"Secrets of the Korean War"

[Mike Yared <mikeyared@yahoo.com>]

U.S. News & World Report
August 9, 1993
SECTION: WORLD REPORT; Vol. 115, No. 6; Pg. 45
HEADLINE: Secrets of the Korean War
BYLINE: By Douglas Stanglin; Peter Cary
DATELINE: Moscow
HIGHLIGHT:
Forty years later, evidence points to Stalin's deep
involvement

BODY:
Locked away in a safe in the headquarters of the
Russian General Staff in Moscow is a highly unusual
map. It was drawn up in 1950 by Joseph Stalin's
military advisers. Stalin himself approved the map --
and the routes inscribed on it showing how North
Korean troops would invade South Korea. The map is the
centerpiece of a newly emerging body of evidence that
should put to rest forever the myth that the Soviet
Union was only a bystander in the bitter conflict on
the Korean peninsula. The war claimed 33,651 American
lives.

It has been 40 years since the armistice was signed
that ended the war, but only now is Moscow's role in
the conflict becoming fully appreciated. In the years
since the war's conclusion, U.S. intelligence agencies
developed evidence suggesting deep Soviet involvement
in the conflict, but the issue was submerged as
Washington and Moscow sought to avoid confrontation.
An early-1950s document from the National Security
Council, for instance, states that U.S. officials
"should not refer to the U.S.S.R. as an aggressor in
Korea." "We knew who was running the show," complains
Philip Corso, a retired Army lieutenant colonel who
worked in the White House after collecting
intelligence in Korea. "But the powers-that-be back
here didn't want to talk about it." 

The new evidence comes from recently opened Russian
archives and from research by Russian and American
historians. American authorities say some of the new
information fills important gaps in the historical
record; other material raises new questions to be
explored. In interviews with U.S. News, a number of
Soviet officials with knowledge of Moscow's role in
the Korean War spoke publicly about the subject for
the first time. One was a Soviet military historian
who had access to a secret "Pentagon Papers"-type
study of the war ordered by Nikita Khrushchev. Among
their claims:

The original war plan, which was approved by Moscow,
called for a one-week conflict. The North Koreans were
to seize Seoul within three days and all of South
Korea within seven days.

Stalin severely reprimanded North Korean leader Kim Il
Sung for answering "not yet" when he was asked whether
his forces were prepared for the invasion of the
south. Kim was forced to sit outside the office of the
furious Stalinfor hours until Kim changed his answer.

Soviet pilots battled the U.S. Air Force in the early
months in the skies over Korea using planes
transported secretly to air bases along the Manchurian
border. The Soviet pilots wore Chinese uniforms and
were trained to use Chinese phrases on their radios to
mask their involvement in the war.

As part of Stalin's plan to create a client state of
North Korea, 15,000 to 20,000 Soviet citizens who were
ethnically Korean were sent back to Korea from 1945 to
1948. Many assumed high positions in the North Korean
military and government, including 2,000 to 3,000
military specialists.

Kim Il Sung was handpicked by Stalin to lead North
Korea over a number of other contenders, including Pak
Hon-Yong, an ardent Communist whom Kim later purged.
Kim learned of his selection by Stalin at a meeting in
the Soviet city of Khabarovsk early in 1945. The
Soviet military personnel file on Kim shows he had a
Soviet Army commission and had lived in Russia.
Sources say he even fathered a daughter -- last known
to be in Leningrad -- by a woman with whom he was
living. At the meeting in Khabarovsk, a Soviet general
told Kim he had been chosen for a "new assignment" in
North Korea. Next, Kim showed up in North Korea in
September 1945, escorted by Soviet military officers.

Uncle Joe's role. A primary source of the new
information is Gavril Korotkov, a former Soviet
intelligence officer now with Russia's Institute of
Military History. Korotkov has just completed a
manuscript on Stalin entitled "Generalissimo's Last
War." He began his research 40 years ago, quietly
interviewing participants even during the war, and
later interviewed the Korean War era chief of the
Soviet General Staff and Gen. Nikolai Lomov, who was
head of the General Staff's Far East department.
Korotkov's sources provide details from several
critical war-planning sessions in Moscow. The first
occurred in March 1949. Kim's Moscow visit that year
was publicized, but what happened at the meetings
between Kim and Soviet leaders has never been
revealed. At one session, Korotkov's sources say, Kim
was briefed by Defense Minister Marshal Nikolai
Bulganin on what he was to tell Stalin about the need
for an invasion of the south. Kim met with Stalin the
following day, March 6, according to General Lomov,
and the Soviet premier pledged to send several of his
top advisers to help plan the invasion. "We can't
solve the problem of Korea with the Americans," Stalin
told Kim, according to Korotkov's sources. "We have to
solve it ourselves. We can't use Soviet troops, that's
clear. But you -- with the state and government and
Army -- you can do it."

On March 12, Kim met again with Marshal Bulganin and a
group of Soviet admirals and generals. This session
would be devoted to more detailed planning of the war
effort. Korotkov says he saw Bulganin's report of that
meeting. In the text, Korotkov says, "you can feel the
urgency of preparing the Army for the offensive."

Kim returned to Moscow again in February 1950. This
time the visit was secret. General Lomov, who was in
the room at the time, described the scene to Korotkov:
Kim told Stalin that he was not ready to invade,
because China's Mao Zedong had not returned two Korean
divisions that he held for a planned -- but canceled
-- attack on Taiwan. The Soviet premier was furious at
the delay. "Stalin told Kim that they were ready to
start the fighting and couldn't wait," Korotkov
explains. Stalin ordered Kim to "go sit down in the
reception room and think it over." Kim was invited
back only after a long delay. Korotkov recalls what
happened next: "Stalin told [Kim] that he should be
ready in May -- not later. Kim replied that he would
be ready."

