Re: Korean War Airpower

[<Cfbernard@aol.com>]

You all,

I can't find what I wrote about the four Australian Mustangs that strafed us (Task Force Smith) at Pyongtaek for about 25 minutes on 3 July, 1950.  The only man of ours they hit was a sergeant who climbed under the mess truck.  Those of us in our well prepared holes were immune to their attack.  My enduring concern is how long it took the North Koreans (and the VietCong) to learn this.

I have found another comment partially made about misdirected air attacks on Love Company a week later.  This is drawn from our history, LOVE, Labor and Laughter.

Example: he (Hugh Brown) burned the first tank we killed an hour after we had wasted its crew.  He had poked his carbine's muzzle through the pistol port they opened to shoot us off the back of their tank; the ricochets took out the crew.  I asked why he was burning it as the crew was already dead.  His answer: "I want them others to know where this one is, what happened to it, and for them to be discouraged about fighting us.''
 
     The weakness in his theory was the noxious brown trail of smoke that helped our Air Force pilots see it.  They strafed it in the middle of our position for the next two hours!  We were dug in so well by then that none of us were hit.  DOUBLE LESSON: dig yourself in if anyone's aircraft are in the area, as they do not discriminate very well; do not ever believe your own airplanes will solve problems with your enemies' dug-in infantry.  This only works s in Hollywood.  Note also, their infantry learned very quickly to dig in i.e.,neutralizing much of the advantage we thought our airplanes were providing.

      We found Hugh was a deserter when we proposed a battle-field commission for him while we were still on the Naktong.  He left a hospital without permission after his second wound in late September, because being promoted required 30 days on the line; he did not want to return to Japan as the junior officer in the company (we innocents thought the war was over after Seoul was retaken.)

     My objective is not to tell war stories, but to use my experience, observations, and exposure to help soldiers and Marines understand and prepare for the world in which they may work.  General Ridgway called this "the aimed fire war."  I want to help fighters think about what it takes to meet their greatest possible responsibility, i.e., leading their fellows for some of the last minutes of their lives.  The nature of the work means that the leaders of fighters are themselves vulnerable, even short-lived.  

Men fight for their comrades, the men with them when this is going on.  They do not fight for the nation's larger and more glorious goals.  N.B., the "fighting" that I speak of is the intimate horror that only walking infantry are exposed to and must endure.  My definition is: "crawling on your belly like a reptile close enough to throw a grenade at some hostile wretch with a working machine gun." This narrow view includes one of you throwing the grenade, and the other standing up and shooting the gunner when he swings his tube around to kill the guy who threw it.  Remember also that machine gunners come with crews; the reason they are still alive is they know and are prepared for your form of attack.  The price for being outfought is pretty high, and very conclusive!