Re: Kunu Ri Pass

[<ChosinMead@aol.com>]

Ed, there is nothing in my message to suggest I said it was done without the help of the other branches of the service. Do you mean to suggest that the 8th Army did not have the same assistance available to them? If the assistance was so crucial, and played such an important part- how come the 8th Army did not get the same results as did 10th Corps?
True, the Marines did not do it all by themselves, but they did coordinate and implement the services of the other branches.
True, without the Army Dropping the Baily bridges, we would never had gotten our dead and materiel out- But you are mistaken to suggest that we wouldn't have gotten out. There was a trail around the collapsed bridge that we would have used to get ourselves and our wounded out.
"The Army troops who kept the South end open" - The 3rd ID was holding the Hungnam perimeter, that was their assignment, and they did it well, but they never advanced further north than Chinhungni. By the time we reached Chinhungni, the Chinese had virtually ceased operations- they were content to let us leave. To give you some idea of the difficulty holding the Hungnam perimeter, the best statistics I can find is that the 3 rd ID experienced a total of 16 KIA's for the entire campaign.
< unmentioned help the weather provided since it affected Chinese operations as badly as it did UN operations>
Yes, it did affect our operations, but it didn't stop us from coming out in an orderly fashion, with our dead, wounded and materiel. Does this suggest that the weather did not effect the operations of the Chinese against the 8th Army.
Since the original writer (and you) chose to make a comparison, then how is it that both the 10th Corps and the 8th Army had the same assistance, faced the same enemy- who were effected equally by the weather- and yet had very different results? I suppose it was better press!
Another unmentioned factor: The figures for the battle of the Chosin range from 60,000 to 120,000 Chinese (depending on who you believe) versus 15,000 Marines and soldiers. At any rate, they were outnumbered at least 4-1. Conversely, the 118,000 man 8th Army was attacked by the 118,000 man Chinese and Korean Army. Keeping in mind the rule of thumb that an attacking force needs at least a 3-1 advantage- In western Korea, the Communists did not have that advantage, yet they were successful.
PLease don't get on my case for this controversy- I didn't start it, but I was not about to let a slight go unchallanged. Lee N. Mead