Re: Korean War & Vietnam War

[Ed Evanhoe <evanhoe@arbuckleonline.com>]

Robert,

>>At 07:52 PM 12/28/2002 -0700, you wrote:
> Well Cookie, either you didn,t read the same archievs I did, and were not 
> around in the period following the end of WW2, or you fail to factor in 
> the reasons the Soviets provided the best WW2 weaponry to the NKPA, and 
> the US refused to do the same for the South, much less the fact that 
> Soviet Advisors helped develop the strategy for the move south.<<
Strange.  Wonder where the "best WW2 weaponry" went to?  I certainly don't 
consider Mosin-Nagant 7.62 rifle and carbine (like the M-1 we gave the 
South Koreans, it was too long of a stock for the average NK or Chinese 
soldier to shoot properly), PpSh machine pistols, the DS M1939 heavy 
machine gun, the M1910 Maxim wheel mounted machine gun, and the like 
particulary "good" infantry weapons.  And this is what the Soviets gave 
North Korea.  True, they furnished a very good tank, the T-34, and a 
relatively good SP gun, the Su-76 but in only limited numbers.  IIRC the 
count at the beginning of the war was 112 T-34's in Korea.  They supplied a 
couple hundred more as the war went along but by then the 3.5" Bazooka and 
the 75mm recoilless rifle firing HEAT was more than a match for the T-34 
and the Su-76, to say nothing of 105's and the 90mm tubes on M-46 and M-47 
firing HEAT.)

> >>The prodding of Stalin and Mao's own Military Romanticisim brought 
> China into the war, with the strategy being to draw the UN deeply into 
> the North, isolate the Marine Division, and employ two armies to destroy 
> it in detail.<<
Disagree.   China had driven the Nationalist Chinese to Formosa (Taiwan) 
the previous year, war lords and small bands of Nationalist still roamed 
the countryside and much of the country had yet to consolidated under 
communist rule, especially in southern China, plus the threat of the 
Nationalists returning to mainland still existed, and that was where the 
majority of their best troops were located. China did not want to fight in 
Korea but did not want American troops on its border where they could open 
a second front in support of the Nationalist returning.  Thus, as the NKPA 
collapsed and American troops approached the Yalu, China felt it had to 
stop American advance to protect itself.

> >>  Gen. Peng was convinced the lightly armed ROK ellements would readily 
> collapse and be routed , and the Army units tied to roads could be 
> ambushed, cut off and effectively destroyed or rendered combat 
> ineffective. With a Marine Division destroyed, which had never happened 
> before, and the casualty count from defeated Army formations, the US 
> would lose it's zeal for war and sue for peace. China would gain 
> tremendous prestige , and Korea would be united as a Communist Country. 
> Having failed to secure the Northern Boarder and being therefore 
> vulnerable to infiltration of a battlefield not properly isolated, the 
> divided UN Forces were positioned for defeat.<<
Agree this was what the Chinese wanted to do.  Peng was right about the ROK 
forces and about ambushing road-bound troops as they withdrew but didn't 
have the logistics to carry it through to a successful conclusion.  As a 
matter of fact, 8th Army was able to withdraw most of its forces intact 
from their part of North Korea, the exceptions being the 2nd Infantry 
Division and Turkish Brigade, both of which were pretty well chopped up at 
Kunu-ri and running "The Gauntlet" between Kunu-ri and P'yongyang.  Troops 
from the 1st Cav and 24th withdrew down the west coast highway with minimal 
problems and casualties.

Ed

Ed Evanhoe, PO Box 916, Antlers, OK, 74523-0916
Author: DARKMOON: Eighth Army Special Operations in the Korean War
Co-author: KOREAN WAR ORDER OF BATTLE 1950-1953 (Dec, 2002)
Life Member: Special Forces & Special Operations Associations
Web site:  http://www.korean-war.com  Co-list owner KOREAN-WAR-L