority behind the MLR but only
temporarily on the other side of it, based on who was flying that day.
The significant indicators that they did not have air supremacy are
the gradual changeover of B-29 mission tasks to night operations and
in favorable conditions (e.g. weather favoring blind bombing with
radar as the searchlights were ineffective under such conditions.)
This is true. And the B-29 raids
got more costly as time went on. After sustained losses in June 1952,
escorts were authorized. In July, Marine F7F's from VMF(N) 513 were used
as escorts, but they didn't prove effective against the Communist jet
night fighters. In November 1952, the Marine squadron received F3D
Skyknights. These proved to be so effective that they were the
preferred aircraft for this mission.
The USAF had F-94B's as
interceptors in South Korea, but because of their advanced technical
capabilities, the USAF didn't want to risk them in North Korea. In
November 1952 this was changed by the Air Force Chief of Staff ordered
them to be assigned to join the escorts.
However, the Communists
continued to shoot down B-29's and USAF planners figured that there were
two Communist night fighter forces. One to decoy the escorts away, while
a second force hovered overhead waiting to pounce on the bombers. So,
Bomber Command requested that Skyknights fly 2,000 to 3,000 feet above
the bombers, while flights of F-94's flew ahead of the B-29's. This
arrangement proved to be the key to protection of the B-29's.