RE: Kunu Ri Pass

[Mike Davino <mdavino@yahoo.com>]

Gene,

Was it the assistant division commander, Brigadier
General Bradley, who gave Colonel Freeman the OK to
withdraw using that route?

Mike Davino


--- walter e wallis <unclgene@pacbell.net> wrote:
> I was at Kunu Ri with the 23rd Infantry. The reason
> the 2nd Division -23rd
> took the road they did was that the river road was
> parallel to the front and
> there was just as much [or little] reason to expect
> the enemy had already
> cut that exit. I was at the Regimental voice radio
> when Col. Freeman finally
> made contact with Division. He sought, and was given
> permission, to take the
> river road. Had that road been cut, my life would
> have been a little
> different.
> We did have some air support. A P51 strafing
> Chinamen's Cap overshot the
> target a bit and gave me that thrill of a lifetime,
> incoming 50's.
> While I am not interested in a pissing contest with
> the Jarheads, I will
> only remind them that, after our heavy losses from
> Kunu Ri, we were still
> back on line in time to break the back of the
> Chinese advance at Chipyongni.
> Where were the Marines in February?
> 
> Gene
> 
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-KOREAN-WAR-L@listproc.cc.ku.edu
> [mailto:owner-KOREAN-WAR-L@listproc.cc.ku.edu]On
> Behalf Of Les Hanson
> Sent: Monday, June 16, 2003 12:54 PM
> To: KOREAN-WAR-L@listproc.cc.ku.edu
> Subject: Re: Kunu Ri Pass
> 
> 
> History channel
>                 Right now Korean way
>  EST 3:52
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Ed Evanhoe" <evanhoe@arbuckleonline.com>
> To: <KOREAN-WAR-L@listproc.cc.ku.edu>
> Sent: Monday, June 16, 2003 12:16 PM
> Subject: Re: Kunu Ri Pass
> 
> 
> > Lee,
> >
> > I wasn't suggesting the Marines didn't do a
> bang-up job of the withdrawal,
> > only pointing out others were involved in helping
> the Marines withdraw.
> >
> > As for the adverse weather,  if Chinese statements
> are to be believed the
> > cold kept them from deploying all the forces they
> originally intended and
> > it slowed down their planned advance, thus leaving
> them unable to close
> the
> > exit route completely.
> >
> > As for the withdrawal from Kunu-ri, it was a total
> CHARLIE FOXTROT. In the
> > first place instead of trying to exit on a narrow,
> one-lane, winding
> > mountain road the 2ID could have exited Kunu-ri
> via the Kunu-ri-Anju
> > highway and then south down the main Antung, China
> - P'yongyang highway as
> > other US & ROKA units/divisions did and brought
> out most of the equipment
> > and people.  However the 2ID command staff decided
> there would be too much
> > traffic using this route and chose the
> Kunu-ri-P'yongyang mountain road
> > instead, not knowing the Chinese already had
> occupied the mountains on
> both
> > sides overlooking that road because the Chinese
> didn't reveal their
> > presence when 2ID recon parties checked the road
> out. In fact, they
> allowed
> > the advance party through so they could draw the
> main body into a classic
> > trap.  The only thing that save the 2ID/Turks from
> being totally wiped out
> > was the Chinese had only the ammunition they
> brought with them when they
> > infiltrated on foot and did not have a re-supply,
> thus could not support a
> > sustained firefight.
> >
> > The air support was non-existent on the west coast
> from 28 Nov through 3
> > Dec 1950 because that entire area was socked in
> with low clouds (which
> also
> > helped hid the Chinese from view when the recon
> parties checked out the
> > road/pass south of Kunu-ri.)
> >
> > And so it went......
> >
> > Ed
> > Ed Evanhoe, PO Box 916, Antlers, OK, 74523-0916
> > Life Member: Special Forces & Special Operations
> Associations
> > Author:  DARKMOON:  Eighth Army Special Operations
> in the Korean War
> >
> 


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