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Re: A point of interest
From The Official Army History of the Korean War
Chapter 21: The Last Offensive
"In the matter of close air support, the negotiations played a less important role. Air Force, Navy, and Marine fighters and fighter-bombers continued to strike enemy troops and strongpoints whenever opportunity arose. During April, Navy and Marine pilots concentrated on Cherokee-type missions against targets that were out of reach of the artillery. They discovered that making successive runs in the same area for several days allowed them to become familiar with the terrain and tended to muzzle the antiaircraft fire in that vicinity. Evidently the Communists gunners could not be resupplied quickly and once they had fired the shells on hand were forced to sit and watch the attacks helplessly."
"The new 25th Division sector was generally east of Panmunjom and northeast of Munsan-ni. On low hills, approximately ten miles northeast of Panmunjom and the same distance north of Munsan-ni, lay a series of outposts called the NEVADA Complex. (See Map 8.) General Williams assigned the responsibility for the defense of these positions and neighboring outposts, BERLIN and EAST BERLIN, to the attached Turkish Armed Forces Command under Brig. Gen. Sirri Acar on 5 May."
It had been a bitter struggle as the losses on each side attested. Over 117,000 rounds of artillery fire and 67 close air support missions had aided the UNC ground units in withstanding the determined assaults of the Chinese. The enemy had sent 65,000 rounds of artillery and mortar fire in return, up to this point an unprecedented volume in the Korean War.
"To General Taylor, as he watched the enemy gather strength for offensive action in the early days of June, the weakest links in the Eighth Army line lay in the U.S. I and IX Corps areas. As he pointed out to Clark on 2 June, the UNC positions north of the Imjin and Hant'an Rivers had not been chosen fox their defensive strength. Relatively shallow penetrations would force the UNC to pull back behind the rivers and the enemy had the capability to push the Eighth Army troops back if he desired to expend the effort. In this event, Taylor continued, he would have to face the alternative of conceding the lost territory or of making costly counterattacks to regain the positions. Taylor was ready for an offensive and had alerted the reserves, increased photo reconnaissance by the Fifth Air Force, and enlarged the stockage of ammunition, but the problem of how long the Eighth Army should cling to present battle lines in the face of intense pressure remained to be settled."
The Communists, however, did not choose to take advantage of the defensive weaknesses of the Eighth Army in the west. Instead they began to attack the eastern and central sectors of the line, where the ROK forces were concentrated."
The FEAF was anything but quiet during the months of June and July 1953. On June 15 FEAF flew 2,143 various sorties, "the largest single day effort in the war. Task Force 77 broke all records by flying 532 combat sorties," and 1st MAW from land bases and carriers established a new record with 478 sorties. "Fifth Air Force flew 859 sorties against the Chinese troops, and this continued until 8th Army lines were stabilized.
On one day, 30 June 1953, VMA-121, dropped 156 tons of bombs of bombs on Communist troops in four strike missions, setting a record for single engine prop aircraft in the war. The effort was the result of all hands, clerks, staff, and cooks participating in loading ordnance. And that was just one Marine squadron.
"For the entire month of June FEAF flew in excess of 7,000 close air support sorties. 1st MAW flew 1,348 sorties "and friendly foreign aircraft flew an additional 537 . . ." During the month 49% of all FEAF combat sorties were involved in close air support missions.
Artillery fired between April and July:
UNC 105 mm and above