Stalin would approve the invasion plan six weeks after
this meeting. At the last minute, however, the
invasion was postponed from May until June 25, because
Mao was slow to return the two borrowed Korean
divisions.

Not all historians are readily convinced by the new
information. Kathryn Weathersby, an assistant
professor from Florida State University now doing
research in Moscow, says the warmongering Stalin
described by Korotkov is at variance with references
in the Russian archives to 50 cables in which Kim
repeatedly urged Stalin to support North Korea's
invasion. But she and other historians acknowledge
there is a growing body of evidence to show that
Stalin -- even if reluctant -- became deeply involved
in the actual war plans.

A secret air war. The new material, for instance,
indicates massive Soviet assistance to the North
Korean war effort. From 1946 to 1949, the Korean Army
was built up with Soviet tanks, field artillery and
aircraft. It was rebuilt after the U.S.
counteroffensive, in the fall of 1950. A still secret
Soviet report values the equipment at 1 billion
rubles, most of which the Koreans received at no cost.

At the start of the air war, the Soviets provided
virtually all the Communist aircraft; even after the
Chinese entry on North Korea's side in late 1950,
Moscow provided half of the planes fighting the United
States. All told, Moscow assigned some 5,000 airmen to
what would become essentially a two-year air war
between Soviet and American pilots. In a series of
articles, Lt. Gen. Georgi Lobov, then commander of the
64th Fighter Air Corps, which fought in North Korea,
details Soviet tactics. Soviet fighters were
effective, Lobov says, because American fighter
escorts had to fly as slowly as the bombers, and the
Soviets were able to slash into the formations in
high-speed attacks. Despite the Soviets' being
outnumbered by American planes by 8 or 10 to 1, Lobov
claims that 1,300 U.S. planes were shot down in
air-to-air combat or by antiair artillery. The number
squares with U.S. estimates.

Dogfights. In a lengthy interview, Yevgeni Pepelyaev
offers a firsthand account of the secret air war. A
fighter pilot who would be honored as a Hero of
theSoviet Union for shoot-ing down 20 American planes,
Pepelyaev says he was "volunteered" in the fall of
1950 to go to Korea, ostensibly to train Korean
pilots. In April 1951, Pepelyaev says, he was thrust
into combat. In 10 months, the decorated airman
recalls, his pilots averaged 120 combat operations;
some flew as many as 150 missions.Pepelyaev racked up
108 combat flights himself;of those, 38 involved
dogfights.

The Soviets went to extraordinary lengths to hide
their involvement. They painted Chinese insignia on
all their planes, then changed some to North Korean.
One result was great confusion in the air, says
Valentin Golubev, then a Soviet Air Force mechanic.
Soviet pilots were also issued Chinese uniforms, with
red high-topped boots that blew off if a pilot
ejected. On combat missions, the Soviet crews were
supposed to speak Chinese. "We got an order from our
senior bosses and a list of commands in Chinese,"
Pepelyaev recalls. "It worked until the first real
fight in the air, when we forgot not only our Chinese
commands but Russian words too -- except for dirty
language."

For all their efforts, the involvement of the Soviets
was an open secret. Says Pepelyaev: "The Americans
knew perfectly well all about us." And Golubev, the
mechanic: "I remember some representative at the U.N.
always raising this question of Russians fighting in
Korea, but our Soviet authorities always just denied
that."

The Soviets also got involved with prisoners of war.
Korotkov and Col. Alexander Orlov, also an
intelligence officer, say that about 80 Soviet
specialists were involved in direct interrogations of
Americans. Korotkov says he twice interrogated
Americans, mainly about their backgrounds. He
remembers talking to one American for over an hour:
"Our plain goal was to try to recruit him, to get him
to work for us. We didn't have any luck with the
Americans. They were very secure and were sure they
would be rescued and get back to the States."

Unfortunately, for many that did not happen. During
the Korean War, 10,218 Americans were taken prisoner;
of those, 3,746 returned. Colonel Corso, who was the
chief of the Special Projects Branch of Far East
Command intelligence, says he had firm knowledge of at
least 500 sick and wounded POWs who were not returned
by the North Koreans. It is possible, Corso says, that
thousands of living prisoners did not come home. For
that, Corso says, U.S. policy makers must shoulder the
blame for not pursuing the early evidence of Soviet
involvement more aggressively. Concludes Corso: "What
you have there is all true."

GRAPHIC: Pictures: Secret warrior. Valentin Golubev,
then a Soviet Air Force mechanic, says his Korean War
role was so secret he was never allowed to wear the
medal he got from the Chinese. (Nikolai Ignatiev --
Network/Matrix for USN&WR); Pictures: Interrogator.
Col. Alexander Orlov, a Soviet intelligence officer,
says he prepared technical questions to be asked of
American POWs. Other Soviets questioned the POWs
directly. (Nikolai Ignatiev -- Network/Matrix for
USN&WR); Pictures: Ace pilot. Yevgeni Pepelyaev, who
shot down 20 enemy planes, was "volunteered" to
secretly fight in the Korean War. "We were told we
were the good guys, defending North Koreans," he says.
(Nikolai Ignatiev -- Network/Matrix for USN&WR);
Picture, Invasion map. A copy of the map that Stalin
approved shows the planned invasion. The original is
locked in a safe in Moscow. (Photo by Jeffrey
MacMillan -- USN&WR); Pictures: Players. Stalin
(above); Molotov (left), Kim Il Sung and Bulganin in
Moscow in 1953 (Sovfoto) 

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