|
Mr. Joe Brennan
stated that he did not think that the Soviets/Chinese were very vulnerable
to any *non-nuclear* attack by the US on the Asian landmass, esp. one coming out
of Korea. On the contrary, it was just this nuclear big-stick that these two
powers were trying to avoid in an outright confrontation.
When the NSC
paper about the possible use of a "nuke" on Shanghai was leaked, though this
paper was never given any real consideration at the time, this was what it took
to get the PRC to push through the cease-fire talks in Korea in
1953.
Truman's and Eisenhower/Dulles' "brinkmanship" with
respect of the nukes were what kept China from moving on Taiwan in 1949, 1953
and 1956. There are many sources about these matters that support how close we
came to dropping the BIG ONE, of our limited inventory, during this
period.
What does become clear through all of this is that
Stalin and Mao were willing to trade off local forces for bigger gains
internationally. China clearly still thinks that it won the Korean war because
it gave them international prestige at Geneva in 1954.
Another factor that seemed to limit the Soviet
projection of power during this time period was that Korea was consuming far too
much of Russia's gross national product, to the point that the Five Year Plan
had still not been implemented since the end of WW-II. Though Stalin was able to
place pressure through proxy states to achieve his international aims, there
still was a limit to how much material that they could just give
away.
In the end though it must be remembered that the
Cold War was won by the US outspending the communist's ability to counter our
production capabilities for defense. And, the PRC is still not willing to move
overtly against the Spratley Islands or Taiwan as long as it thinks that this
would result in an open confrontation with the United
States.
|